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On the eve of the Iraq war in March 2003, Tony Blair appeared on British television to make 
a sombre address to his nation. His words were firm and resolute:  
 
…this new world faces a new threat: of disorder and chaos born either of brutal states 
like Iraq, armed with weapons of mass destruction; or of extreme terrorist groups. 
Both hate our way of life, our freedom, our democracy (TB-20.03.03).  
 
The language of Blair is striking. Iraq is a ‘brutal state’, a country of ‘chaos’ and ‘disorder’, 
armed with ‘weapons of mass destruction’; a country that threatens nothing short of ‘our’ very 
existence. The ideological purpose is clear: to create a significant distance between ‘us’, as 
‘freedom fighters’, and ‘them’ as ‘extreme terrorists’. The means to serve this ideological 
purpose is language, in this instance, both through a vivid lexicalisation and a wider 
ideological polarisation of ‘us’ and ‘them’.  
 
Blair’s address came at the most critical time of his reign as Prime Minister. For more than a 
year the Sedgefield-born Labour leader had been trying to convince his government, his party 
colleagues and the British public of the need for military action against the Iraqi regime of 
Saddam Hussein. However, opposition was fierce, and Blair was in desperate need of a 
turnaround in public opinion; a turnaround that could justify Britain’s participation in a record 
fifth military operation in just over six years. 
 
In this thesis I propose that the language of Blair and the construction of a discourse of the 
Iraq war played a decisive role in achieving this turnaround1. The discourse was carefully 
considered; in part based on a world-view set out in the early years of Blair’s New Labour 
ivention, and in part, carved out in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September and 
the consequent ‘war on terrorism’2. The aim was clear; to make war in Iraq legitimate and 
justifiable to the British people.  
                                                
1 While Blair is the primary focus in this thesis this does not imply that the Prime Minister acted alone in the 
creation of his discourse. In addition to the influence of Cabinet members and other party associates, Blair and 
New Labour have been known for its consistent use of PR-advisors and media analysts.  
2 New Labour is here associated with Tony Blair’s 1997 election campaign, while ’war on terrorism’ is meant as 
the allied response to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of September 11, 2001, which started 
with military operations in Afghanistan.  
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The media played a crucial role. On the one hand, it represented the most obvious opportunity 
for Blair and his government to communicate directly with the British people. As a result, 
Blair used every chance he had to give speeches, ‘doorstep’ interviews or radio shows. In 
addition, media backing for the war itself, and an acceptance of the Iraq rhetoric and discourse 
of Blair, would indirectly help to convince people that war in Iraq was justifiable. The process 
was not unfamiliar to the Labour government; both Kosovo and Afghanistan had shown that 
the British people were not afraid to accept war if they found it justified.  
 
Iraq was, however, different. While the wars in Kosovo and Afghanistan both had enjoyed 
high public support and an acceptance of government rhetoric, polls in February 2003, just 
one month before the war in Iraq started, showed a public opposition to war of over 50 
percent. To add to Blair’s pressures, his own Labour party was split in two over whether or 
not war was right. At one point the so-called anti-war ‘rebels’ were even believed to be 
outnumbering the Labour Members of Parliament supporting Blair3.  
 
The combination of fierce public and political opposition not only made the issue of Iraq 
controversial, it eventually made the debate over Iraq a battle for Blair’s political future.  
It was a battle where every word counted, where every turn of phrase seemed to matter. But 
most of all, it was a battle to win the hearts and minds of the British people.   
 
1.2 Aims and hypotheses 
 
The thesis is divided into two parts; first, in the identification and analysis of ideological 
language in Tony Blair’s speeches relating to international affairs, and, second, in the analysis 
of newspaper material, both articles and opinion pieces, within the ideological frame set by 
Blair. Accordingly, the over-all purposes of the thesis are: (a) to highlight the ideological and 
semantic implications of the discourse and rhetoric of both Blair/Labour and newspaper 
articles concerning the Iraq war, (b) to compare the discourse of Blair and the Labour 
government with the newspaper discourse, and (c), to compare the pre-war discourse with 
both government and newspaper discourse a year after the war started. 
 
                                                
3 Reported in the Independent, 06.11.08. Opinion polls from ICM/Guardian, see Chapter 3, section 3.3.1.  
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More specifically, the thesis will attempt to show that:  
 
(a) Blair constructs an ideological discourse that attempts to morally and politically justify 
the war in Iraq.  
 
(b) the media played a crucial role in mediating the gap between government and public 
opinion, largely through the acceptance of the ideological language of Blair and his 
government. The media, thus, was a vital part in the legitimisation of the Iraq war. 
 
(c) the Iraq war, and the political fall-out after the initial battle was won, changed the role 
of political discourse and rhetoric, largely through the media and the general public’s 




In the thesis I will make use of two different approaches to political and media analyses: 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and cognitive metaphor theory. Both theoretical 
frameworks are preoccupied with the ideological implications of language use and, thus, both 
approaches share a similar aim to uncover discursively produced political agendas.  
 
Furthermore, both approaches most often take a qualitative approach to analyses. Contrary to 
a quantitative account of lexical items or metaphors where the emphasis is on summarising 
patterns or regularities through counting, the aim of a qualitative approach is to interpret the 
meanings of texts, both in relation to the contexts upon which they are constructed and the 
dependence and interaction between producer, text and consumer (Richardson 2007). Thus, 
the focus is not on finding patterns of language use or a consistent use of metaphors, but try to 
interpret how these patterns or metaphors might work.  
 
The attempt to combine two distinctly different approaches makes the thesis theoretically 
diverse. The different approaches are also multi-faceted in themselves, influenced by media 
analysis, political analysis, sociology, history, critical linguistics and semiotics, to name but a 
few. This wide theoretical inclusion highlights the methodological complexity of political and 
media discourse both in relation to a wider discourse analysis, on the one hand, and metaphor 
analysis, on the other. Both methods of analysis are highly dependent on context; any political 
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and media analysis must be understood in reference to the various contexts they are based on 
(see also further discussion in Chapter 2).  
 
1.4 Material  
 
In the analysis of Blair’s political discourse I have looked at a material ranging from April 
1999 to March 2004 consisting of 6 speeches and 1 press conference. Of these, three are set 
within a time frame of one month before the Iraq war began in March 2003. The speeches and 
press conference transcripts are referenced by codes, which consist of the initials and the date 
of production. Tony Blair’s opening speech at the House of Commons Iraq debate on the 18th 
of March 2003 is, for instance, coded as ‘TB-18.03.03’4 (see primary sources).  
 
The newspaper material is restricted to two different periods. The pre-war articles are taken 
from a timeframe of 10 days before the start of the Iraq war, ranging from the 15th to the 25th 
of March 2003. The post-war articles are taken from the 6th and 7th of March, 2004, in relation 
to Blair’s Sedgefield speech on the 5th of March, almost two weeks prior to the first year 
anniversary of the war. The data is taken from 18 different newspapers, 9 daily papers and 9 
Sunday papers (see primary sources). 
 
The different papers can be classified into three traditional UK groups: broadsheet, mid-
market and tabloid newspapers. While primarily referring to style and profile, the different 
papers are often marked by a clear socio-economic belonging. For instance, the Daily Mirror, 
as a tabloid (or low-market) paper, traditionally entertains a working class readership, whilst 
the longstanding conservative broadsheet the Daily Telegraph, predominantly attracts readers 
from the upper social classes. Additionally, and important to this thesis, the different 
newspapers reflect different political views of the Iraq War, some being supportive of military 
actions, while other stand firmly against any British involvement in operations in Iraq. The 
material is gathered both from online resources, searchable news archives and paper copies 
(Chapter 3 will provide a more thorough account of the various British newspapers). 
  
It is important to note some limitations with respect to the source material. Firstly, the sheer 
volume of articles, speeches and secondary sources in relation to the Iraq war makes any 
attempt to make a fully complete analysis impossible. Although the newspapers do cover a 
                                                
4 One speech by George W. Bush is also considered, referenced by the initials GB.  
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wide spectrum, the do not necessarily reflect all aspects of an extensive Iraq debate. 
Simultaneously, it is important to note the limitations in making any definite claims of how 
government and media discourse function, both separately and relationally. The aim must 
rather be to establish various important themes and discourses that are significant parts of the 
complex interdependence between political governmental rhetoric and newspaper discourse. 
These processes can then be applied in further research.  
 
1.5 Structure of thesis 
 
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 is an overview of the theoretical framework for 
the thesis, divided into two main sections of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (section 2.1) 
and metaphor theory (section 2.2). Chapter 3 focuses on the media, both in regards to the 
theory of media discourse (section 3.1), UK newspapers (section 3.2) and finally, public 
opinion with regard to Iraq (section 3.3). Chapter 4 is an analysis of the international 
discourse of Blair and New Labour, both in relation to the background of this discourse 
(sections 4.1 and 4.2) and Iraq specifically (4.3). Chapter 5 turns to the analysis of the various 
newspapers both before and after the start of the war, before a conclusion is provided in 

















Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, research in the field of political and media discourse has 
largely been approached through two different theoretical frameworks; the field of Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) (section 2.1) and cognitive metaphor theory (section 2.2). I will 
deal with both approaches in turn, looking at the historical background, main principles and, 
subsequently, the criticism of these. Finally, I will discuss whether there exists any middle 
ground between the two frameworks.  
 
2.1 Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Discourse has become such an often-used term in academic work that it has become a matter 
of discussion and debate in itself. Most scholars dealing with discourse will indeed agree that 
attempting to find a unifying definition probably would turn out to be a highly contentious 
proceeding. The reason is simply that it seems to be impossible to find a definition of what 
discourse exactly constitutes. Fairclough (1992: 3) admits: “discourse is a difficult concept, 
largely because there are so many conflicting and overlapping definitions formulated from 
various theoretical and disciplinary standpoints”.   
 
But despite being difficult to define, the concept of discourse seems to be as popular as ever; 
it is on the one hand vague and uncertain, yet remains on everyone's lips. As H.G. 
Widdowson (1995: 132) cynically remarks, discourse is “widespread but spread very thin (...) 
something everyone is talking about but without knowing with any certainty what it is”. 
Widdowson may be right. Discourse, and perhaps especially Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA), might be a trendy phenomenon. In itself, that arguably attracts criticism just as much 
as appraisal. Students of linguistics, however, tend to fully embrace CDA; as Toolan remarks 
(1997: 221) “[linguists] seem to be guarded in our embrace of CDA, but our students are not”.  
 
The increasing popularity of Critical Discourse Analysis has manifested itself in a great 
variety of research over the past two decades. A main focus, however, has been the research 
into the mass media. Indeed, CDA has arguably become a standard framework for studying 
media texts, and according to Bell and Garrett (1998: 6), some 40 percent of articles published 
in the influential discourse journal Discourse and Society deal with a media corpus. One of 
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the primary reasons for this focus is no doubt grounded in the important role of the media in 
the society of today. In addition, media discourse is often easily accessible and available, 
while at the same time reflecting the linguistic tendencies found in society as a whole.  
 
Chapter 3 (section 3.1) will look more specifically at the media and the mediatized discourse 
processes. However, it is first useful to look at the defining theoretical framework of CDA in 
general. Theoretically, CDA must be regarded as multifaceted. Many would in fact argue that 
it is best seen as a perspective or programme rather than a single, coherent theory. As Wodak 
remarks:  
 
(...) heterogeneity of methodological and theoretical approaches represented in this 
field of linguistics would tend to confirm Van Dijk's point that CDA “(...) [is] at most 
a shared perspective on doing linguistic, semiotic or discourse analysis”  
(Wodak 2001: 2). 
 
Indeed, the theoretical scope and varying angles are striking. Fairclough and Wodak (1997) 
acknowledge up to eight different theoretical approaches within the field of Critical Discourse 
Analysis. Three of them have, however, been more influential than others; the social-
cognitive approach of Van Dijk, the discourse-historical approach associated with Wodak, 
and finally, the approach advocated by Norman Fairclough and his “orders of discourse” 
theory5.  
 
At the same time, CDA shares many main and guiding assumptions and principles. After a 
brief outline of the historical background of CDA (section 2.1.1), I will attempt to summarise 
these assumptions (section 2.1.2). Further, I will look more closely at the three main 
approaches of CDA proposed in this thesis, before considering the criticism of the CDA 
approach (sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4).  
 
2.1.1 Historical background 
 
The approach of Critical Linguistics (CL) is generally acknowledged as the foundation of 
what is now known as Critical Discourse Analysis. CL was a theoretical approach that 
                                                
5 Fairclough and Wodak (1997) not only identify and list several of the different approaches, they also have a 
thorough account of the most influential work in earlier years, with especially emphasis on Critical Linguistics of 
the 1970’s. It is important to note that these influences still make important contributions to CDA today. Another 
notable omission from this thesis is the work of the “visual grammar” approach most commonly associated with 
Kress and Van Leeuwen.  
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evolved during the 1970’s and is inextricably linked to pioneering linguists who either worked 
at or were related to the University of East Anglia in the 1970's (e.g. Fowler et al. 1979, Kress 
and Hodge 1979). On the one hand these critical theorists drew on a variety of social theories 
for inspiration; from the Frankfurt school of Jürgen Habermas, to George Orwell, and to a 
lesser extent Michel Foucault. Linguistically, CL based itself on Michael Halliday’s theory of 
systemic-functional grammar.  
 
The approach of Halliday was at the time considered by many to be the only valid alternative 
to Chomsky's dominant theoretical theory of transformational grammar. As Fowler has 
argued, Chomsky and transformational grammarians provided useful sets of terminology, but 
the inherent belief that language is structural and that language is genetically endowed in the 
human brain is highly unsuitable to critical linguistics: “Chomsky is not interested in the role 
of language in real use (and indeed will not allow such matters to be a valid concern of 
linguistics)” (1991: 5). Unable to find a place in Chomskyan linguistics, Fowler turned to 
Halliday and systemic-functional grammar to find a much more suitable model for critical 
analysis, a model that took into account the role of communicative function. In contrast to the 
Chomskyan paradigm, critical linguists were (and still are) concerned with a functional 
explanation of linguistic structure. CL’s turn away from transformational grammar (and also a 
structuralist approach) coincided with the rise of sociolinguistic research as a whole, including 
several other approaches that have, though to a lesser agree, influenced CDA (conversation 
analysis, semiotic analysis, amongst others). In other words, CL was by no means an isolated 
movement, but rather part of a broader sociolinguistic turn. 
 
Two important assumptions have been particularly influential to CDA. Firstly, Critical 
Linguistics views text as multifunctional, “simultaneously representing the world (ideational 
function) and enacting social relations and identities (interpersonal function)” (Fairclough 
1995: 25). Secondly, texts are built out of choices in vocabulary, grammar and so forth. The 
lexical and linguistic choices are, in other words, ideological.  
 
Although Halliday’s systemic-functional grammar and what we might call ‘Fowlerian Critical 
Linguistics’ are considered the most important and influential approaches to the field of CDA, 
CD-analysts draw upon an extremely varied field of theory;  social semiotics, cultural-generic 
analysis, corpus linguistics, Labovian sociolinguistics, conversational analysis, to name but a 
few. As a result of this wide theoretical inclusion, it is perhaps unsurprising that also the field 
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of CDA itself is marked by several different approaches with regards to theoretical 
framework.  
 
2.1.2 Main assumptions and principles of CDA 
 
Before we turn to the different approaches, however, it is useful to look at the guiding 
assumptions and principles of CDA as a whole. Firstly, CDA is an explicitly political 
approach to discourse. It is discourse analysis with a clear stance, and an established 
worldview: 
 
Unlike other discourse analysts, critical discourse analysts (should) take an explicit 
socio-political stance: they spell out their point of view, perspective, principles and 
aims, both within their discipline and within society at large.  
        (Van Dijk 1993a: 252)  
 
As van Dijk argues, CDA is openly political. More specifically, it requires a worldview where 
one believes that people in power also benefit from a potential abuse of power. After all, it is 
this hierarchical power struggle and social inequality that CD-analysts set out to unmask. A 
rejection of this hierarchical worldview would obviously devaluate CDA. Further:  
 
CDA is unabashedly normative: any critique by definition presupposes an applied 
ethics (…) critical discourse scholars should also be social and political scientists, as 
well as social critics and activists.  
       (Van Dijk 1993a: 253) 
 
Van Dijk’s focus on the normative presence in CDA is reinforced by Fairclough and Wodak 
(1997: 258); CDA does not see itself as either dispassionate or as an objective social science, 
but rather as engaged and committed. But as Fairclough and Wodak are quick to point out, 
this does not imply that CDA is less scholarly than other approaches to research: the same 
“standards of systematic analysis apply with equal force to CDA as to other approaches” 
(1997: 259). Still, the outspoken political objections, the intervention on the side of dominated 
or oppressed groups for instance, have made critics eager to place CDA within a socialist 
movement. Certainly, most would agree that there at least is a socialist element involved in 
CDA6. 
 
                                                
6 Fairclough is perhaps the most open socialist in the CDA community (some even labelling him as a neo-
marxist).  
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According to Fairclough and Wodak (1997) the critical approach to discourse analysis takes 
two distinctive views:  
 
a) CDA sees discourse – language use in speech and writing – as a form of ‘social 
practice’. This social practice is dialectical; it is a two way relationship in which 
the discursive event is ‘shaped by situations, institutions and social structures, but 
also shapes them’. 
  
b) Discursive practices may have major ideological effects: that is, they can help 
produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social 
classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities.  
(Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258) 
 
To Fairclough and Wodak, language is intangibly related to power relations. This focus on the 
importance of power is shared by Van Dijk (1993a: 250), who argues that CDA is concerned 
with “focusing on the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance”. 
Van Dijk’s definition of dominance, “the exercise of social power by elites, institutions or 
groups”, mirrors the notion of ‘power over discourse’ in the account of Fairclough and Wodak 
(1997). Blommaert (2005: 24) agrees, “power, and especially institutionally reproduced 
power, is central to CDA”. In other words, power relations, whether manifested as 
‘dominance’, ‘hegemony’ or similar, constitute an integral part of CDA.  
 
The way in which these power relations function in various discourses may, however, be 
difficult to uncover. Thus, CDA attempts to provide an analysis of how discourse works and 
to unmask the negative effects of power relations, namely those that result in social inequality 
(an ‘abuse of power’). This focus on social issues and inequality in turn makes CDA less 
preoccupied with trying to fit into any specific discourse theory.  
 
According to Fairclough, adding the ‘critical’ in front of discourse analysis also recognises 







The normal opacity of these practices to those involved in them – the invisibility of 
their ideological assumptions, and of the power relations which underlie the practices 
– helps sustain these power relations.       
     (Fairclough 1996 cited in Toolan 1997: 222)  
 
The ‘critical’ element is thus what makes CDA different; what makes it able to unmask and 
uncover social inequality. Many CDA-scholars have in turn criticised other approaches for 
being inadequate in its studies of the social dimensions of language use. According to Van 
Dijk (1993b: 131) these studies have often been ‘uncritical’ if not ‘apolitical’, having “aimed 
to describe the world, and ignored the necessity to change it”.  
 
Within the CDA framework some important terms crop up again and again. As mentioned 
earlier, social power and dominance are terms that are inseparable from the framework. But 
what exactly does social power constitute? Firstly it is different to individual power; one’s 
ability to personally control people outside a larger social group or similar. Secondly, social 
power is inextricably linked to access; access to “socially valued resources such as wealth, 
income, position, status, force, group membership, education or knowledge” (Van Dijk 
1993a: 254). This social power is not always bluntly enacted and is rarely easy to identify. 
Instead, dominant or prejudice discourse is often expressed subtly, and may even seem natural 
and acceptable, making the role of CDA to uncover these discourses even more important. 
Many examples are found in racist discourse, especially in the 1950’s and 60’s, in male 
dominance over women, etc. When a group accepts to be dominated by the powerful out of 
their free will, hegemony is closely linked to the analysis of dominant discourse. According to 
Herman and Chomsky (1988)7, “one major function of dominant discourse is precisely to 
manufacture such consensus, acceptance and legitimacy of dominance” (Van Dijk 1993a: 
255).  
 
Again, CDA reemphasises its multifunctional nature. The notion of hegemony and the 
acceptance of dominance cannot be straightforwardly accounted for. The lines between what 
is and what is not accepted discourse are not easily drawn, neither is the line between who are 
the villains and victims of such discourse. In the words of Van Dijk:  
 
Indeed, we have already suggested that many forms of dominance appear to be ‘jointly 
produced’ through intricate forms of social interaction, communication and discourse. 
                                                
7 See Herman and Chomsky’s Manufacturing Consent (1988) for a social critique of the political mass media 
which relates to CDA.  
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We hope that critical discourse analysis will be able to contribute to our understanding 
of such intricacies.          
        (Van Dijk 1993a: 255).  
 
What is clear, however, is that one of the most important aspects of social dominance and 
power abuse lies in the access to, or in some cases control of, mass media and public 
discourse, which is almost exclusively confined to elite groups, such as politicians, 
journalists, scholars and so on. Thus, manipulation and dominance requires some form of 
access to public discourse to be influential, be it news reports, opinion pieces, political 
debates, television shows, etc. As mentioned earlier, Fairclough and Wodak (1997) noted that 
there is not only power in discourse but also the important element of power over discourse 
(Chapter 3 will look more closely at the specifics of media discourse).  
 
Another important guiding principle in CDA is its inherently interdisciplinary nature. 
Fairclough and Wodak elaborate:  
 
(…) CDA is by its nature interdisciplinary, combining discursive disciplinary 
perspectives in its own analysis, and being used to complement more standard forms 
of social and cultural analysis.  
      (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 271) 
 
CDA, in other words, attempts to contribute to its analysis by making use of a variety of 
different research fields; although the most obvious contributions come from social theory, 
political theory and linguistic theory. For example, analyses of political discourse in relation 
to the London terrorist attack must take into account not only the linguistic properties of an 
anti-terrorism discourse, but also social theory, history, etc.  
 
2.1.3 Different approaches of CDA 
 
As was mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, CDA includes several different 
approaches. One of the most influential approaches within CDA is related to the scholar 
Norman Fairclough. Fairclough bases his work on two important influences. One is 
‘Foucaldian’ critical theory and its relation to the importanc of language as a form of social 
action. The second influence, and one that is similar to Fowler and Critical Linguistics, comes 
from Halliday’s systemic-functional model, which provides “the toolkit for deconstructing the 
socially constructed (thus linguistically constructed) machinery of power” (Chilton 2005: 21). 
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Although not the only CD-analyst influenced by Foucault, Fairclough is arguably the most 
obvious one, making use of terms such as ‘the order of discourse’ to outline discourse theory. 
The central notion of the ‘orders of discourse’ is that different discourses are constrained by 
different, although interdependent, networks; “we always experience the society and the 
various social institutions within which we operate as divided up and demarcated, structured 
into different spheres of action, different types of situation, each of which has its associated 
type of practice” (Fairclough 2001: 24). Consequently, orders of discourse will differ both 
relating to the type of discourse and the way they are structured. ‘Conversation’ can, for 
example, be of various types of discourse associated with various types of social situations. 
Whilst in a more formal proceeding (such as a court of law or similar) conversation may not 
have an important or appropriate role in the official proceedings but may have an highly 
important role in “off-stage” proceeding such as bargaining between different lawyers8.  
 
Power relations are of central concern to Fairclough, and the ways in which the ‘orders of 
discourse’ function are determined by relationships of power. The notion of power is most 
easily identified through class relations and class struggles, but power relations equally apply 
to the power struggles between men and women, ethnic groups, age groups and other social 
groups that are not “specific to particular institutions” (Fairclough 2001: 28).  
 
The assumption that social power roles and action can be deconstructed through linguistic 
analysis is also central to the work of Ruth Wodak. Wodak, however, differentiates herself 
from Fairclough in her research approach to discourse analysis. While Fairclough is brought 
up on the systemic-functional model of theory and thus often concentrates on rather limited 
amounts of research material, Wodak turns to the sociolinguistic and also ethnographical 
traditions for inspiration in what she calls the discourse-historical approach. One of the key 
notions in this approach is an emphasis on corpus-based research. As with Fairclough, the 
notion that language is inherently social remains a key assumption in the discourse-historical 
approach of Wodak (e.g. Frankfurt-school in social theory). What sets Wodak’s approach 
apart, however, is related to methodology:  
 
(…) one of the most salient distinguishing features of the discourse-historical 
approach is its endeavour to work with different approaches multimethodically and on 
                                                
8 See Fairclough’s Language and Power (2001) for a thorough account of ‘social order’ and the ‘orders of 
discourse’.  
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the basis of a variety of empirical data as well as background information.  
         (Wodak 2001: 65) 
 
A third CDA-approach is the one associated with Dutch linguist Teun Van Dijk and his 
social-cognitive model. In several studies from the late eighties and early nineties Van Dijk 
outlined a framework for analysing news discourse, and especially newspapers, that have 
been highly influential to CDA. Similarly to Fairclough, Van Dijk acknowledges three 
different perspectives; text, discourse practice and sociocultural practice (Fairclough 1995). 
Importantly, the emphasis is on the link between textual analysis and sociocultural analysis. 
However, Van Dijk differentiates himself from both Wodak and Fairclough in what he calls a 
social cognitive framework – cognitive ‘models’ and ‘schemata’ shape both discourse 
production and comprehension:  
 
Discourse, communication and (other) forms of action and interaction are monitored 
by social cognition. The same is true for our understanding of social events or of social 
institutions and power relations. Hence social cognitions mediate between micro- and 
macro-levels of society, between discourse and action, between the individual and the 
group.            
        (Van Dijk 1993a: 257)  
 
The focus on social cognition governs the process of analysis. The macro-structure of the text 
is its overall organization, its themes and topics. The organization of a text is thus 
hierarchical, with an overriding theme (the macro-structure) at the top. A news report has a 
headline, a lead and different ‘events’ throughout the main text, and each element corresponds 
to the overall theme. Unlike Fairclough and Wodak amongst others, it is through the model of 
social cognition we are able to unmask the role of dominance and power in discourse; the 
social cognitions “explain the production as well as the understanding and influence of 
dominant text and talk” (Van Dijk 1993a: 257).  
 
While Van Dijk, Fairclough and Wodak represent various positions in relation to CDA, they 
all share a similar source of inspiration in social theory. One of the unavoidable influences is 
the mentioned Foucault. Another important influence is the Frankfurt school of social theory, 
especially with regards to Wodak and the historical-discourse approach. All the different 
influences make way for several interpretations and approaches to CDA. While I have only 
outlined some of the main assumptions in three of the approaches in particular, it is important 
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The explicit political stance of CDA is perhaps unsurprisingly one of its most obvious 
controversies. An approach to discourse that implies a political and ideological bias is not 
controversial in itself; the problem is, however, that the ideological and political stance is an 
initial requirement. The biggest controversy is, in other words, not the political commitment 
of the researcher, but the belief that this commitment is a necessity. As Hammersley (1997: 
245) remarks, “the central feature of critical research is not that researchers can have political 
commitments and still pursue scientific research (…), but that the latter can and ought to be 
geared to serve the former”. According to Hammersley, Fairclough and other CD-analysts 
treat the legitimacy of a critical approach as obvious, and on this basis sets off on criticising 
more conventional modes of research. In other words, Hammersley argues that CDA fails to 
invalidate the conventional research methods.  
 
CD-analysts, however, argue that many of the more conventional scholars who try to avoid 
any mix of ‘politics’ or opinion into academic work, are playing right into the people in power 
and ignoring the misuse of power (e.g. dominance) and denying social inequality. In many 
cases a more conventional approach, rather than critically examine powerful networks, works 
to support and legitimise the power elites and various power relations; as Van Dijk argues, “it 
is this collusion that is one of the major topics of critical discourse analysis” (1993a: 254).  
 
Still, there is an inevitable tension in the work of CDA, positioning itself in between more 
conventional research and its social commitment; it is “work which involves a negotiation or 
even a compromise between critique and science, that is, between commitment and rationality 
(Toolan 2002: 223). The failure to acknowledge this tension is perhaps what such a 
committed CD-‘activist’ as Fairclough has received most criticism for. For instance, can CDA 
firmly argue the need and value of uncovering impartiality in discourse without 
acknowledging its own role as impartial related to the analytical process? As Toolan (2002) 
remarks, it is, however, far preferable to concede that you cannot analyse or write about 
power, hegemony and dominance without yourself potentially being implicated and 
compromised by the powerful and hegemonizing turns of your own discourse.  
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2.2 Metaphor theory 
 
An alternative framework for the analysis of both media and political discourse alike can be 
found in cognitive linguistics and more specifically metaphor theory. Similarly to the field of 
CDA, modern metaphor theory is grounded in pioneering work dating back to the late 1970’s. 
One work stands out in particular: Lakoff and Johnson’s seminal Metaphors We Live By from 
1980. In turn, the late eighties saw the beginning of metaphor research into political discourse. 
Again, Lakoff was a pioneering contributor, with his research into the metaphors of the First 
Gulf War from 1991 raising widespread attention. The work has inspired an increase in 
research into metaphors of political discourse and the last ten years have, in fact, been the 
most productive to date, including the publication of several articles related to the latest war 
in Iraq (e.g. Chilton 2002, Lakoff 2003, Charteris-Black 2005, Ferrari 2007) and earlier, in the 
late 90’s, related to racist discourse in newspapers (e.g. Santa Ana 1999, El Refaie 2001). 
 
It is perhaps striking that the analysis of metaphors in political discourse is so profoundly 
influenced and guided by the already mentioned work of Lakoff and Johnson. Its importance 
is, however, not exaggerated. In Metaphors We Live By Lakoff and Johnson challenge what 
was the conventional and traditional view on metaphor: that they simply are poetic or 
linguistic devices. As Lakoff remarks, the traditional view defines metaphor as “a novel or 
poetic linguistic expression where one or more words for a concept are used outside of its 
normal conventional meaning to express a similar content (1993: 202). According to the 
classic, conventional interpretation, everyday language is simply assumed not to have any 
metaphors. Lakoff and Johnson firmly set their argument against this classical interpretation, 
instead claiming that metaphors indeed form a large part of our everyday thinking. Metaphors 
are not just poetic ‘twists’ of language, they are an integral part of how we conceptualise 
difficult and abstract concepts.  
 
The basis of Lakoff and Johnson’s groundbreaking work on metaphors goes back to the work 
of Michael Reddy and his 1979-article The Conduit Metaphor9. While the discussion of 
metaphor and thought might have been touched upon briefly by other linguists, Reddy was the 
first scholar to challenge the conventional ideas of metaphor and put them in a cognitive 
perspective. The main assumptions Reddy challenged are as follows:  
                                                
9 A work which Lakoff has consistently emphasised as the primary influence of Metaphors We Live By.  
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(a) All everyday conventional language is literal, and none is metaphorical 
(b) All subject matter can be comprehended literally, without metaphor 
(c) Only literal language can be contingently true or false 
(d) All definitions given in the lexicon of a language are literal, not metaphorical.  
(e) The concepts used in the grammar of language are all literal; none are 
metaphorical.  
 
These traditional assumptions highlighted by Reddy form the basis of Lakoff and Johnson’s 
work. The aim was to falsify these traditional assumptions and show how metaphors 
constitute powerful cognitive tools that govern everyday thought processes. 
 
2.2.1 Lakoff and Johnson and their theory of metaphor 
 
As Lakoff and Johnson emphatically state in the 2003 afterword to the new edition of 
Metaphors We Live By:  
 
How we think metaphorically matters. It can determine questions of war and peace, 
economic policy, and legal decisions as well as the mundane choices of everyday life. 
Is a military attack a ‘rape’, ‘a threat to our security’ or the ‘defense of a population 
against terrorism’?  … Is your marriage a partnership, a journey through life together, 
a haven from the outside world, a means for growth, or a union of two people into a 
third entity?  
      (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 243)  
 
Whether we conceptualise a marriage as a ‘journey’ or ‘haven’, or whether we see the 
relationship as a ‘means for growth’ or not, does, of course, matter. Perhaps even more 
obvious is the example of whether we perceive a military attack as a ‘rape’ or a ‘defense’. The 
example shows how political metaphors may work. There are ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’, 
‘neighbours’ and ‘outsiders’, ‘attack’ and ‘defense’. One may want to ‘tighten the screws’ or 
‘loosen up’ a policy; or one may want to ‘protect’ and ‘seal its borders’ in some cases, while 
‘open them up’ in others. The list seems endless.  
 
Before we turn to political metaphors it is, however, important to look at the more general 
everyday metaphors that provide a good starting-point for framing the theory of metaphor 
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later applied to political discourse. The initial claims of Lakoff and Johnson are neatly 
summed up by Kövecses (2002: viii):  
 
a) metaphor is a property of concepts and not of words 
b) the function of metaphor is to better understand certain concepts, and not just some 
artistic or esthetic purpose  
c) metaphor is often not based on similarity 
d) metaphor is used effortlessly in everyday life by ordinary people  
e) metaphor far from being a superfluous though pleasing linguistic ornament, is an 
inevitable process of human thought and reasoning  
 
Furthermore, Lakoff and Johnson suggest that metaphors are subject to a conceptual mapping 
from a semantic source domain to a semantic target domain. The source domains are in most 
cases things that are easily identifiable to people and something we can easily relate to. These 
source domains are often a part of our physical world and therefore familiar. As El Refaie 
(2001) remarks, this could, for instance, explain why we “tend to see abstract social belonging 
in spatial terms and employ the metaphor of a container with a clear inside and outside to 
conceptualise ‘us’ and the ‘others’ (e.g. boxed in, closed, tightly sealed). 
 
Taking the example of a conceptual metaphor such as TIME IS MONEY it can be reflected in 
several ways. Some examples are (Lakoff & Johnson 2003: 7-8):  
 
You’re wasting my time 
 This gadget will save you hours 
 How do you spend your time these days? 
 I’ve invested a lot of time in her  
 
The conceptual metaphor TIME IS MONEY is reflected through the target domain, TIME, 
via the source domain, MONEY. In modern Western culture time is seen as a valuable 
commodity; we receive hourly wages, we pay for how long we talk on the phone; we pay 
interest on our loans, etc. Lakoff and Johnson argue that the TIME IS MONEY metaphor 
leads to the sub-categorization of concepts such as TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE and 
TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY. Accordingly, when we say that someone is wasting 
time, we specifically refer to time as a limited resource, although it is still a part of the 
overriding metaphor of TIME IS MONEY. A similar example can be provided in the 
conceptual metaphor of ARGUMENT IS WAR. The target domain of argument is understood 
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in terms of the source ‘war’; “elements from war – things like attack, defence, retreat etc. - are 
projected on to the abstract domain of intellectual argument (Taylor 2002: 135). Some 
examples of the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor are (Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 4):  
 
 Your claims are indefensible 
 He attacked every weak point in my argument 
 His criticisms were right on target  
 I demolished his argument 
 
The metaphor implies that when agreement is reached the argument ceases to exist, as the 
concept of an argument, just as wars, must end in victory or defeat. Just as with TIME IS 
MONEY, the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is a typical source to target domain mapping, 
abstract concepts are conceptualised through more specific and physical concepts. Kövecses 
(2002) remarks that the same source and target domains show up time and time again. The 
typical source domains include the human body, health and illness, animals, building and 
construction, sports and games, business, cooking, machines and tools to name a few. While 
common target domains often are emotions, desires, issues of morality, society/nations, 
politics, economy and other concepts which are more abstract to human beings.  
 
The two examples of TIME IS MONEY and ARGUMENT IS WAR, as shown above, are just 
two of a rich number of conceptual metaphors that Lakoff and Johnson discuss in their work. 
These conceptual metaphors, consisting of a source and target domain, are by no means the 
only metaphors in existence. In addition there are also a wide range of metaphors that can be 
structured into a quite small group of image-schemas:  
 
a) Containment (i.e. put ideas into words, be in love) 
b) A journey and its component parts (i.e. he’s come a long way, she’s ahead of her time) 
c) Proximity and distance (i.e. a close friend, keep one’s distance) 
d) Linkage and separation (i.e. to keep in touch, break social ties)  
e) Front-back orientation (i.e. look forward to the future, look back on the past) 
f) The part-whole relationship (i.e. split-up, break up) 
g) Up-down orientation (i.e. high price, low blood-pressure)  
 
These image schemas are “so deeply grounded in common human experience that they 
constitute, as it were, universal pre-linguistic cognitive structures” (Taylor 2003: 136). They 
are in other words a basic part of our cognitive system; some of them closely related to our 
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own experience of the human body (i.e. gravitation and up-down schema). Up-down 
orientation provides a good example of how we use these image schemas, and results in 
several conceptual metaphors. The metaphor of MORE IS UP/LESS IS DOWN is for instance 
extensively used to denote position on a scale; high price, high speed, low rate, etc. This can 
just as well be applied to the conceptual metaphor of GOOD IS UP/BAD IS DOWN, as in 
high standards, high moral values, low expectations, etc.  
 
2.2.2 Metaphor theory and political discourse 
 
The work of Lakoff and Johnson and conceptual metaphor theory forms the basis of metaphor 
research into political discourse. The role of metaphors as a cognitive mapping of abstract 
concepts onto the more familiar suggests that metaphors are, indeed, a valid commodity in 
political discourse (as was also suggested by Kövecses, section 2.3.1). If metaphors can play 
an important part in how we perceive things around us, how we understand such a thing as 
politics, the use of metaphors can become an important tool in the legitimisation process that 
is so crucial in political discourse. Metaphors can thus constitute an important part of a 
convincing argument, and serve a legitimising purpose. Interestingly, a process of 
delegitimisation is just as an important part of political discourse. According to Chilton:  
 
Delegitimisation can manifest itself in acts of negative other-presentation, acts of 
blaming, scape-goating, marginalising, excluding, attacking the moral character of 
some individual or group, attacking the communicative cooperation of the other, 
attacking the rationality and sanity of the other. 
  (Chilton 2004: 47 cited in Charteris-Black 2005: 17) 
 
Metaphors are no doubt used both with a legitimising and delegitimising effect, negative 
other-presentation vs. positive self-representation being a good example. 
 
As mentioned, Lakoff’s (1991) study of the metaphors in the First Gulf War is one of the 
most important works related to metaphors in political discourse; as his famous opening line 
argued: “metaphors can kill. The discourse over whether we should go to war in the gulf is a 
panorama of metaphor” (1991: 1). Despite the article often being cited as the first to raise 
awareness to metaphors as an important part of political discourse, it was actually Chilton and 
Lakoff who two years earlier outlined what they called a “first attempt to apply the theory of 
conceptual metaphor to the area of foreign policy”; arguing that “unfortunately, the study of 
foreign policy has lagged far behind research in the cognitive sciences on the nature of 
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metaphorical understanding (…) This is hardly an accident. Foreign policy theorists pride 
themselves on realism, and metaphor, in the traditional view, is taken to be anything but 
realistic” (Chilton & Lakoff 1989: 3-4).  
 
Chilton and Lakoff map out what they regard as the most important conceptual metaphors that 
dominate foreign policy. On of the most common metaphors they found was the 
STATE/NATION IS A PERSON conceptualisation. The metaphor entails that nations have 
‘friends’, ‘enemies’, ‘neighbours’, ‘neutral parties’, and they can in turn be ‘trustworthy’, 
‘friendly’, ‘hostile’, ‘aggressive’, ‘strong’ or ‘weak willed’, ‘stable’ or ‘unstable’ and so on. 
Needless to say, how the ‘personality’ of a nation is characterised is crucial to how other 
nations perceive it.  A ‘rogue’, ‘unstable’ state that tends to be ‘aggressive’ and uncooperative 
is more likely to be an enemy to your own nation. The conceptualisation of a state/nation as a 
person is closely related to a community metaphor. The community metaphor implies that 
different nations each constitute a part of an international ‘community’, where there are 
norms, values, beliefs and responsibilities. ‘Outsiders’ do not take the responsibilities of the 
important nations in the community, hence nations being ‘irresponsible’, ‘immature’, 
‘underdeveloped’, etc. Importantly, a community also implies rules and obligations. 
Consequently, there are not only law-abiding nations, but also villains.  
 
The NATION/STATE IS A PERSON metaphor also generates several spatial and physical 
metaphors. A good example is found in bodily metaphors connected to health, where 
problems inside a nation are conceptualised as diseases one must get rid of (e.g. “purge the 
country”, “stop the spread”, “infect other parts of the country”). In international relations one 
can, for instance, speak of dealing out ‘blows’, and being ‘shot down’ in diplomatic 
proceedings, while cross-nation relationships may be an ‘open wound’ or ‘in healing’, to 
name a few examples. Another physically grounded metaphor is the conception that a 
NATION IS A CONTAINER. A nation can ‘isolate’ and ‘protect itself’ from outsiders or it 
can ‘open up’ and come ‘out of its shell’. This metaphor is also often used in domestic issues 
such as immigration or trade where the borders are ‘closed’ or ‘open’, one can stop the ‘flow 
of trade’ or ‘open up to foreign investors’, etc. (see El Refaie 2001).  
 
Foreign relations are also often a war simply on a diplomatic level (e.g. ARGUMENT IS 
WAR). Countries can ‘attack’ one another for their values or position, they can ‘bully’ their 
way, ‘manoeuvre’ around etc. Similarly, international diplomacy makes use of an equally 
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important metaphor, namely POLITICS IS BUSINESS, which again is related to WAR IS 
POLITICS PURSUED BY OTHER MEANS10. The combination of these two metaphors is 
one of the most important strategic metaphors that govern reasoning in international relations. 
They both imply that the political ‘gains’ of conflict (e.g. war) must be balanced against the 
‘costs’. A well run nation should of course keep a close account of their gains and costs in the 
eventuality of a war or similar in close accordance with a business model. When a country 
then goes to war, or imposes strict sanctions on another country, it is based on a judgement 
that the gains are believed to outweigh the costs. A metaphorically grounded 
conceptualisation of politics as is seen in POLITICS IS BUSINESS is a central pillar in the 
diplomatic processes of international relations. Arguably it is the ultimate grounds for rational 
actions.  
 
An important emphasis in Lakoff’s recent work is on the ideological implications of 
metaphors in politics. In his book Moral Politics (2002) Lakoff suggests that there are 
fundamental conceptual differences in conservative and liberal thought. In essence, Lakoff 
argues that while liberals govern their conceptual systems through an overriding conceptual 
metaphor of a ‘nurturing parent role’, the conservatives employ what Lakoff calls a ‘strict 
father’ morality. The ideological implications are fundamentally different; conservatives tend 
to see personal prosperity being realised through discipline and hard work, while liberals see 
prosperity as best achieved through a nurturing model (i.e. caring and helping for others) (see 
Lakoff 2002).  
 
One of the most notable claims in Moral Politics is the suggestion that conservatives tend to 
make use of more metaphors than liberal politicians do; they, in other words, tend to be more 
inventive11. In turn, this suggests that conservative metaphors more often become 
unconsciously (or idiomatically) accepted. Conservatism is thus more likely to shape our 
understanding of the world. An example of the ideological implications Lakoff (and Johnson) 
argues are for instance found in the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR (see also criticism, 
section 2.3.3). As other critics also have pointed out (see for instance Tannen 1998), this 
conception is part of a discourse of aggression and violence, which shapes our understanding 
                                                
10 Lakoff (1991) names it the Clauzewitz-metaphor after Prussian general Karl von Clauzewitz who famously 
argued that war should be perceived through a cost-benefit analysis.  
11 This ‘inventiveness’ is, according to Lakoff, largely due to the vast amounts of money and time the 
conservatives have dedicated to forming ideas and language, through think tanks and university funding 
(UCBerkeley News, 27.10.03).  
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of what arguments constitute; arguments become more aggressive and warlike. Our 
conception of arguments are indeed so deeply rooted in a war conception that any other 
conception, like an argument being a ‘dance’, would more than likely not be considered an 
argument (Lakoff & Johnson 2003: 5) . The example shows how a metaphor can have 
unconscious ideological implications which are an integral part of how we conceptualise it.  
 
2.2.3 Criticism  
 
The various metaphors that are highlighted above are some of the most important and 
dominant metaphors that are part of an international political discourse. Some of them are 
indeed so commonplace that they are accepted unconsciously; while some might even be 
argued to have lost all their rhetoric impact. The obvious question, then, is when does a 
metaphor stop being a metaphor? What is metaphorical and what is not? The criticism of 
Lakoff has not only concerned his overtly ‘leftist’ political persuasion, but also, from the 
more metaphor theoretical perspective, his overemphasis on the rhetoric significance of many 
metaphors. Billig and MacMillan, for instance, suggest that Lakoff’s theory of metaphor is 
“too simple to account for the complex, rhetorical processes by which a metaphor might pass 
from a striking, novel comparison into an unthinking idiom” (2005: 460). What Billig and 
MacMillan refer to is the issue of whether metaphors can die out, or as they put it, the 
“diachronic passage by which a bright young metaphor becomes a dried lexical stalk” (2005: 
460). Indeed, it is evident that some metaphors may become lexicalised, taking a literal rather 
than metaphorical meaning (i.e. passing from metaphor to idiom). The living metaphor is 
killed by what Billig and MacMillan call usure, the wearing down or usage, of the original 
meaning (2005: 461).  
 
A usure-theory thus suggests that metaphors may turn into idioms by a process of habituation, 
where lexical items become conventional and, in turn, idiomatic. Such a theory is inextricably 
linked with a diachronic approach to language and is similar to Wodak’s emphasis on the 
importance of a historical approach to Critical Discourse Analysis. Metaphors are inherently 
linked to being ‘like’ something else, its essence is “understanding and experiencing one kind 
of thing in terms of another” (Lakoff & Johnson 2003: 5). But what happens when a metaphor 
no longer shares the same common properties between the source and target domain, as it has 
become commonly lexicalised?  
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Lakoff has argued that the process where a metaphor becomes an unconscious 
conceptualisation becomes even more ideologically implicit, thus making it more powerful 
(see argument is war, section 2.3.2). Accordingly, Lakoff is able to account for the idiomatic 
processes of metaphors (their potential death) through the existence of cultural and 
ideological movement. The concept of ARGUMENT IS WAR thus becomes an important 
unconscious ideological tool, reflecting a discourse of violence.  
 
However, as Billig and MacMillan argue, the effect may not be as straightforward as 
suggested by Lakoff. A metaphor may become so habituated by language-users that they react 
unconsciously in a “single, predictable way” (2005: 478). In other words, the unconsciousness 
may involve that the metaphor is remote from any ideological input to the language-user. A 
good example is found in the highly common move of declaring war on a political subject; for 
instance, the ‘war on drugs’, ‘war on crime’, ‘war on corruption’, etc. Indeed, such rhetorical 
moves are so commonly used they seem almost empty of meaning, and do not necessarily 
imply any real changes of policy. As Billig and MacMillan suggest, this may reflect a 
commercialised culture which requires inflated rhetoric, and through the “constant repetition 
of the idiom, the metaphorical meaning is dulled” (2005: 478).  
 
What is and what is not metaphorical is, in other words, hard to define. Billig and MacMillan 
suggest that Lakoff’s political metaphor theory, although highly influential and 
groundbreaking, might be overemphasising the metaphorical cognitive processes. Over time, 
some metaphors pass from metaphors to idioms, and in this process may lose their ideological 
input (see Billig & MacMillan 2005). Others, however, argue that there is nothing to suggest 
that what we think of as idioms lack metaphorical meaning although they are frequent in use. 
As Gibbs remarks, “scholars often treat idioms as dead metaphors because they confuse dead 
metaphors with conventional ones. The position fails to distinguish between conventional 
metaphors, which are part of our live conceptual system (…), and historical metaphors that 
are no longer useful or part of how we ordinarily think” (Gibbs 1994: 22). Gibbs thus agrees 
with Lakoff in the suggestion that it is in fact these conventional metaphors, the unconscious 






2.3 CDA and cognitive metaphor-theory; any middle ground?  
 
I have broadly outlined two different approaches to analyses of media and political discourse. 
Although they draw on vastly different theories, one firmly set in the tradition of cognitive 
linguistics and one in the sociolinguistic tradition, they still share many of the same 
assumptions about political and media discourse. Firstly, they both share the same aim: 
through either critical discourse analysis or metaphor analysis respectively political rhetoric 
and political agendas can be uncovered. Although cognitive linguists preoccupied with 
metaphors of political discourse do not share the same outspoken assumptions, or even 
activism, of many CD-analysts, it is clear that also the study of political metaphors aims to 
uncover instances of prejudice, social inequality and other instances of what was mentioned 
as a delegitimisation process12. Many of the metaphors that govern political discourse are no 
doubt unconsciously conceptualised. When a politician speaks of ‘friends’ or ‘enemies’ we 
unconsciously make use of the NATION STATE IS A PERSON-metaphor. When a 
proposition is argued to be ‘protective’ or ‘isolationist’ a NATIONS AS CONTAINERS 
metaphor is in work. Consequently, these metaphors become powerful rhetorical tools, and if 
a newly established metaphor can become an unconscious, idiomatic, metaphor, it can no 
doubt serve a rhetorical and ideological purpose.   
 
Ideology is indeed highly important in both CDA and metaphor theory. Similarly to the two-
fold processes of legitimisation and delegitimisation, a definition of ideology is dependent on 
whether the ideological assumptions are a matter of “false consciousness” or more neutrally, 
“a comprehensive and coherent social perception of the world”. More specifically ideology 
can be seen “as a systematic body of ideas, organized from a particular point of view” (Hodge 
and Kress 1993: 15 cited in Charteris-Black 2005: 21); it is a belief system upon which a 
social group “justifies its existence to itself” (Charteris-Black 2005: 21). Needless to say, such 
a definition makes the concept of ideology increasingly important to an analysis of media and 
political discourse, as ideology becomes an important resource in legitimising a certain view 
or policy13.  
 
                                                
12 See Chilton (2004) and Charteris-Black (2005) 
13 (‘Self’ vs. ‘Others’ representation is a good example of such a legitimising ideology where there is an ‘us’-
‘them’ polarisation often resulting in the notion that ‘we’ are good and ‘they’ are bad) 
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Although sharing many assumptions and objections about political and media discourse, there 
have been notably few attempts in trying to combine the theoretical frameworks CDA and 
metaphor theory into a coherent framework of discourse analysis as a whole. Most often, 
research in the field of political and media discourse is restricted to making use of one of the 
two models. This is acknowledged by Hart (2005, 2008) who argues that CDA has neglected 
cognitive theories of meaning in discourse. However, Hart (2008: 93) admits several 
compatibility problems. Firstly, the focus is different. Cognitive theorists are not occupied 
with individual sentences, but rather metaphorical mappings, while CDA, in contrast, focuses 
on concrete examples of language (actual instances of talk or text). Secondly, tension between 
the two theories arises with regards to the element of consciousness. In CDA, metaphors are 
generally considered to be ‘chosen’ by speakers, while in metaphor theory metaphors are 
often unconscious. Finally, there are opposing perceptions of the relation between linguistic 
representation and conceptual representation. While metaphor theory views linguistic 
structures merely as reflections of the conceptual structure, CDA entails that a “linguistic 
representation in discourse can determine, to some extent, conceptual representation” (Hart 
2008: 94)14. 
 
The theoretical differences between CDA and metaphor theory are on the one hand clear-cut. 
The cognitive framework of metaphor theory, the emphasis on cognitive and often 
unconscious processes, in many ways excludes a theoretical unity between the CDA-
orientated approach and metaphor theory. At the same time, many of the key assumptions 
made about language and discourse remain. The main aim of this thesis, as was set forth in the 
introduction, is to highlight the ideological implications of both wider discourse processes and 
metaphors in both government and media discourse. Accordingly, both frameworks become 
useful in such an analysis. Indeed, if the different theoretical backgrounds are kept in mind, 







                                                
14 Note that Hart attempts to solve the ‘gap’ by linking metaphor theory to conceptual blending theory, an 
alternative to conceptual metaphor theory founded on mental space theory (see Hart 2008).  
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Chapter 3: The Media 
 
Chapter 2 outlined the basic theoretical framework of the thesis. Media discourse (and also 
political discourse) was, however, only briefly mentioned as significant in both Critical 
Discourse Analysis and metaphor analysis. This chapter will specifically discuss the media; 
first in relation to discourse processes (section 3.1), secondly, as an overview of our media 
research target; newspapers (section 3.2), and finally, by discussing the public opinion context 
of the Iraq war (section 3.3). Finally, a summary is provided (3.4).  
 
3.1 The media and discourse 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, an important assumption in discourse analysis is its 
ideational function. Media discourse is no exception. News reporting, whether in the form of a 
newspaper report or a television broadcast, is never neutral. Rather, news reports are subject 
to a highly selective process. For one, nothing is automatically newsworthy; every event does 
not make the news. Additionally, various media outlets, be it newspapers or competing 
television stations, report news in different ways. For instance, a newspaper such as The Sun 
will find different stories newsworthy than the Guardian, as will the conservative broadsheet 
the Daily Telegraph and the liberal broadsheet the Independent. What the consumer receives 
is ultimately a partial view of the world, or as Fowler (1991: 11) remarks, “the world of the 
Press is not the real world, but a world skewed and judged”. 
 
Most people would find the ideological differences uncontroversial. As Fairclough (1991) 
remarks, these differences of ideology between various media outlets are mostly considered to 
be a healthy part of a democratic country. At the same time, there exists a common 
assumption that some news reports are in fact neutral (more than often reflected in personal 
opinion). Certainly, this is a potentially dangerous view of media discourse. Instead, it is 
important to keep in mind that all media discourse is subject to a representation of events.  
 
These important assumptions about media discourse by no means become less important 
considering the extremely powerful social role of the media today. In fact, the media 
constitutes a huge part of people’s everyday lives; in print, radio, TV and on the internet. This 
position gives it the ability to influence knowledge, beliefs, values, social relations and social 
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identities (Fairclough 1995: 2). Accordingly, access to the media, whether as a writing 
journalist or as a skilled politician, is inextricably linked with power. This ‘power over 
discourse’, as argued by Fairclough and Wodak (1997, see chapter 2), is almost exclusively a 
matter of access. The media indeed plays a pivotal role, by (a) having the access itself and, 
(b), being the primary distributor of this access. This access is of course limited; not everyone 
can achieve the same amount of access and, accordingly, a potential lack of access is as power 
reducing as the opposite is enhancing.  
 
A fundamental difference between other forms of communication and media discourse relates 
to communicative events. In direct speech between two people or in a group discussion the 
time of creation and consumption is the same. In the media, however, this relation between 
creation and consumption is different. A newspaper article or a TV news presentation not only 
consists of a communicative event when it is created, it is also an event in its production and, 
further, in the various times of consumption. Thus, the communicative events of media 
discourse are more complex than a single communicative event, and must rather be seen as a 
chain of communicative events (Fairclough 1995).  
 
An important focus in this communicative chain lies in the mediation between the private and 
public domain. Indeed, in this mediation process the media has been a major contributor in 
restructuring people’s expectations of what can be regarded as behaviour for private 
consumption and what is public. This has gained notable criticism as having a negative effect 
of blurring the lines between what is public and private. A good example is found in the 
reporting of celebrity or gossip news, and also in how the media portray people in crisis (e.g. 
people in grief, personal crisis, etc.) 
 
Importantly, feedback or consumer response is not readily available to the newsmakers. As a 
result, the media try to create an ideal audience: “producers postulate and construct ‘ideal’ 
audiences partly on the basis of guesses about audience response and various types of indirect 
evidence (such as programme ratings or market research)” (Fairclough 1995: 40). Consumer 
awareness has become more important in the last decade, perhaps as a result of fiercer 
competition and ratings monitoring becoming more easily obtained. There is an obvious 
tension connected to these advances in audience targeting, with the pressure to gain high 
ratings often intensifying the focus on entertainment rather than information. Accordingly, it 
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is fair to pose the question of whether the growing pressures of ratings may contribute to a 
further distortion to the mentioned processes of selection.  
 
Going back to the role of access in the media discourse it is important to note that the media is 
under clear professional and constitutional control. It is more often than not hard to gain 
access for people outside of the power elites15, as access is subject to several hurdles such as 
economic interests, editors, sub-editors, to name a few. However, as early as 1995, Fairclough 
acknowledged processes in what he called “mitigating the unequal distribution of access”. 
Fairclough was referring to vox pop16 and radio phone-in programmes as having an important 
impact in bridging the gap in access between elite groups and the less powerful. Today, these 
tendencies, acknowledged by Fairclough back in 1995, have arguably grown to new heights 
with technological advances and access to the internet becoming more and more widespread. 
Almost every newspaper, TV-channel or magazine has an online version where readers can 
submit blogs, comment on stories and even chat with journalists and other readers. The Iraq 
war in 2003 was perhaps the first war when people in Europe had the possibility of accessing 
both Arabic and ‘western’ news broadcasts. At the same time they could learn what the Iraqi 
people themselves thought via the internet; they could make their opinions heard on 
discussion boards; and for the first time, a controversial war17 could be seen on 24-hour news 
channels that made extensive use of viewer response via digital teletext (see section 3.2 and 
3.3).  
 
3.1.1 The media and political discourse 
 
Media discourse is closely connected with political discourse and rhetoric. An analysis of a 
newspaper report on a political speech or a debate in the House of Commons, must, for 
instance, take into account both processes in media discourse and political discourse. In 
analysing political discourse, however, there are also several distinct features that need to be 
taken into acount. A considerable influence on the field of political discourse comes from 
sociology and Pierre Bordieu;  Thompson (1991) sums up his position:  
 
                                                
15 Elite-groups such as journalists, politicians, state officials etc. See earlier discussion on access.  
16 Similar to what is called “man on the street” in the US (in Norway “5 on the street”). Basically, it is asking for 
opinions on a particular news story from people on the street.  
17 The Afghanistan war that preceded the Iraq war is not forgotten. Still, the Iraq war created significantly more 
media attention, largely due to its controversy.   
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It would be superficial (at best) to try to analyse political discourse or ideologies by 
focusing on the utterances as such, without reference to the constitution of the political 
field and the relations between this field and the broader space of social positions and 
processes … attempts to apply some form of semiotics or ‘discourse analysis’ to 
political speeches … take for granted but fail to take account of the sociohistorical 
conditions within which the object of analysis is produced, constructed and received.  
     (Thompson cited in Fairclough 1995: 177) 
 
The important implication of Bordieu is that a simply linguistically based analysis of political 
discourse would prove unfruitful if it is not backed up by a clear account of its sociohistorical 
preconditions. Bordieu acknowledges that political discourse is “doubly determined’ 
(Fairclough 1995): On the one hand, it is an autonomous discourse which is produced and 
influenced within the political sphere. Speech in Parliament is, for example, a discourse 
internally produced within the field of politics. On the other hand, political discourse is also 
externally produced in that politicians must represent and respond to the public that has 
elected, or might consider electing them. An analysis of political discourse can, then, be two-
fold. It can either look at the internal aspects of political discourse (e.g. the different 
discourses produced ‘inside’ political life such as the House of Commons or government 
proceedings) or it can look at the external proceedings, such as the communicative 
relationship between politicians and the public. Obviously, the media plays a crucial role in 
this relationship and thus should also be central in political analysis; a role that, according to 
Fairclough, Bordieu largely overlooks (Fairclough 1995: 183).  
 
According to Fairclough an analysis of political discourse must not only be based on the 
various orders of discourse, but more specifically the ‘order of mediatized political discourse’. 
The political world consists of a large amount of different voices, discourses and genres, 
where, according to Fairclough, the media plays a crucial role. The different voices can be 
divided into five categories (1995: 185-86):  
 
(a) Political reporters (e.g. journalists, correspondents, TV-presenters etc.  
(b) Politicians, trade union leaders, archbishops etc.  
(c) Experts (e.g. political analysts/commentators, academics.)  
(d) Representatives of new social movements (e.g. Greenpeace, Oxfam etc.)  
(e) Ordinary people 
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Needless to say, the different voices are often internally diverse; perhaps most notably this is 
the case with politicians, where there clearly are vastly different levels of influence based on 
access to media, hierarchical position, governmental power, etc. Discourses are, as opposed to 
voices, the more general political trends that are being implemented (policy, doctrines etc.) 
The relationship between discourses and voices is often complex, as the different voices are 
highly varied and rapidly prone to change. Thus, the discourses are always relational and 
relative. Accordingly, a conservative politician may, for instance, draw upon discourses that 
would have been perceived as liberal previously, and vice versa.  
 
The different voices, discourses and genres give a complex picture of the orders of a 
‘mediatized political discourse’. A number of questions arise with regards to the relationship 
between political discourse and media discourse. The most important is perhaps the question 
of how political discourses shape media reports, and, also, how the media, and the privilege of 
access to the media, shape the discourse of politicians.  
 
The central concern to this thesis lies in the former. The increasingly powerful role of the 
mass media in politics and its position in society as a whole has been well and truly noted by 
political parties and politicians, resulting in vast amounts of both energy and resources being 
put into media management. The growing importance of being rhetorically gifted as a 
politician has been striking the last decade. Political leaders with a ‘gift for the gab’ have not 
only been able to come to power, they have more often than not, been able to stay there.  
 
3.2 Newspapers in Britain 
 
British national newspapers are traditionally divided into three categories: up-market/ 
broadsheet; mid-market; and tabloid/lower-market. The split is not only a journalistic one; it 
is also related to lay-out. The up-market papers were traditionally all large in size, hence the 
name broadsheet. In recent years, however, several of the traditionally up-market papers have 
switched to more compact sizes (Independent, The Times) and Berliner-format (Guardian, 
Observer). Mid-market and tabloid papers are both of a tabloid format. The national 






- The Daily Telegraph (Sunday Telegraph) / David and Fredrick Barclay 
- The Financial Times / Pearson PLC 
- The Times (The Sunday Times) / News Corporation  
- The Independent (Independent on Sunday) / Independent News and Media 
- The Guardian (The Observer) / The Scott Trust 
 
Mid-market:  
- Daily Express (Sunday Express) / Northern and Shell PLC 
- Daily Mail (Sunday Mail) / Daily Mail and General Trust PLC 
- Metro18 / Daily Mail and General Trust PLC 
 
Tabloid 
- Daily Mirror (Sunday Mirror) / Trinity Mirror 
- The Sun (News of the World) / News Corporation 
- The People / Trinity Mirror 
- Daily Star (Daily Star Sunday) / Northern and Shell PLC 
- Daily Sport (The Sunday Sport) / Sport Newspapers Group 
 
Of the up-market/broadsheet papers both the Independent and Guardian/Observer must be 
regarded as left-wing or more liberal papers, compared to the Times, the Financial Times and 
the Daily Telegraph who are all more conservative in their political opinions. The latter is 
perhaps the most obvious and outspoken supporter of the Conservative party19. Within the 
mid-market and tabloid papers there is a similar divide with Trinity Mirror-owned 
publications such as the Daily Mirror and the People traditionally being Labour-supportive, 
while News Corporation-owned the Sun stand out as the most predominant Conservative-
supportive paper with the Daily Express, and its owner Northern Shell Media, running a close 
second.  
 
British newspapers also show a distinct pattern in relation to socio-economic class and 
readership. Chan and Goldthorpe (2007: 1110) show that the up-market, mid-market and 
                                                
18 Free paper available in 14 urban centres throughout Britain and published by Associated Press. Not printed on 
Saturdays and Sundays.  
19 Famously renamed ‘The Torygraph’ in the satirical magazine Private Eye due to its strong ties to the 
Conservative Party.  
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lower-market papers all can be clearly divided based on the social class of their various 
readers. The up-market papers attract people who work in jobs with high social status and 
relatively high income; mid-market papers attract the highest amount of readers from the 
lower-middle class with medium social status and income; while lower-market papers mainly 
attract readers from the working class and jobs of a lower social status.  
 
3.2.1 Newspapers and Iraq 
 
Six of the daily newspapers were supportive of the war in Iraq: the Times, Sun, Daily 
Telegraph, Express, Daily Mail and Daily Star. Three papers opposed the war: Independent, 
the Mirror and Guardian (Stanyer 2004: 421). Based on circulation numbers of March 2003 
the pro-war newspapers gathered a combined circulation of 9,134,294 papers opposed to a 
2,584,359 circulation of the three anti-war papers20. In other words, the combined circulation 
of pro-war dailies outweighed the anti-war ones with over 6 million copies, the anti-war 
papers standing for under a third of UK sales. 
 
By many, the Iraq war has been considered to be the single biggest media event in history21. 
This was also reflected in the public interest and although newspapers were far from first in 
the competition to be breaking news on the events in the Iraq war, they saw a substantial 
boost in circulation figures in the month of March 2003 (Table 3 and 4). The most important 
boost in circulation came in the first week of the war, before figures steadily declined back to 
previous levels.  
 
Table 3: Net Circulation of Daily Papers March 2003/2002 
PAPER   MAR 2003  MAR 2002  % CHANGE 
Sun    3,521,144   3,379,508    4.19    
Daily Mail   2,341,999   2,318,023    1.03   
Daily Mirror   1,997,846   2,089,539   -4.39   
Daily Telegraph   910,725   952,622   -4.40   
Daily Express   888,145   852,252    4.21    
Daily Star  849,689   755,040   11,22 
Times    622,592   657,113   -5.25   
Financial Times   453,282   469,521   -3.46   
Guardian   396,849   382,057    3.87    
Independent   189,664   191,826   -1.13   
 
Source: Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC)s from mediaguardian.co.uk.  
                                                
20 The Financial Times did not take a particular editorial stance for or against the Iraq War.  
21 Estimations say that between 2,500 and 3,000 people were involved in the reporting of the early stages of the 
war. In comparison, 1500 journalists took part in the first Gulf war in the early 90’s (Stanyer 2004).  
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Table 4: Net Circulation of Sunday Papers March 2003/2002 
PAPER   MAR 2003  MAR 2002  % CHANGE 
News of the World  3,849,013   3,970,726   -3.06   
Mail on Sunday   2,312,905   2,277,898    1.54    
Sunday Mirror   1,603,578   1,762,500   -9.02      
Sunday Times   1,365,988   1,368,608   -0.19   
Sunday Express   859,290   812,482    5.76     
Sunday Telegraph  704,964   753,255   -6.41    
Sunday Mail   619,546   662,170   -6.44   
Observer   430,791   422,470    1.97   
Independent on Sunday  182,719   193,809   -5.72   
 
Source: Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC)s from mediaguardian.co.uk.  
 
 
Both Table 3 and 4 show an increase in sales with several papers, most notable is the increase 
in circulation of daily papers the Sun and the Guardian. Several papers are also minimising 
the trend of decreasing sales (see section 3.1), most notably the Daily Mail and the Financial 
Times22. While some of the changes in circulation numbers no doubt can be attributed to 
events outside the war and politics in general, there is a clear overall increase in sales for 
March 2003; an increase which also continued into April 200323. In April 2003 the Guardian 
reported that all newspapers could report increasing sales the first week of the war with one 
notable exception in the anti-war paper the Daily Mirror. The Times reported an increase of 
about 5 %, The Independent claimed sales had risen by 9 %, while the Guardian claimed a 6 
% increase (MediaGuardian 01.04.2003) Perhaps the most disappointing performance was 
that of the Daily Mirror whose harsh anti-war line clearly did not reflect well on its readership 
(see also discussion in section 3.3).  
 
3.3 Public opinion  
 
The support for military action reflected in the majority of newspapers did not, however, 
reflect public opinion. Opposition before the start of the war remained fierce, its absolute 
height being when approximately one million people marched in a demonstration in London 
organised by a strong coalition of anti-war organizations. Significantly, protesters were not 
only made up of political ‘activists’, but also a large number of ‘ordinary’ citizens. The 
opposition on the street of Britain’s largest cities was also reflected in opinion polls. Already 
                                                
22 Down 9,79 % from January 2002 to 2003 and down 6,4 % from December 2002 to December 2001, compared 
to the 3,46 % decrease between February 2003 and 2002.  
23 The Express had, for instance, been steadily increasing their sales all year. Their high increase reflects this 
trend in addition to what might be argued as a slight boost due to the Iraq War. Also the Daily Star had a 
significant increase throughout the year and was only slightly up from their previous months’ average.  
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back in November 2002 an ICM poll for the Guardian showed that two fifths of voters were 
opposed to any military action against Iraq. The trend was reconfirmed in December and 
continued all the way into the final days before the start of the war, as indicated below (Table 
5):  
 
Table 5: ICM/Guardian poll on War in Iraq 2002/2003 
Q: Would you approve or disapprove of a military attack on Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein? 
 
 
Dec 15  Jan 17  Feb 14  Mar 14  Mar 21          Apr11 
 
Approve    36 %  30 %  29 %  38 %  54 %         63 % 
Disapprove    44 %  47 %  52 %  44 %  30 %        23 % 




Opposition was at its height around one month before the start of the invasion. However, in 
the last week before the start of the war, support saw a sharp rise. The war opposed majority 
from March 14th was in the space of one week turned into considerable support for the war 
with 54 % supporting the war, 30 % were against and 15 % uncertain. In April support for the 
war made a further increase to 63 %. One of the leading media research companies in the UK, 
MORI, called the turnaround from opposition to support one of the most dramatic it had 
witnessed. Their polls confirmed what had been found in the ICM survey, showing a 30 % 
increase in the approval for military action once the war started (Stanyer 2004: 428)). The 
“sudden and widespread shift in public mood”, as the Guardian called it (25.03.03), could 
also be clearly seen in the approval ratings of Prime Minister Tony Blair. ICM polls 
conducted for News of the World from before and after the war show a dramatic shift in the 
PM’s popularity:  
 
Table 6: ICM/News of the World poll on Blair approval March 2003 
Q: Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Prime Minister Tony Blair is handling the 
current situation regarding Iraq?  
 
    Mar 6   Mar 28 
 
Approve   29 %   50 %  
Disapprove   53 %   39 % 
Don’t know   18 %   11 % 
 
Source: icmresearch.co.uk/News of the World 
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One of the main reasons for the turnaround in opinion has been attributed to patriotism and a 
desire to ‘support the troops’. Such a ‘patriotic shift’ is not necessarily to be confused with a 
shift in favour of government policy. However, Blair’s approval ratings indicate that this was 
not solely the case. While the surge in support for the war may to a certain point hide 
discontent with people perhaps feeling “obliged to show support for British troops once war 
began”, the jump in approval for Blair shows, perhaps more clearly, how support for the war 
gained pace from mid-march and onwards (Lewis et al. cited in Murray et al. 2008: 8). Thus, 
patriotism can only be regarded as partly responsible and does not account for the turnaround 
on its own.  
 
The indication that Iraq had ‘weapons of mass destruction’, or ‘WMD’ as it was popularly 
shortened, was central to the debate before March 2003. In turn, United Nations (UN) support 
for military action was highly dependent on whether the US/UK could prove that the Iraqis 
had this alleged ‘WMD’. A MORI poll conducted in January 2003 showed that 61 % of the 
British people would support military action against Iraq with the backing of the UN, while as 
much as 77 % would oppose war without the UN’s approval. The importance of UN 
involvement in the military operations was clearly increasing within the public; opposition to 
war without the UN was up 7 % from a similar survey conducted in September 2002 while 
support was down 10 % (Lewis 2004: 298). The British government and Tony Blair were of 
course acutely aware of the significance both the UN and the question of ‘WMD’ represented 
to public support for the war. As Justin Lewis suggests, “once it became clear that Hans 
Blix’s team would not turn up the ‘smoking gun’ and the UN would not sanction war with 
Iraq, they needed to persuade people that these conditions were less pivotal to the case of 
war” (Lewis 2004: 298). One of the efforts of government rhetoric was for instance the attack 
on French leaders blaming them for ruining the diplomatic process set forth in the UN 
Security Council. An ICM poll for News of the World from March 2003 showed that 59 % 
believed that French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac was putting French interests before the 
interests of the global community and 49 % supported Tony Blair in his famous statement 
saying that the French had poisoned the diplomatic process. Most tellingly, 58 % disapproved 
of the way Chirac was handling the current situation regarding Iraq (ICMresearch.co.uk).  
 
Looking at the breakdown between social classes, the ICM/Guardian poll from February 
2003 showed that opposition against war was highest within the upper middle class and 
middle class (58 %) and the lower working class (55 %). While opposition still was high (49 
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%) in the lower middle class, this was also the social group most supportive of the war. The 
same pattern was confirmed in polls conducted both before and after February. Another 
survey, again by ICM for the Guardian, also showed that opposition was significantly higher 
amongst people who read the liberal broadsheet press compared to more conservative 
counter-parts, while support for the war was high with the tabloid readership (Table 7):  
 
Table 7: Reader opinion regarding Iraq 
Q: Do you approve or disapprove of the Military attack on Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein? (% of readers) 
 
Approve  Disapprove  Don’t know 
Daily Telegraph    49   34   17 
Times    55   29   16 
Daily Express   57   26   17 
Daily Mail   61   26   13 
Sun    68   17   16 
Daily Mirror   49   38   13 
Guardian   25   66   10 






Keeping in mind the political stance of the different newspapers (see section 3.2), it is only 
the Mirror which can be argued as ‘out of touch’ with their readers with respect to their views 
of the war. Stanyer (2004: 429) remarks that “while the readers shifted position to support the 
war, the paper maintained its anti-war stance throughout”. This juxtaposition between the 
editorial line and the readers has later been regarded as the main reason for the Mirror’s 
falling sales in the period, a decrease of 4,39 % in daily circulation numbers and  
9,02 % in their Sunday numbers (see section 3.2). It is, however, not possible to prove that the 
Mirror readership actually binned their paper due to the paper’s views on the war and the 
coverage per se. Putting Iraq on top of the agenda might have been an equally important 
factor in alienating the readership, the paper moving slightly away from its usual tabloid style 
to more serious left-centre influenced reports24. In April the paper and editor Piers Morgan 
deliberately took some of the emphasis away from Iraq, again focusing on more traditional 
tabloid stories (celebrity scandals, gossip etc.), giving their circulation numbers a badly 
needed boost25.  
                                                
24 For instance, the Mirror included several liberal journalists such as Robert Fiske in their ‘Iraq team’. As sales 
continued to drop into April 2003, the paper and editor Piers Morgan moved away from their expansive war 
reporting to more traditional tabloid features (Guardian, 28.04.03) . 
25 Piers Morgan has later explained that the Mirror’s commitment to the Iraq-war was partly based on their 
highly successful coverage of the terrorist attacks of September 11. The Daily Mirror was, according to Morgan, 
the only tabloid paper to thoroughly cover the New York attacks in the months after it happened.  
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Just as the Mirror’s new and ‘serious’ war reporting was to be short-lived, Tony Blair’s 
‘Baghdad bounce’ would soon turn in favour of a new rise in opposition and new lows in 
Blair’s approval rating. A poll by YouGov for Sky News conducted in June showed that 43 % 
believed that Tony Blair had ‘deliberately distorted information’ regarding Saddam Hussein’s 
possession of WMD, with 70 % saying it ‘matters a lot’ whether Blair told the truth or not 
(yougov.co.uk, 03.06.2003). Also, a focus group survey of so-called “switchers”, former 
Conservative party voters who switched to Labour in 199726,  in the Financial Times in June 
2003 reported that they felt ‘duped’ by Blair on the war in Iraq (Financial Times, 17.06.03). 
 
The scandal over the so called ‘dodgy dossier’ and the death of Ministry of Defence-
employee, Dr. David Kelly, and the subsequent inquiry by Lord Hutton, made Blair’s 
approval ratings even worse27. In an ICM poll for the Guardian in late September, after the 
Hutton inquiry had begun its proceedings, 61 % of respondents said they were dissatisfied 
with the Prime Minister, while only 32 % responded as ‘satisfied’. 53 % answered they 
thought the war in Iraq was unjustified (with 38 % considering it to be justified), while as 
much as 70 % said they believed Blair to be “too concerned with public relations and spin” 
(ICMresearch.co.uk). A poll by ICM for the Sunday Telegraph confirmed the results of the 
Guardian survey with 67 % of people stating that the government ‘did deceive’ the public 
about Saddam Hussein’s ‘weapons of mass destruction’, 61 % saying they believed the 
dossier on Iraq’s WMD was ‘sexed up’ as reported by the BBC, while only 29 % believed 
that UK and US forces would find clear evidence of WMD in Iraq.  
 
In between the hearings of August and September 2003 and the final report of January 2004, 
Blair’s approval rating and support for the Iraq War again rose slightly (to 38 % compared to 
32 % in September)28. Once the Hutton report was published, however, Blair’s ratings again 
dropped, with 53 % stating that the PM’s reputation had deteriorated and 37 % responding 
that he should resign. Respondents stating they were ‘dissatisfied’ with Blair rose to 55 % in 
January and a further 58 % in the ICM/Guardian poll for February. Still, in March 2004, a 
year after the start of the conflict in Iraq, 48 % answered in an ICM/Newsnight poll that 
                                                
26 Blair’s first election win and the start of New Labour.  
27 David Kelly was named as the source in BBC’s disclosure of dodgy intelligence reports regarding Iraq. Lord 
Hutton was asked to lead an official judiciary inquiry into the circumstances of his death.   
28 After the successful capture of Saddam Hussein, an ICM/New Frontiers survey also showed that 55 % 
believed that it was “justified” to remove the Iraqi leader from power.  
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military action was the right thing to do with 43 % stating it was wrong. In other words, 
Blair’s approval ratings did not reflect public opinion on the war directly but was more likely 




Both the media and public opinion figures reveal several of the important contexts of this 
thesis. Firstly, figures show the sheer size of the Iraq war as a media and political event. 
Indeed, the hunger for news of the war was insatiable; a fact reflected both in newspaper 
circulation and TV and radio figures. Secondly, the British public reflected rapidly changing 
opinions of the war. What was initially a historical opposition to war, in the matter of weeks, 
witnessed a dramatic turnaround in favour of Blair and his government. Numbers reveal that 
patriotic tendencies were likely to be part of the reason for this turnaround, but, as was 
mentioned, this must only be considered as one of several factors, as it fails to explain the 
sudden political support for the Prime Minister himself. Other important contexts that form 
part of this thesis are also brought up. The French/English dispute is one example, the issue of 
WMD another. Importantly, figures also show how the war and the events surrounding the 


















Chapter 4: The ‘third way’: Blair’s international discourse 
 
 
When New Labour and its leader, Tony Blair, came to power in 1997 it represented a new 
political era in the UK. The simplicity of Labour’s catch-phrase ‘a new politics for a new 
Britain’ clearly struck a chord within the British public; a public who had grown tired of a 
long Conservative reign. The change was not only prominent in domestic politics, New 
Labour also created a new and powerful discourse of international relations and policy. It was 
a discourse whose rhetoric would see Britain face more challenges on the international arena 
than any previous Labour government ever had. The Iraq war and the controversy and debate 
that preceded the military operations themselves would become the ultimate test for what has 
been described as Blair’s ‘third way’ in international discourse.  
 
The Iraq discourse is founded on basic principles and assumptions that guide Blair and New 
Labour’s foreign policies. On the one hand these principles were set out in the early years of 
New Labour. On the other, they were set out in the aftermath of the events in the United 
States on September 11, 2001. One of the implications of the shocking terrorist attacks was 
that it changed many of the main assumptions of international relations. Accordingly, the 
international discourse had to change. This combination of the basic political assumptions of 
Labour and ‘Blairist’ international relations with the implications of September 11 forms the 
basis of the discourse on Iraq.  
 
I will look at both the political foundations and the main characteristics of Blair’s 
international discourse before and after the terrorist attacks of September 11 (section 4.1 and 
4.2), before turning to the main focus at hand, the discourse of the Iraq war (section 4.3).  
 
4.1 New Labour and the ‘third way’ 
 
Language is a crucial part of New Labour. As Norman Fairclough puts it, “language has 
always been important in politics, but the way New Labour does politics makes it more so” 
(2000: vii). New Labour is a rhetorical move in itself; it is a ‘vision’ of a ‘new politics’ for a 
‘new Britain’. The ‘new’ in Labour was, of course, intended to indicate change from ‘old’ 
Labour: New Labour was by no means to be confused with the stale ‘socialist’ and left to 
centre politics that allegedly had prevailed in the Labour party for such a long time. Instead it 
 45 
was supposed to spark an idea of reinvention, a fresh start for Britain. And it worked. Labour 
won a landslide victory taking 418 seats in parliament, making it the biggest election victory 
Labour had ever witnessed (the Conservative party taking only 165 seats).  
 
Since the very start of New Labour the media have been a central concern within the party. 
Fairclough (2000: vii), perhaps fittingly, describes New Labour’s media relationship as being 
marked by an ever present and “notorious taste for media spin”. This taste is for instance seen 
in the important political roles assigned to PR-experts and political advisors such as Philip 
Gould and Alastair Campbell29. Their influence led to a firmer control and monitoring of the 
governmental discourse and the language of leaders such as Blair became carefully 
scrutinised. Conservative expressions such as ‘privatisation’ were much dreaded, as were 
typical left-wing terms such as ‘socialism’ (Fairclough 2000: vii). Instead, at the heart of New 
Labour, we find the idea of ‘enterprise and fairness’, a rhetoric of reconciliation between 
economic freedom and social justice. As Fairclough points out, the rhetoric of New Labour is 
full of such language, full of expressions signifying a ‘not only this but also that’ attitude.  
 
Even more significant was perhaps the idea of a ‘third way’. Not only was it central to New 
Labour ideology on both a domestic and international agenda, it is another prime example of 
the sort of rhetoric and political discourse the party became so fond of. The very concept of a 
‘third way’ signifies a new political direction which goes beyond the simple left or right 
divide. It marks an “attempt by centre and centre-left Governments to re-define a political 
programme that is neither old left nor 1980s right” (TB-24.04.99). Consider, for instance, a 
passage from Blair’s speech to the Confederation of British Industry in 1998:  
 
This is the third way. A belief in social justice and economic dynamism, ambition and 
compassion, fairness and enterprise going together (…) The third way is a new politics 
that helps people cope with a more insecure world because it rejects the destructive 
excesses of the market and the intrusive hand of state intervention. It is about an 
enabling government that gives people the chance of a better future in which all people 
can play their part (Blair 1998 cited in Fairclough 2000: 10) 
 
The key assumptions of ‘enterprise and fairness’ are reemphasised by Blair, along with a 
rejection of an intrusive state (old left) and a ridicule of the failing social welfare policy of the 
Conservatives (old right). The ‘new’ politics of the ‘third way’ is designed to ‘help’ people 
                                                
29 Gould has later been acknowledged as the man behind coining ‘New Labour’.  
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who are faced with two negatives, “the destructive excesses of the market” on the one hand 
(the ideology of the right), and the “intrusive hand of state intervention” on the other (the 
ideology of the left). The positive lexicalisation echoes the ‘fairness and enterprise’ ethos; it is 
‘social justice’ combined with ‘dynamism’, ‘ambition’ and ‘compassion’. The central notion 
is of something new and vibrant (‘new politics’), that is still accountable and realistic.  
 
The ‘third way’ is an important metaphor. It is grounded in a POLITICS IS A JOURNEY 
metaphor, which in turn is closely related to a metaphor of PROGRESS IS FORWARD 
MOVEMENT.  Within this frame, the concept of a ‘third way’ implicitly sparks notions of 
something ‘new’ and ‘challenging’ that emerges out of the old two-way divide between left 
and right. We conceptualise a cross-roads where we are left with two ‘old’ and pre-existing 
paths (which we have ‘gone down before’) and one new ‘third way’ which we have yet to try. 
A passage from the 1997 New Labour manifesto provides a good example:  
 
The vision is one of national renewal, a country with drive, purpose and energy … In 
each area of policy a new and distinctive approach has been mapped out, one that 
differs from the old left and the Conservative right. This is why new Labour is new 
(NLM-1997) 
 
‘Drive’, ‘purpose’, ‘energy’, ‘distinctive approach, ‘mapped out’ all relate to progress or 
movement. Also, the notion of ‘mapping out’ implies that this is not some remote and 
undiscovered political path, but planned and considered, created on a ‘vision’ of ‘renewal’. It 
is also a metaphor that spells ‘conviction’. Any ‘new’ path inherently involves a ‘fear’ of the 
unknown. Tony Blair is thus a leader who is willing to take the ‘risk’ which is required to 
prosper; he is a man of strong conviction.  
 
But as much as New Labour created a language of a ‘new’ direction in politics, it was not 
necessarily always clear what this remake would consist of. Much of the ‘third way’ discourse 
and ‘protocol’ was indeed made up as it went along, trying to put “flesh on the broad idea” 
(Kampfner 2004: 12). Finlayson (1999: 271) agrees that the idea of a ‘third way’ appeared in 
Labour politics “before it had a definite content”, thus “analysts were left considering not how 
useful or coherent it was, but what it might actually be”. The discourse of New Labour and 
the ‘third way’ was, in other words, no coherent political theory, with a readily available 
discourse. It was rather a matter of creating a discourse that coincided with the political 
progress.   
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This was much the case with regards to creating an international discourse too. Just as on the 
home front, a ‘third way’ discourse of international relations would to a significant extent be 
carved out as it went along. Importantly, Blair and his associates had an important ideological 
ally in US President Clinton and his administration. Blair and Clinton were not only 
committed to a further development of cross-Atlantic relations, they also shared a similar 
domestic agenda that they wanted to broadcast to the world. This resulted in what Kampfner 
(2004: 13) calls a ‘third way’ roadshow that “would take like-minded politicians and thinkers 
to Washington, Florence, Berlin and New York”. Still, Blair was very much the instigator of 
this international roadshow. A key moment was his speech in Chicago in April 1999, in which 
he outlined what he called “a new doctrine of the international community”. The speech 
outlines many of the key assumptions that would guide British international politics in years 
to come.  
 
4.2 The ‘third way’ in international politics 
 
Timing was everything for Blair when he made his speech in Chicago. After a longer period 
of diplomatic efforts Blair had been the catalyst in NATO’s intervention into events in 
Kosovo, where, as Blair put it, “unspeakable things are happening … awful crimes that we 
never thought we would see again have reappeared – ethnic cleansing, systematic rape, mass 
murder” (TB-24.04.99). To Blair, Kosovo represented a war that was based on a moral 
obligation to help a suffering nation:  
 
This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values. We cannot let 
the evil of ethnic cleansing stand. We must not rest until it is reversed. We have 
learned twice before in this century that appeasement does not work. If we let an evil 
dictator range unchallenged, we will not spill infinitely more blood and treasure to 
stop him later. (TB-24.04.99) 
  
Blair’s primary justification for NATO intervention in Kosovo is a moral one: it is based on 
‘values’. A key feature of this discourse of morality is that ‘we’, in this case the ‘Western’ 
international community, have a responsibility to stop the atrocities against the Kosovo-
Albanians. Beneath this key notion two different discourses are present. The most salient is 
the historical reference to atrocities in the last century. The main rhetoric is that 
‘appeasement’ did not work in stopping Nazi atrocities and will not work this time either (see 
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also historical association, section 4.3.2). Notably, appeasement here represents the negative 
effects of diplomacy, and the underlying assumption is that diplomacy is indeed a waste of 
time; firm action is needed.  
 
But at the same time as Blair emphasises this firm position (‘inaction is not an option’ 
rhetoric), he still balances this against a ‘costs and benefits’ rhetoric as acknowledged by 
Lakoff in what he called Clausewitz’s-metaphor (e.g. POLITICS IS BUSINESS, see section 
2.3.2). The reasoning of Blair is, however, slightly different to the traditional assumptions of 
the Clausewitz-metaphor; that war or armed conflict is based on a simple estimate of costs 
and benefits. For example, Blair makes use of a ‘cost/balances’ assessment when he argues 
that if we do not act now our costs will be much greater later on: “we will have to spill 
infinitely more blood and treasure (…) later” (TB-24.04.99). At the same time, a simple 
POLITICS IS BUSINESS approach is unfulfilling when it comes to the moral obligations that 
face the international community. In addition to a ‘Clausewitz’-assessment, there is 
considerable emphasis on the moral grounds for action. Accordingly, Blair repeatedly 
emphasises the importance of looking at what is happening in a wider context; “people want 
to know not only that we are right to take this action but also that we have clear objectives and 
that we are going to succeed”. Further, Blair argues that the “principle of non-interference 
must be qualified in important respects. Acts of genocide can never be a purely internal 
matter” (TB-24.04.99). A ‘new international doctrine’, in other words, involves a rethink of 
the traditional guiding principles of international relations. To Blair, the ‘new’ world requires 
a modification of the traditional protectionist and isolationist principles of international 
relations. This modification entails an obligation and duty to engage and participate in the 
international community.  
 
This moral obligation of intervention is a key assumption in a ‘third way’ international 
discourse. This principle of intervention is based on a governing discourse of globalisation; a 
discourse where a new and global world community represents new challenges. As Blair 
states in his 1999 speech:  
 
I believe the world has changed in a more fundamental way. Globalisation has 
transformed our economies and our working practices. But globalisation is not just 
economic. It is also a political and security phenomenon … We live in a world where 
isolationism has ceased to have a reason to exist. By necessity we have to co-operate 
with each other across nations. (TB-24.04.99) 
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To Blair, globalisation changes the pertinence of the traditional and ‘old’ way of thought in 
international politics. The end of the bipolar political world climate with the fall of Soviet 
Russia, combined with the rapid rise of several new foreign markets, changes the whole 
outlook of international relations. Consequently, the discourse has to change, and just as in 
domestic politics, the ‘third way’ represents a new way forward in international politics and a 
turn away from the ‘old’ doctrine of isolationism. Thus, it is a rejection of both ‘traditional’ 
left-wing/socialist ideas and the Conservative right. ‘Old’ thought is marked by ‘isolationism’ 
which arguably carries several negative notions in what Blair calls a “completely new 
world”30. An ‘isolationist’ approach has “ceased to have a reason to exist” due to the new 
challenges that have surfaced on the international stage. And perhaps even more importantly, 
globalisation means that events on one side of the world affect the other. As Blair states, 
“many of our domestic problems are caused on the other side of the world”, before referring 
to both financial and political events with world-wide effects (TB-24.04.99).  
 
Blair’s globalisation discourse is largely conceptualised through the idea of an international 
community. This way of understanding global politics is reasoned in a conceptual metaphor 
NATION STATE IS A PERSON, which in turn evokes an international community 
metaphor. As Lakoff argues:  
  
A state is conceptualized as a person, engaging in social relations within a world 
community. Its land-mass is its home. It lives in a neighborhood, and has neighbors, 
friends and enemies. States are seen as having inherent dispositions: they can be 
peaceful or aggressive, responsible or irresponsible, industrious or lazy (Lakoff 1991: 
3).  
 
The ‘neighbourhood’ is, of course, the same as the community. Consequently, the global 
international community means that all nations are part of the same community; ‘we are all 
neighbours’. Thus, what was before considered too remote and far away to be a ‘threat’, must 
now be considered as a possible enemy31. Bastow and Martin (2003: 41) point out that in the 
‘third way’ an emphasis on ethics is “typically accompanied by an appeal to ‘community’”, 
and the community is seen as an “practically cohesive moral order”. An important feature of 
                                                
30 More positive notions of ’isolationism’ may be represented in lexical choices such as ’protectionism’ or a 
‘moderate’ approach. In a globalisation discourse, ‘isolationism’ represents a reluctance to participate in the 
world community, and to take part in diplomatic processes. As Blair himself states, “twenty years ago we would 
not have been fighting in Kosovo. We would have turned our backs on it”.  
31 Perhaps unlike when Lakoff published his paper on the First Gulf War and there did not exist any globalisation 
discourse.  
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all communities is the notion of a common identity; an identity which is often ‘heightened’ by 
the existence of an ‘absent presence’ – a presence that ‘undermines’ or ‘declines’ the 
contingent factors of the community (see Bastow & Martin 2003: 41-42). This ‘notion of a 
common identity’ is central to the conceptualisation of a community metaphor, even at an 
international political level. In the community which Blair adheres to, the notion of identity is 
realised through common beliefs and challenges.  
 
It is within this conceptualisation of a community in which the notion of ‘threat’ is 
understood. Instead of approaching ‘globalisation’ as an opportunity (e.g. the opportunity of 
access for the third world economy to worldwide markets), it is presented as a threat; “a set of 
problems to overcome” (Fairclough 2005: 45). Indeed, to Blair, effects of globalisation first 
and foremost lead to challenges related to refugees, drugs and finance:  
 
Financial instability in Asia destroys jobs in Chicago and in my own constituency in 
County Durham. Poverty in the Caribbean means more drugs on the streets in 
Washington and London. Conflict in the Balkans causes more refugees in Germany 
and here in the US. (TB-24.04.99) 
 
Hay and Rosamond (2002: 155) argue that the ‘threatening’ effects of globalisation that Blair 
sets out are founded in a globalization discourse constructed within the more familiar 
economic and political boundaries. Moreover, it is important to differentiate clearly between 
the effects of globalisation itself and the strategic employment of globalisation as a 
convenient justification32. Within the community metaphor there is, indeed, no ready script 
for constructing a negative ‘threat’ scenario to globalisation challenges. Rather, Blair’s 
construction of a world-view is highly dependent on context: in one economic context it is 
positive (free-trade, economic freedom), in another it is negative (“financial instability in Asia 
destroys jobs in Chicago”). In a security-context it is a most definite negative.   
 
One of the important ways in which Blair imagines the threat of globalisation is through an 
‘us’ vs. ‘them’ dichotomy. In this bifurcation, ‘us’ represents the ‘Western’ world, and 
includes ‘our’ moral, economic and financial systems, and subsequent political doctrines and 
policy. ‘We’, are then set against the antagonists, ‘them’, which constitutes a threat to ‘our’ 
values and belief systems. According to Van Dijk (1998: 59) this polarization is a familiar 
                                                
32 According to Hay and Rosamond the “effects of having internalised popular constructions of globalisation” 
(i.e. the discourse) is “all too frequently” mistaken for the effects of globalisation itself (Hay and Rosamond 
2002: 155).  
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ideological pattern, “whereby We are associated with positive values such as democracy, 
rationality and non-violence, and They with dictatorship, violence and irrationality”. The 
ideological implications of an ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ bifurcation can be translated into an ideological 
square where the aim is to:  
 
 a) Emphasise our good properties / actions 
 b) Emphasise their bad properties / actions 
 c) Mitigate our bad properties / actions 
 d) Mitigate their good properties / actions  
        (van Dijk, 1998: 33) 
 
In Blair’s speech this bifurcation of the world can be easily identified through lexical choices. 
‘We’ are inextricably connected to the “values we cherish”, which implicitly are based on 
‘democracy’, ‘freedom’, ‘rationality’ and ‘progression’. The negative ‘other’ representation is 
marked by a colourful and varied lexicalisation: ‘they’ have ‘dictators’ and ‘barbarous 
regimes’ who are ‘dangerous’ and ‘ruthless’ and launch ‘vicious campaigns’, bringing 
‘calamity’ on their own people. Blair’s lexicalisation makes use of what Fowler has described 
as over-lexicalisation: “the existence of an excess of quasi-synonymous terms for entities and 
ideas that are a particular preoccupation or problem in the culture’s discourse” (1991: 85). In 
the case of setting up a ‘third way’ discourse of international relations, the ‘lexical over-kill’ 
is meant to produce what Fairclough calls ‘discourses of malignity’ represented in “politics 
(e.g. ‘dictators’), law and order (e.g. ‘crime’), and religion (e.g. ‘evil’). Notably, protagonist 
values are not explicitly stated but rather assumed and presupposed. In contrast, antagonist 
features and values are relatively explicitly stated and are often highly repetitive. 
 
The community metaphor is reinforced in the ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ polarisation. ‘Us’ refers to the 
‘Western’ allies and a range of common values that are implicit; ‘them’ constitutes the 
‘threat’ to those very values which are so important in a healthy community. Thus, as Blair 
states, “the spread of our values makes us safer” (TB-24.04.99). The best way to protect ‘our’ 
own values and beliefs is, in other words, by actively getting involved in conflicts that might 
not have been regarded as important in previous decades. As Blair continues:  
 
Non -interference has long been considered an important principle of international 
order. And it is not one we would want to jettison too readily. One state should not 
feel it has the right to change the political system of another or forment subversion or 
seize pieces of territory to which it feels it should have some claim. But the principle 
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of non-interference must be qualified in important respects. Acts of genocide can 
never be a purely internal matter. (TB-24.04.99) 
 
The rationale of Blair is clearly linked to a ‘community’ and ‘partnership’ discourse similar to 
a domestic ‘third way’ discourse. As Fairclough (2005: 49) remarks, Blair “explicitly extends 
the concepts of ‘community’ and ‘partnership’ from a national to an international scale”. The 
challenge is to find a middle-way between ‘isolationism’ and ‘interventionism’. Two 
important metaphors are in play. One is the already mentioned community metaphor. The 
other is a container-metaphor, which is important in relation to both international and 
domestic politics. For instance, nations are often conceptualised as containers which can be 
‘open’ or ‘closed’, ‘sealed’/’shut’ or ‘leaking’ etc. In international relations an isolationist 
approach would entail a strong emphasis on the container, while globalisation would seek 
away from it. Blair advocates an ‘opening up’ but is careful to balance his argument by stating 
that “one state should not feel it has the right to change the political system of another” (TB-
24.04.99) 
 
4.2.1 The impact of 11 September 
 
Back in April 1999 it was war in the Balkans that was the primary concern of Tony Blair and 
the New Labour government on the international stage. Interventionism was in its early 
stages; the Kosovo war indeed being one the first wars justified by a need for political 
intervention on foreign territory. Kosovo was a success story for Blair and combined with 
efforts within the European Union, Blair had set himself apart as one of the most prominent 
and outspoken world leaders. Then came the terrorist attacks in New York on September 11th 
2001, and in the matter of one single day, the international community was shaken beyond 
recognition. In the Blair government there was a feeling that the world “would never be the 
same again” (Kampfner 2004: 111).  
 
The attacks produced a frantic search for new discourses. Being both unprecedented and 
highly unpredictable there was no readily available discourse to turn to for political leaders. 
Nevertheless, the first attempts to frame a discourse to deal with the situation came from the 
main targets the United States. First, the Bush administration attempted to frame the situation 
simply as ‘war’. But the attacks clearly did not spark the conventional notions of warfare 
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within the public and had to be amended to the idea of a ‘war against terrorism’ (indeed more 
similar to familiar conceptions of ‘war’ on ‘drugs’, ‘crime’, etc.).  
 
As Aitchison (2003: 194) points out, there was a linguistic confusion in the international 
community immediately preceding the attacks, “the condemnation was clear, though the 
terminology required to describe it took time to evolve". Lakoff (2001: 3) agrees. The initial 
framing of the terrorist attacks and the metaphors used did not fit. It could not be treated 
simply as a crime with ‘victims’ and ‘criminals’ that needed to be ‘brought to justice’ and 
‘punished’, as “the crime frame entails law, courts, lawyers, trials, sentencing, appeals, and so 
on”. ‘War’, then, would perhaps fit better, fulfilling the need for vastly stronger language. But 
while there are ‘enemies’ and ‘casualties’, there is no enemy army, no regiments, no tanks 
(…) and no clear ‘victory’ (Lakoff 2001: 3). As a result, the Bush administration frantically 
searched for new metaphors to be used, some clearly not as good as others; for instance, the 
use of ‘cowards’ did not necessarily reflect well on martyrs willing to sacrifice their lives for 
their ideological and religious beliefs.  
 
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, Blair outlined his post-September 11 thoughts in 
a speech at the Labour Party Conference on October 2nd:  
 
In retrospect, the Millennium marked only a moment in time. It was the events of 
September 11 that marked a turning point in history, where we confront the dangers of 
the future and assess the choices facing humankind (…)  
 
Be in no doubt: Bin Laden and his people organised this atrocity. The Taliban aid and 
abet him. He will not desist from further acts of terror. They will not stop helping him. 
(…) Whatever the dangers of the action we take, the dangers of inaction are far, far 
greater. (TB-02.10.01) 
 
The feeling of the post-September 11th world as something unprecedented and exceptional is 
inescapable. Terrorism, now solely symbolised by the terrorist attacks that took place in New 
York, is not only a ‘threat’, but also a danger to ‘humankind’. Blair’s choice of words gives a 
conception of a doomsday scenario that anticipates action. The bottom line is simple, ‘if we 
do not act, our very existence is threatened’; “the dangers of inaction are far, far greater”. The 
definition of a ‘target’, “those that finance terror, those who launder their money, those that 
cover their tracks”, is similar to that of US President Bush and his famous catch phrase 
‘terrorists and those who harbour them’. The definition is not only purposely vague, it is also 
purposely broad. The idea of an enemy that can be ‘everywhere’, and could be ‘anyone’, 
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perhaps echoes an overall fear and concern in the world at the time, but significantly it also 
spreads fear within the public, resulting in a reinforced legitimisation for action.  
 
Blair’s speech is full of similar images of fear that help provide a legitimacy of the military 
response that would follow:  
 
But understand what we are dealing with. Listen to the calls of those passengers on the 
planes. Think of the children on them, told they were going to die … Think of the 
cruelty beyond our comprehension as amongst screams and the anguish of the 
innocent, those hijackers drove at full throttle planes laden with fuel into buildings 
where tens of thousands worked … There is no compromise possible with such 
people, no meeting of minds, no point of understanding with such terror. Just a choice: 
defeat or be defeated by it. And defeat it we must. (TB-02.10.01) 
 
The language of Blair is apocalyptic; the notion of ‘a cruelty beyond comprehension’ and the 
image of planes at “full throttle” flying “into buildings” relives the images of fear that 
represent the 11 September attacks. Moreover, the idea that there is no “point of 
understanding with such terror” has an important rhetorical function in silencing any 
opposition to action; the choice is simple, “defeat or be defeated by it”. As Blair states, there 
can be no “moral ambiguity” in this matter, and any attempts to ‘justify’ the events of 11 
September are to turn matters on its head (TB-02.10.01). Significantly, this rhetoric 
invalidates any attempt at constructing a more moderate approach by branding it as an attempt 
to justify the horrific events in New York and Washington. Indeed, any attempt to ‘justify’ 
events basically stop nothing short of what must be seen as support for the terrorist and their 
actions.  
 
This ‘with us or against us’ rhetoric is highly similar to the discourse of the Bush 
administration in the US33. However, the discourse in the UK sets itself significantly apart in 
its attempt to put the events of September 11 in the perspective of an ‘international 
community’ as outlined in Blair's 1999 speech on a ‘new doctrine of the international 
community’:  
 
Today conflicts rarely stay within national boundaries … Today a tremor in one 
financial market is repeated in the markets of the world … Today confidence is global; 
either its presence or its absence …(…) I have long believed this interdependence 
                                                
33 See for instance Porpora & Nikolaev (2008) and Ferarri (2007) for more recent accounts of the US discourse 
in relation to Iraq and the ‘war on terrorism’.  
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defines the new world we live in (…) We can't do it all. Neither can the Americans. 
(TB-02.10.01) 
 
Here, Blair repeats many of the same ideas that are presented in his 1999 speech and puts 
them in the perspective of events such as Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Rwanda. The inclusion of 
the ‘internationalist’ rhetoric that Blair here asserts to is significant in that it adds the 
mentioned moral obligation and accountability into the post-September 11 response. Thus, the 
UK discourse sets itself a part from the political discourse of the Bush administration in the 
United States. To Blair, the campaign against terrorism must be combined with a moral 
obligation to protect and help a wider international community including countries outside the 
‘Western’ alliance. The difference may have a natural explanation in the US having an 
obvious desire for revenge and being able to punish those people accountable. While there 
indeed were British casualties and certainly a desire for justice in the European community, it 
was still important to make any responsive action morally and rationally accountable34. At the 
same time, it is clear that the moral accountability is much more of a fundamental pillar in the 
UK discourse than compared to the US discourse shaped in the aftermath of September 11. 
The example thus shows how the ethical and moral dimension is an intangible characteristic 
of the ‘third way’ international discourse35.  
 
If anything, September 11 entrenched the polarisation of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’, with the cruelty of 
the terrorist attacks signified the immoral and ‘evil’ nature of the antagonists. This is 
reinforced in the dooming and fearful imaging that is seen in Blair’s lexicalisation over the 
attacks.  The symbolic effect of September 11 would have an important discursive impact. 
Prior to the attacks in New York and Washington, Blair’s focus on the potential threats posed 
by globalisation was central in his international discourse; it was an attempt to re-imagine a 
traditional worldview. Post 11 September this global re-imagining was quite simply taken for 
granted. The impact of this would become highly significant in the Iraq discourse that would 




                                                
34 67 British citizens lost their lives in the terrorist attacks (Guardian, 18.09.02).  
35 In his research, Charteris-Black (2005: 146) found that Blair uses a word from the domain of ethics and 
morality once every 128 words in his speeches (in comparison Conservative PM Margaret Thatcher used one per 
183 words). According to Charteris-Black this “seems to confirm the impression that ethical discourse is a 




The previous sections in this chapter outlined the basic assumptions that form the fundament 
of Blair’s Iraq discourse. The main assumptions in Blair’s international discourse were that:  
 
a) International relations must adopt a moral accountability to intervene when 
needed. 
b) Globalisation makes any isolationist tendencies futile. Engaging in the ‘new’ world 
is essential.  
c) A failure to realise and acknowledge the effects of globalisation may constitute a 
threat. Indeed, several aspects of globalisation must essentially be regarded as a 
threat.  
 
Within these assumptions Blair attempts to frame the events of September 11. At the same 
time the attacks also represent new implications for the international community:  
 
a) Conventional ideas of international security must be reconsidered.  
b) New ‘threats’ reinforce the importance of a moral accountability and international 
engagement.  
 
Accordingly, globalisation and the threat of terrorism constitute the two most important 
contexts for framing the discourse of Iraq.  
 
I will make several useful distinctions within the Iraq discourse. Firstly, there are differences 
between the pre-war discourse and the discourse once the war got under way. Secondly, I 
propose that the pre-war discourse, primarily aimed at legitimising military operations in Iraq, 
can be separated into two different discourses: a discourse of security, and a discourse of 
morality36. I will firstly look at these two main discourses (sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2), before 
considering other discursive features (4.3.3). Finally, I will look at the post-war discourse 
(4.3.4) and look at how the discourse changed a year after the war started, in accordance with 
what was outlined in the introduction.  
 
                                                
36 This is not, however, to say that the two discourses are independent of each other. They are rather two 
different parts of an overall political discourse of the Iraq war.  
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4.3.1 Security discourse 
 
As was mentioned above, one of the most important discursive consequences of September 11 
was an acceptance of a global world view. Consequently, the assumption that remote militant 
groups or regimes could pose a significant threat to domestic security became unquestionable. 
Accordingly, September 11 became a highly powerful rhetorical tool in the legitimisation 
process with regards to military operations in Iraq. In his speech in September 2002, marking 
the one-year anniversary of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, Blair, for 
instance, stated:  
  
On September 11 last year, with the world still reeling from the shock of events, it 
came together to demand action. But suppose I had come last year on the same day as 
this year - September 10. Suppose I had said to you: there is a terrorist network called 
al-Qaida. It operates out of Afghanistan. It has carried out several attacks and we 
believe it is planning more. It has been condemned by the UN in the strongest terms. 
Unless it is stopped, the threat will grow. And so I want to take action to prevent that 
(...) Your response and probably that of most people would have been very similar to 
the response of some of you yesterday on Iraq (...) There would have been few takers 
for dealing with it and probably none for taking military action of any description. 
(TB-10.09.02) 
 
Here, the discursive effect of September 11 is two-fold. On the one hand it works familiarly 
as an indicator of the gravity and emotional effect of the situation: the ‘threat’ is real and will 
grow “unless it is stopped”. Secondly, there is an emphasis that September 11 was a turning 
point in international relations (September 10th indicates the ‘old’ way of thinking). 
Consequently, the new post-September 11 world requires a new approach to international 
relations, a line of thought reminiscent of previous Blair speeches.  
 
Furthermore, it is within this September 11th discourse that Blair raises his concerns over the 
state of Iraq and the regime of Saddam Hussein. Although he might not state it explicitly, it is 
implicit that the failure to deal with the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein could (and is likely 
to) result in similar prospects such as the terrorist attacks of September 2001. While ‘hard’ 
evidence of a link between Iraq and terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida proved difficult to 
establish, any mention of the two together was likely to have a legitimising effect due to the 
emotional and justifiable impact of 11 September represented. Thus, any deliberate 
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‘distortion’ of roles could have a legitimising effect37. In addition, the ‘interventionist’ 
discourse outlined back in 1999 is now an implicit part of Blair's discourse; there is no 
qualifying argument backing the assumption that “unless it is stopped, the threat will grow”. 
Accordingly, interventionism can not only be accounted for on moral grounds (e.g. Kosovo), 
but also on the basis of security. The association between ‘Saddam’ and September 11, 
although sometimes subtle, is one such basis38.  
 
The other more significant basis for a security justification lies in the link between Saddam 
Hussein and a chemical and biological weapons programme. The threat is clear to Blair:  
 
I sometimes think that there is a kind of word fatigue about chemical and biological 
weapons. We're not talking about some mild variants of everyday chemicals, but 
anthrax, sarin and mustard gas - weapons that can cause hurt and agony on a mass 
scale beyond the comprehension of most decent people (TB-10.09.02).   
 
Blair’s persistence on the inability to comprehend how dangerous these ‘chemical and 
biological weapons’ really are, confirms the idea of an immediate and real threat39. The 
discursive intention is in both cases to emphasise the threatening and dangerous implications 
of inaction, and add to the image of fear that is created by the threat of ‘weapons of mass 
destruction’. The combination of the frightening aspect of a nuclear attack and the association 
to September 11 make up a powerful security justification for war. The rhetorical end line is 
simple; we must take action to prevent it.  
 
The security legitimisation of the Iraq war is repeated in several of Blair’s speeches. Consider, 
for instance, Blair’s speech opening the debate on Iraq in the House of Commons on the 18th 
of March 2003, just days before the war started:  
 
                                                
37 Polls in the United States showed that around the two-year anniversary of 11 September and almost six 
months after the start of the Iraq War 7 out of 10 Americans believed Saddam Hussein and his Iraq regime was 
involved in the attacks on New York and Washington. The misconception is likely to be grounded in the 
numerous links between the Iraq regime and 11 September claimed by President Bush and his administration. 
Although Blair was much more reluctant in his claims, there are several examples that show a ‘distortion’ 
between terrorist groups, the Iraq regime and 11 September (Poll conducted by the Washington Post between 7-
11 August 2003, published September 6, 2003, washingtonpost.com).  
38 Although Blair is subtler than his American ally Bush,  the association of Blair is arguably also partly based on 
a persistent focus from the US administration that the ‘war on terrorism’ is not only with the terrorist themselves 
but, as Bush famously stated, also with “those who harbour them” (GB-11.09.01).  
39 It is indeed highly similar to the image presented in the US of how the ‘smoking gun’ could turn out to be a 
‘mushroom cloud’. 
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... the possibility of the two coming together - of terrorist groups in possession of 
WMD, even of a so-called dirty radiological bomb is now, in my judgement, a real and 
present danger ... And let us recall: what was shocking about September 11 was not 
just the slaughter of the innocent; but the knowledge that had the terrorists been able 
to, there would have been not 3,000 innocent dead, but 30,000 or 300,000 and the 
more the suffering, the greater the terrorists’ rejoicing ... Three kilograms of VX from 
a rocket launcher would contaminate a quarter of a square kilometre of a city (TB-
18.03.03).  
 
Even though Blair admits that the ‘association’ between Iraq and terrorist groups, specifically 
Al Qaida, is ‘loose’, the association between terrorism on the scale of September 11th is 
repeated: a failure to act on the ‘threat’ of the Iraqi regime could lead to dreadful events. The 
association is full of rhetorical potential, very much resembling an attempt to create a self-
defence scenario similar to that argued by Lakoff (1991). Based in the NATION STATE IS A 
PERSON metaphor, the self-defence scenario entails that war is justified on the basis of the 
threat alone, and is linked to what Lakoff calls a ‘strict father morality’, where military action 
is validated by the need to punish and hold the protagonists (‘evil’) accountable. According to 
Lakoff (2002), a ‘strict father morality’ is central to a conservative worldview (as opposed to 
a liberal viewpoint seen in a ‘nurturant parent morality’, see also section 4.3.2).  
 
The self-defence scenario entails that a failure to act will result in the threat of terrorism 
becoming a reality; thus the UK will have blood on their hands. In his address to the nation on 
the eve of war, Blair stated:   
  
The threat to Britain today is not that of my father's generation. War between the big 
powers is unlikely. Europe is at peace. The cold war already a memory ... But this new 
world faces a new threat: of disorder and chaos born either of brutal states like Iraq, 
armed with weapons of mass destruction; or of extreme terrorist groups. Both hate our 
way of life, our freedom, our democracy ... My fear, deeply held, based in part on the 
intelligence that I see, is that these threats come together and deliver catastrophe to our 
country and world. These tyrannical states do not care for the sanctity of human life. 
The terrorists delight in destroying it (TB-20.03.03).  
 
Blair reinforces the immediate ‘threat’ and the self-defence scenario. Furthermore, he 
juxtaposes the ‘old’ world, “my father’s generation”, with the ‘new’ world. Underlying this 
juxtaposition is an important metaphor of PROGRESS IS FORWARD MOVEMENT. A 
changed political climate internationally requires action and the need for new politics is 
conceptualised partly through a metaphor where the ‘old system’ is ‘backwards’ and 
‘regressive’, whilst Blair’s more interventionist ideas are the ‘way forward’ and ‘progressive’. 
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Thus, it may also explain why a self-defence scenario was impossible to ascribe to the Gulf 
War back in 1991, but is applicable to the Second Gulf War 12 years later (see Lakoff 1991, 
2003)40.  
 
An ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ dichotomy is as significant as ever before. ‘They’ are ‘tyrannical states’ 
that hate “our way of life, our freedom, our democracy”. Who ‘they’ actually consist of is 
blurred, represented as both ‘terrorists’ and ‘brutal states like Iraq’, and poses the question of 
whether this is part of a deliberate distortion between the two groups (the connection is almost 
admittedly vague: ‘based partly on intelligence’). Other lexical choices such as the use of the 
abbreviation ‘WMD’ is interesting. Firstly, the term is undeniably linked to the Iraq war. In 
fact, using ‘WMD’ as short for ‘weapons of mass destruction’ was virtually non-existent prior 
to the ‘war on terror’ and the start of the harsher rhetoric against Saddam Hussein and Iraq41. 
The term shows how policy makers contribute to the lexicalisation of war; as Richardson 
suggests, the phrase WMD is shown to be “directly related to the propaganda of the US/UK” 
(Richardson 2007: 188). An ‘us’ and ‘them’ framing is central in its conception; indeed, it is 
only ‘them’ who have ‘WMD’, a term which carries negative assumptions. ‘We’ do not have 
‘WMD’, but what is more likely to be represented as a ‘nuclear programme’. In essence, the 
concept of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ and ‘WMD’ became a highly implicit term, 
conceptualising an ‘us’ and ‘them’ framing.  
 
Further, it is interesting to note how the concept of ‘WMD’/’weapons of mass destruction’ is 
used. For instance, in Blair’s press conference on 28th of February, the concept of ‘WMD’ is 
modified by either ‘the threat of’ or the potential ‘development’ of these weapons (TB-
28.02.03). Interestingly, in Blair’s speech to the House of Commons on the 18th of March the 
highly significant distinction of ‘threat’ is gone, substituted by a possessive pronoun: “Iraq 
and its WMD” (TB-18.03.03, emphasis added). Similarly, in his address to the nation, Blair 
speaks of disarming “Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction” and of “brutal states like Iraq, 
armed with weapons of mass destruction” (TB-20.03.03). There is, of course, a significant 
difference in the modification used by Blair in February and the highly implicit language he 
                                                
40 Lakoff argued that an attempt to frame the Gulf war within a self-defence scenario failed to gain acceptance 
with the American people (e.g. protecting American oil interests).  
41 For instance, the Times only had 8 articles containing the abbreviation ‘WMD’ in 2002 (none in 2001), 
compared to 202 articles in 2003. The Guardian showed a similar pattern, the number of articles rising from 68 
in 2002 to 630 in 2003, while only 7 prior to 2002 (guardian.co.uk/timesonline.co.uk).  
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uses in March. While he in February acknowledges that the existence of Iraqi ‘WMD’ is not 
certain (e.g. they have means to develop it), he in March directly implies existence.  
 
The terrorism/security discourse makes use of several familiar metaphors that govern 
cognitive processes in understanding international politics. Clausewitz’s metaphor (as 
modified by Blair, see section 4.2) is central in how actions are reasoned (e.g. ‘we must act or 
it will cost us greatly later’). This Rational Actor metaphor is, however, only applicable to 
‘us’, and legitimises potential ‘damage’ with regards to civilian casualties and crimes of war, 
as seen in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Interestingly, ‘their’ actions are conceptualised through 
a different metaphor, WAR IS VIOLENT CRIME. The implication of this metaphor is, of 
course, very different. As Lakoff argues, war is here “understood only in terms of its moral 
dimension, and not, say, its political or economic dimension” (Lakoff 1991: 1). The two 
opposing metaphors are central in creating and confirming the ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ bifurcation, as 
they spark notions that ‘they’ are criminals who murder, assault and rape. As Lakoff writes, 
“we see US as rational, moral and courageous and Them as criminal and insane” (Lakoff 
1991: 2).  
 
4.3.2 Morality discourse 
 
The terrorism/security discourse is combined with a familiar discourse of morality. This is 
perhaps what has become the most significant trademark of Blair’s political discourse; a 
combination of moral values with a moral accountability (as shown in section 4.2). A good 
example is seen in Blair’s speech at the Labour Party Conference in October 2001:  
 
When we act to bring to account those that committed the atrocity of September 11, 
we do so, not out of bloodlust … We do so because it is just (…) So I believe this is a 
fight for freedom. And I want to make it a fight for justice too. Justice not only to 
punish the guilty. But justice to bring those same values of democracy and freedom to 
people round the world (TB-02.10.01). 
 
Implicit is the idea of a moral accountability towards military action: ‘we are doing the just 
thing’ and we are bringing them ‘our’ good values of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’. Indeed, 
‘we’ are here implicitly presented as liberators who will free ‘them’ from evil, at the same 
time as we can ‘punish the guilty’. The discourse of morality as exemplified here is based on 
a particular worldview which is highly similar to that of the Bush administration and 
American conservative ideas as outlined by Lakoff (2002). One of the important assumptions 
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of a conservative world-view (i.e. strict father morality) is that evil exists as a force in the 
world and must be fought. Consequently, the enemy of evil is good (‘us’) and, importantly, 
‘we’ are allowed to perform ‘lesser evils’ in the fight for ‘our’ world-view (Lakoff 2001: 4). 
In Blair’s speech from October 2001 he makes use of exactly this rationale. ‘Justice’ can only 
be gained through showing superior strength and winning a physical battle. A failure to act 
will, in other words, be immoral, regardless of the sacrifice. As Lakoff (2001: 4) remarks, 
“nothing is more important than the battle of good against evil, and if some innocent non-
combatants get in the way and get hurt, it is a shame, but it is to be expected and nothing can 
be done about it”.  
 
This evil vs. good bifurcation (i.e. ‘us’ vs. ‘them’) is as crucial in the morality discourse as it 
is in the security discourse. In the aftermath of September 11 ‘evil’ simply became the 
embodiment of terrorism in general (‘it was a tragedy. An act of evil’). While this assumption 
seemed to work well with regards to the military operations in Afghanistan, it could not be as 
easily transcribed to war in Iraq; many people were indeed sceptical to whether the link 
between terrorism and Iraq was reliable. In response to this, the regime of Saddam Hussein 
became the embodiment of a moral ‘evil’ instead. As Blair states:  
 
Looking back over 12 years, we have been victims of our own desire to placate the 
implacable, to persuade towards reason the utterly unreasonable, to hope that there 
was some genuine intent to do good in a regime whose mind is in fact evil (TB-
18.03.03). 
 
The example supports the claim by Charteris-Black (2005: 150) who argues that “the 
personification of evil had shifted from Osama Bin Laden to Saddam Hussein”. One way of 
creating this ‘personification of evil’ is through the use of historical association, comparing 
the ‘evil’ of Saddam Hussein to Hitler or Milosevic and  in turn consolidating the ‘western’, 
‘anti-fascist’ alliance (see also section 4.2). In other words, the ‘evil’ we stand up against 
today can easily be transcribed to more historically familiar and accessible events and acts of 
atrocity (comparison with Nazi-Germany understandably creates an emotional response). For 
instance in his speech to the House of Commons on 18 March 2003, Blair stated:  
 
But the only relevant point of analogy is that with history, we know what happened. 
We can look back and say: there's the time; that was the moment; for example, when 




In his speech to the Labour Party Conference in October 2001, it was Kosovo and Milosevic 
which was the association:  
 
The sceptics said it was pointless, we'd make matters worse, we'd make Milosevic 
stronger and look what happened, we won, the refugees went home, the policies of 
ethnic cleansing were reversed and one of the great dictators of the last century, will 
see justice in this century (TB-02.10.01). 
 
The historical examples such as the ones above not only work as highly symbolic associative 
notions towards Saddam Hussein, but also give Blair’s ‘struggle’ a new moral dimension. 
Blair becomes a character of moral accountability and a leading figure in the fight for ‘our’ 
values in a world of ‘evil’. Charteris-Black (2005: 151) notes, “Blair creates a role for himself 
in this epic narrative as a prophetic agent of the forces of good”42. This is backed up by a 
sometimes almost apocalyptic and biblical language.  
 
An important way in which Blair creates a personal role for himself in the moral discourse 
lies in the consistent use of a first person narration. Thus, Blair’s speeches are full of first 
person references like ‘I’ and ‘my’. For instance, when Blair speaks of the threats that “come 
together and deliver catastrophe to our country and our world”, it is based on “my fear, deeply 
held”, and “my judgement as prime minister” (TB-20.03.03). Another good example of the 
consistent use of a first person narration is seen in the Prime Minister’s speech in Spain from 
February 2003:  
 
…I don’t ignore the voices of people who are opposed to the course that we are taking. 
I understand why they take that view and I respect that view. But in the end I have got 
to say as Prime Minister to the country on an issue such as this what I believe and why 
I believe it, and I believe genuinely, passionately, that international terrorism and 
unstable repressive states developing chemical, biological, nuclear weapons are real 
threats to our security (TB-28.02.03).  
 
The example shows how Blair sets his personal conviction in the middle of proceedings; a 
conviction that is both ‘passionate’ and ‘genuine’. The focus is again taken away from the 
proceedings itself (which he implicitly admits are controversial) and onto Blair as a person 
and Prime Minister. An important underlying notion is that his job is ‘all about tough 
decisions’ which are not easy to make, but on the basis of his strong conviction he is 
confident that he can make them. This emphasis on his position as leader of the country 
                                                
42 See also Lakoff (2002) for an account of the religious impact on a conservative world-view.  
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reinforces the importance of Blair’s own personal role, and can in turn help to centre the 
debate onto his own personal conviction. 
 
Another example of how Blair turns to a moral discourse is found in Blair’s speech in the 
House of Commons when he states: “the question most often posed is not why does it matter? 
But why does it matter so much?” (TB-18.03.03). This focus involves an important 
transformation from an assertive to a directive speech act. An assertive speech act would for 
example state that “Iraq has WMD that it is inclined to use in terrorist activity”, and would in 
turn allow opposition to the argument. A directive speech act, as exampled in the case of 
Blair’s speech to the House of Commons, is, however, more of a requesting argumentation. 
As Richardson (2007: 189-90) argues, “the assertive places the imagined antagonist in a 
relation of opposing equals within the critical discussion while the directive implies a 
hierarchical relation”. Such a hierarchical position, almost resembling a teacher/student 
relationship gives way for the personal conviction rhetoric of Blair, and has an important 
impact on the framing of the debate onto the moral aspects of the legitimacy of war, rather 
than the more openly debated security issues43. Thus the transformation from the assertive to 
the directive speech act resembles a shift in argumentative approach to “emphasise an ethetic 
mode of proof, or one that relied on the character of the arguer” (Richardson 2007: 190).  
 
4.3.3 Other discursive features 
 
The two discourses of security and morality must be regarded as the basis of Blair’s Labour-
government and his discourse on the Iraq war. In addition, several other discursive features 
should be considered. Take for instance the opening lines of Blair’s speech to what was 
regarded as a crucial debate in the House of Commons on March 18 2003:  
 
At the outset I say: it is right that this house debate this issue and pass judgment. That 
is the democracy that is our right but that others struggle for in vain … And again I 
say: I do not disrespect the views of those in opposition to mine … This is a tough 
choice. But it is also a stark one: to stand British troops down and turn back; or to hold 
firm to the course we have set … I believe we must hold firm. (TB-18.03.03) 
 
A positive self-representation (as outlined in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2) is evident through the 
emphasis on the ‘democracy that is our right’ and that ‘others struggle for in vain’, and the 
                                                
43 The security issues and the legitimising of pre-emptive attacks were indeed controversial, with several papers 
questioning the evidence and intelligence that was put forward.  
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notion that ‘we must hold firm’ (physical metaphor of positive self-representation). There are 
also several familiar notions of moral accountability (‘beliefs’, ‘respect’). But as Van Dijk 
(2006: 377) argues, there also exists an manipulative effect in “suggesting that the UK 
Parliament (still) had the right to decide about going to war, although it later became clear that 
this decision had already been made the previous year”. The emphasis on the seriousness of 
the matter goes hand in hand, creating a notion that this is too serious to leave to others than 
Blair himself (i.e. he is a man of conviction and beliefs who would not lead his country into 
an unjust war).  
 
Inevitability is another highly important notion. When Blair states that the choice is between 
standing “British troops down and turn back; or to hold firm to the course we have set”, he 
also implies that not going to war would mean a reversal of an already started process (despite 
himself emphasising the right of the House to debate the issue). Within a PROGRESS IS 
FORWARD MOVEMENT metaphor “turning back” is of course a negative physical 
metaphor, which triggers notions of ‘failure’ and ‘abandonment’. The notion of inevitability 
is, of course, closely linked to the notion that it is too late not to act which is present in most 
of Blair’s pre-war speeches. Consider for instance:  
 
Our fault has not been impatience (…)That is why this indulgence has to stop. Because 
it is dangerous. It is dangerous if such regimes disbelieve us. Dangerous if they think 
they can use our weakness, our hesitation, even the natural urges of our democracy 
towards peace, against us. Dangerous because one day they will mistake our innate 
revulsion against war for permanent incapacity; when in fact, pushed to the limit, we 
will act (TB-18.03.03). 
 
Blair creates the anticipation that there is no alternative to action. The damage is in fact 
already done (in this case making ‘they’ believe “they can use our weakness … against us”), 
and the only way to make things right is by following the (inevitable) course towards war.  
 
Another important feature is patriotism. Compared to his allies in the US, Blair does not make 
significant use of patriotic elements. It is however, present on the day of the start of the war: 
“the British people will now be united in sending our armed forces our thoughts and prayers” 
despite the “deep divisions of opinion”. While Blair acknowledges the difference of opinion, 
the effect of his patriotic assertions can clearly shape a ‘with us or against us’ frame, where 
criticism implies that you do not support the troops, and ultimately do not respect potential 
lost lives in the conflict. Consequently, Blair’s turn to patriotism plays a similar silencing role 
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as was discussed with regards to his speech outlining his thoughts on the aftermath of 11 
September (see section 4.2.1).  
 
Another aspect, although not playing any significant role in his various speeches, was the 
patriotic emotions stirred by the public dispute between Blair and his French counterpart 
Jacques Chirac. Just days before the war began Blair and his associates all publicly 
condemned France, singling Chirac and foreign minister De Villepin out as the primary 
sources of a UN resolution failure. In retrospect it is easy to see that the emphasis on France 
as the only opposition to a UN mandate was highly misleading, as several other countries 
including both Russia and Germany were expressing similar concerns. Kampfner argues that:  
 
[Alistair] Campbell orchestrated a campaign of open season against the French. 
Newspapers, previously exhorted to show Britain at the heart of Europe and refrain 
from Eurosceptic xenophobia, were prompted to say whatever they wanted … 
Ministers were given ‘the highest authority’ to lay into the French  
(Kampfner 2004: 288).  
 
A successful campaign against France and Jacques Chirac would have important rhetorical 
implications as it would give an impression that a UN backing was achievable had it not been 
for French opposition which the British were eager to emphasise as unconditional and would 
prevail regardless. The strong world-wide opposition ranging from Asia to Europe, and even 
to the UN, would then be considerably silenced. Moreover, it could also work to rally the 
British public around a patriotic battle with France, the relationship between the two nations 
always having been ‘competitive’, and in turn gain support for military operations. It is 
interesting to pose the question of why the French role in the pre-war proceedings are barely 
mentioned before the last week prior to the start of the war, before becoming framed as the 
sole reason for the failure to achieve a second resolution in the UN. In his speech to the House 
of Commons Blair argues that France would “veto … whatever the circumstances” (TB-
18.03.03), implying that France do not act based on conviction, but opposition alone. UK 
Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, stated that “sadly, one country ensured that the Security 
Council would not act”, while the British ambassador to the UN, Jeremy Greenstock, 
sarcastically claimed that “one country rejected our proposed compromise even before the 
Iraqi government itself” (Independent, 18.03.03).  
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An ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ divide is again an important factor in creating an anti-France discourse. 
Putting the French alongside Saddam Hussein and implying that France is actually supportive 
of Iraq (albeit far from the truth) would of course have important discursive ramifications. 
The NATION STATE IS A PERSON metaphor also plays an important cognitive role, and 
paves way for an important RULER IS THE STATE metonymy: Chirac is France, Blair is the 
UK, Bush is the US, and not least, Saddam is Iraq. As Lakoff (1991) remarks, the metonymy 
is more likely to be used with regards to ‘dictators’ and ‘rulers’ of states such as Saddam (e.g. 
‘the battle against Saddam is a fight we cannot lose’). Still, it is also in play with regards to 
Chirac in the case of an anti-France discourse and is to be considered when analysing 
newspaper reports on the French/British dispute over Iraq.  
 
4.3.4 Post-war discourse 
 
A year after the war in Iraq things had by no means quieted down for Blair and the Labour 
government. The public scandal of the Hutton inquiry and the so-called ‘dodgy dossier’, 
combined with a deteriorating situation in Iraq itself, made Blair’s approval ratings hit new 
lows. The discourse of the Iraq war, highly reliant on the perseverance on finding WMD, had 
been ridiculed in the media. Media-spin had become one of the most despised character-traits 
of New Labour and Blair. Consequently, the discourse had to change. But could a PM with 
historically low approval ratings convince the British public that war in Iraq was the right 
thing to do as the political situation worsened day by day?  
 
In his speech in Sedgefield in March 2004, regarded as one of Blair’s most important and 
prominent speeches of his reign as PM, Blair outlined his vision of the war in Iraq. The 
speech was more than anything an attempt to justify what Blair called the most divisive 
decision he had ever had to make in politics. The discourse is markedly different from the pre-
war speeches. Firstly, in the Sedgefield speech Blair plays down his own personal role in the 
war. For instance:  
 
It is because it was in March 2003 and remains my fervent view that the nature of the 
global threat we face in Britain and round the world is real and existential and it is the 
task of leadership to expose it and fight it, whatever the political cost; and that the true 
danger is not to any single politician's reputation, but to our country if we now ignore 




There is no insistent emphasis on the personal ‘passion’ and ‘belief’ that was so important in 
the pre-war speeches. Instead Blair insists that the decision to go to war was not an issue of 
reputation, but of a sincere conviction that action was needed. This is not to say that Blair 
becomes the distanced pragmatic; he still uses his own person as an important discursive tool 
(largely maintaining the familiar I-narrative). But compared to the pre-war discourse, the 
Sedgefield speech is significantly less emotionalised and makes use of a softer tone than 
previously. Consider for instance the opening lines:  
 
No decision I have ever made in politics has been as divisive as the decision to go to 
war to in Iraq. It remains deeply divisive today. I know a large part of the public want 
to move on (…) But I know too that the nature of this issue over Iraq, stirring such 
bitter emotions as it does, can't just be swept away as ill-fitting the pre-occupations of 
the man and woman on the street. This is not simply because of the gravity of war; or 
the continued engagement of British troops and civilians in Iraq; or even because of 
reflections made on the integrity of the Prime Minister. (TB-05.03.04) 
 
In comparison to the opening lines of the speech opening the House of Commons debate on 
March 18 almost a year before, Blair’s discourse is remarkably more humble. The discursive 
attempt at silencing opposition (see section 4.3.3) is substituted by acknowledgment; their 
“alternative judgement” being both “entirely rational and arguable”, and the issue “stirring 
bitter emotions”. But perhaps more importantly, Blair tries to remove the debate from the 
emotionalised value conviction on to a more rational discourse: the debate is not about the 
integrity of the Prime Minister, but the war in Iraq. Thus, the strong conviction of Blair in 
favour of military action in Iraq was not made out of a personal ‘belief’, but the result of a 
rational and sincere political evaluation. This is highlighted in the second passage of Blair’s 
Sedgefield speech:  
 
In truth, the fundamental source of division over Iraq is not over issues of trust or 
integrity, though some insist on trying to translate it into that. Each week brings a fresh 
attempt to get a new angle that can prove it was all a gigantic conspiracy.  
(TB-05.03.04) 
 
The statement from Blair is perhaps ironic considering his pre-war speeches (it would indeed 
be fair to argue that it was Blair himself who tried to translate Iraq into issues over trust and 
integrity). Still, it signifies the change in discourse that took place during the first year of the 
war. ‘Values’ is substituted for rationale, or as Blair himself states, “the real issue … is not a 
matter of trust but of judgement” (TB-05-03.04).  
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The new focus on the security discourse in turn allows the resurfacing of a globalisation 
discourse that was such an important part of Blair’s vision of the ‘new world’ prior to 
September 11. In the Sedgefield speech, Blair argues how “the notion of intervening on 
humanitarian grounds had been gaining currency”, linking Iraq to Kosovo and Sierra Leone. 
The comparison is strikingly different from the comparisons made in the pre-war discourse 
which almost exclusively alluded to more immediate threatening scenarios such as 11 
September and international terrorism. The ‘interventionist’ discourse which was remarkably 
absent in the time between September 11 and the start of the Iraq war is, in other words, again 
deemed to be valid.  
 
There are important cognitive differences in the metaphors used in the two different 
discourses of pre and post-war. A morality discourse as presented before the start of the Iraq 
war is largely based on a threat-scenario and makes extensive use of emotionalised metaphors 
with specific reference to events such as September 11 (e.g. ‘we must not back down in our 
fight against evil’, ‘smoking gun, mushroom cloud’ etc.). An interventionist discourse such as 
presented in the Sedgefield is much more reliant on metaphors of community and rational-
actor metaphors. Arguably, this has important ramifications for how Blair must structure his 
argument. For instance, a rational-actor model makes a BUSINESS IS POLITICS metaphor 
more prominent, reducing the role of a competing value judgement and paving the way for the 
notion of community:  
 
The essence of a community is common rights and responsibilities. We have 
obligations in relation to each other. If we are threatened, we have a right to act. And 
we do not accept in a community that others have a right to oppress and brutalise their 
people. We value the freedom and dignity of the human race and each individual in it. 
(TB-05.03.04) 
 
The community metaphor Blair here adheres to answers exactly to the interventionist 
discourse that was outlined at the time of Kosovo. Still, the inescapable question is, of course, 





Blair further tries to distance himself from the highly controversial issue of WMD44:  
 
Of course the opponents are boosted by the fact that though we know Saddam had 
WMD; we haven't found the physical evidence of them in the 11 months since the war. 
But in fact, everyone thought he had them. That was the basis of UN Resolution 1441 
(…) But the key point is that it is the threat that is the issue. (TB-05.03.04) 
 
The ‘threat’ now being the issue is quite different from the statements made before the war. 
For instance, in his address to the nation Blair called Iraq a “brutal state (…) armed with 
weapons of mass destruction” and to the House of Commons on 25th of September 2002 Blair 
claimed that Saddam Hussein’s WMD-programme is active, detailed and growing”. Needless 
to say, there is an important difference in the emphasis on the ‘threat’ rather than the weapons 
themselves45.  
 
At the same time, Blair still testifies to many of the features that were prominent in the pre-
war discourse. The lexicalization is similar: ‘their regime’ (not ‘government’) is a ‘brutal 
dictatorship’, ‘they’ murder their own people, ‘they’ are ‘cruel’, ‘tyrannical’, ‘corrupt’ to 
name a few examples. The I-narration is reduced (it was not Blair’s personal conviction that 
was the justification for the war, e.g. ‘it was not my decision’, but rather based on the 
assessment of intelligence and threat), but is still present within a personal characterisation: 
his own views are described as “fervent” and “passionate”. His own personal role is defended 
by stating that “Prime Ministers don’t have the luxury of maintaining both sides of the 
argument. They can see both sides. But, ultimately, leadership is about deciding” (TB-
05.03.04). Again, the implicit notion is of a PM who was genuine and brave in his decision. 
Still, Blair is markedly less forceful in his argument, claiming that “I have never disrespected 
those who disagreed with the decision” (TB-05.03.04).  
 
To sum up, the arguably most important change in the discourse of Blair in the Sedgefield 
speech is the attempt to turn the debate away from a moral and personal accountability, rather 
focusing on the security aspects. Accordingly, Blair tries to play down his own role (“the true 
danger is not to any single politicians reputation” and rather emphasise the political process 
and assumptions that provided the basis for the decisions made. The discourse is thus 
                                                
44 Many considered the failure to find any chemical of biological weapons (WMD) in Iraq as proof of Blair not 
speaking the truth about the intelligence concerning Iraq.  
45 On the BBC’s Breakfast with Frost show on  January 12, 2004, Blair admitted that he was not too confident 
that WMD would be found: “in a land mass twice the size of the UK it may well not be surprising that you don’t 
find where this stuff is hidden” (Daily Telegraph, 03.02.2004).  
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significantly ‘softer’ and less aggressive than the pre-war discourse; a basic aim is indeed to 
defend the highly criticised process that led to the Iraq war.  
 
The change in discourse must of course be seen in relation to the political situation Blair 
found himself in. For one, the Iraq war was turning out to be a lot harder than expected. 
British and allied lives were lost every day, and the Iraqi insurgency was continuing. In 
addition, as was shown in Chapter 3, public opinion polls were not reflecting well on Blair. In 
fact, the Prime Minister had never been more unpopular than he was in the year after the Iraq 
war. At the same time, surveys also showed a fierce public contempt and distrust for what the 
believed to be misleading ‘government spin’ and many people felt that they had been misled 
by the Prime Minister himself. As several political and media analysts have been keen to 
point out, the events of 2003 and early 2004 resembled a ‘crisis of trust’ between the public 
and the government. Stanyer (2004: 433) remarks, “it is not surprising that the post-Hutton 
world is one where people are more suspicious of government communication than ever”, and 
accordingly, “an increasing number may believe that all government communication is in 
essence deceitful, shaped by a team of spin-doctors and should carry a health warning”. The 
presiding emphasis at the time was indeed the almost irreparable damage done to the 
relationship between the public and the government.  
 
Within this perspective it is then perhaps unsurprising that Blair attempts to remove and 
reduce his own personal conviction in the Iraq discourse, and rather focus on the bigger 
picture (e.g. the global challenges of terrorism, etc.). Still, the change in discourse must not be 
exaggerated in the attempt to find change. In fact, the similarities between Blair’s pre and 
post-war discourses are more salient than the changes. Furthermore, the changes such as the 
attempt to silence or background a personal conviction are only partly carried out. While Blair 
tries to turn the debate away from moral and a personal conviction frame (e.g. ‘it is not over 
issues of trust or integrity’), he still consistently makes use of several familiar features of a 
morality/ethics discourse, such as the consistent use of an I-narration and an ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ 
bifurcation.  
 
Clearly, the most obvious moral and ethical arguments were inappropriate. With a prolonged 
war and a large scale Iraqi resistance only seeming to grow, the idea of the UK and US as 
‘liberators of freedom’ did not fit. But the undercurrent moral discourses and the re-emphasis 
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on security aspects were very much there a year later. Thus, a belief that government ‘spin’, 
as it was popularly called, ceased to exist as a consequence of Iraq, is certainly invalid.  
 
4.4 Summary  
 
This chapter has outlined the main features of the international relations discourse that the 
Labour government and Prime Minister Tony Blair made use of with regards to the war in 
Iraq. Although various discourses are intertwined and interdependent, an attempt to categorise 
different discourses and discursive features is useful. Accordingly, two sub-discourses of a 
security discourse and a morality discourse were outlined. Still, both discourses share an 
underlying discourse of globalisation that is crucial to how Blair and the New Labour 
government understand politics. In addition to these two main discourses, other, although less 
salient, features were established, such as historical association, patriotism, idea of 
‘inevitability’, etc. These various discourse and features will in turn be applied in the 





























Chapter 5: Newspaper Analysis 
 
 
The present chapter will concentrate on the newspaper material, analysing both articles and 
opinion pieces ranging from before the war started (section 5.1) and in response to Blair’s 
highly important speech in Sedgefield, just before the one year anniversary of the war (section 
5.2). In accordance with the aims put forward in the introduction, the newspaper material will 
be compared with the discourse of Blair and the most salient discursive topics and features 
that were described in Chapter 4.  
 
5.1 Pre-war discourse  
 
The pre-war newspaper articles and reports are taken from a period of 10 days around the start 
of the war dating from the 15th to the 25th of March 2003. The analysis is divided into several 
categories: lexicalisation (section 5.1.1), moral conviction (5.1.2), globalisation discourse 
(5.1.3) and patriotism (5.1.4). One section (5.1.5) is dedicated to two themes that do not 
necessarily feature within any of the above categories but still must be regarded as prominent 
in the newspaper discourse: historical association and the concept of ‘inevitability’. Finally, I 
will attempt a brief analysis of some of the metaphors found in the newspaper material 




In the previous chapter it was argued that lexicalisation played an important role in 
manifesting the ideological implications of Blair’s discourse. Turning to the newspaper 
discourse, I will look at three different instances of lexicalisation in turn: over-
lexicalisation/‘us’ vs. ‘them’, cross-paper polarisation, and the specific instance of ‘WMD’.  
 
Over-lexicalisation/‘us’ vs. ‘them’: The lexicalisation of the discourse of Blair was largely 
dependent on an ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ bifurcation. Turning to newspapers, it seems that a similar 
pattern of positive Self-representation and a negative Other-representation is largely 
maintained. Consider for instance the following passage from the Sunday Times:  
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Saddam is a dangerous tyrant who has invaded Iran and Kuwait and attacked Israel 
and Saudi Arabia. He has used chemical weapons, not just in the war with Iran but 
also against his own people. Four million people have fled his regime and tens of 
thousands more of his opponents are dead or in jail … As his people have become 
impoverished, he has persisted with efforts to acquire weapons material from other 
countries. He is a danger to us all. (Sunday Times, 16.03.03) 
 
 
The above excerpt from the leading article in the Sunday Times is strikingly consistent with 
the ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ bifurcation created in the discourse of Blair. ‘They’, signified simply by 
the metonymy ‘Saddam’ (ruler for state, see Lakoff 1991), have a leader who is a ‘dangerous 
tyrant’ and uses ‘chemical weapons’ against ‘his own people’46. The differences are clear: 
‘they’ have ‘regimes, ‘we’ have democracies; ‘they’ have ‘chemical weapons’, we have 
‘strategic weapons’; ‘they’ attack other nations and people, ‘we’ intervene. Consequently, 
‘they’ are a danger to ‘us’ all.  
 
An integral part of this bifurcation is a consistent  use of an over-lexicalisation of ‘their’ 
properties, as suggested by Fowler (1991) to be a typical feature of ideologically motivated 
language (see Chapter 4, section 4.2). Again, the newspaper discourse follows a similar 
pattern to that of Blair. Saddam Hussein is, for instance, characterised as an ‘evil dictator’ and 
‘tyrant’ (Sun), a ‘rogue dictator’ (Sunday Times), a ‘mass murderer’ (Mail on Sunday), a 
‘monster’ who is capable of “slaughtering his own people impunity” (Express), a “repulsive, 
murderous dictator who deserves everything he gets” (Daily Mirror). His regime is a 
‘tyranny’ (Guardian), ‘extremist’ (Daily Telegraph), ‘murderous’ (Daily Mail) and a ‘threat 
to world peace’ (Express on Sunday). Although the vivid lexicalisation of Saddam and his 
regime is perhaps more salient in tabloid papers, the broadsheet papers do not follow far 
behind. As the example from the Sunday Times and other broadsheets show, instances of 
over-lexicalisation are common.  
 
Cross-paper polarisation: A difference in lexicalisation can also be drawn between the 
papers that were supportive of the war and those opposed. The most significant contrasts were 
found in the pro-war tabloid the Sun and the anti-war tabloid the Daily Mirror. Consider for 
instance the following passage from the Sun’s Sunday equivalent News of the World:  
 
                                                
46 See Van Dijk (1998) for an interesting account of the use of ‘tyrant’ as a particularly important and significant 
lexicalisation of Oriental leaders.  
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Time has run out for Saddam Hussein. For 12 years he has treated the UN with total 
contempt. For Saddam’s comforters, like self-serving MP Clare Short and the political 
nonentities who set out to undermine the Prime Minister, we have nothing but disdain. 
(News of the World, 16.03.03)47  
 
Short was not the only ‘comforter’ of Saddam Hussein. The Sun also attacks another Labour 
‘rebel’, Robin Cook, in a similar fashion, branding him a ‘gnome’ whom Blair is “better off 
without” (18.03.03)48. The example from the Sun shows how the paper reinforces an ‘us’ vs. 
‘them’ bifurcation by attempting to place the war opposing politicians in a ‘them’ category of 
Saddam’s ‘comforters’, or in the case of the Express “Saddam apologists”(25.03.03). An ‘us’ 
vs. ‘them’ bifurcation thus becomes highly significant in a silencing of the opposition, who 
are nothing but ‘self-serving nonentities’, and in fact support the ‘tyrant’ Saddam.  
 
In contrast, the Daily Mirror enthusiastically embraces Cook’s decision to resign from the 
Labour party, branding him as a ‘hero’ restoring the ‘integrity of Parliament’. The “political 
pariah” Clare Short is, however, vigorously attacked:  
 
Surprise, surprise! Clare Short has found a way to solve her conscience and fill her 
wallet at the same time. Her decision to remain in Tony Blair’s war-making Cabinet 
was absolutely predictable. Totally in character. And utterly despicable. She likes to be 
thought of as Mother Earth, going round the world doing good and patting children on 
the head. The truth is she is a scheming politician ready to do anything to stay in 
power (Daily Mirror, 19.03.03).  
 
Interestingly, the over-lexicalisation that is apparent in framing the ‘villain’ Saddam Hussein 
in the case of the Sun is here applied to the number one enemy of the Daily Mirror, namely 
Clare Short. Being a pro-war paper the Sun narrates a more predictable ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ 
scenario where Saddam and the Iraqi regime constitute the number one enemy (‘them’) and 
the opposition (e.g. Cook) is marginalised through this framing. The anti-war Daily Mirror, 
on the other hand, narrates a villain/hero scenario of its own. Short is set up as a villain, while 
Cook is a hero, at the same time as the paper treads very carefully when it comes to any 
lexicalisation over Tony Blair49.  
                                                
47 Clare Short was a Cabinet member who at first announced that she would resign from her position if Britain 
failed to achieve a UN mandate for military action. She was later convinced to stay on.  
48 Former foreign secretary, Robin Cook, resigned from his position as Leader of the House of Commons in 
protest against British participation in the war in Iraq (see Kampfner 2004 for a critical account of the political 
processes relating to Iraq). 
49 It is interesting that the Mirror almost exclusively ignores the most important political leader and war catalyst, 
Blair, whilst the negative emphasis is on Short. 
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There is no shortage of explicit language in the Mirror: Short is a “scheming politician”, 
“totally in character” and “utterly despicable”. Other articles are similarly harsh on Short, 
branding her a “shallow political creature” (18.03.03), and implying that she is greedy, “still 
being chauffeured around in her luxurious limousine” (20.03.03). The implicit assumption of 
greed on Short’s part is also present in the Daily Mail who cites her salary at "GBP125,000 ... 
amid accusations of cowardice and hypocrisy" (18.03.03). The conception of Short as trying 
to be “Mother Earth, going round the world doing good and patting children on the head” 
implies that the Cabinet member is egotistical and holds a too high opinion of herself (an 
image of ‘patting children on the head’ arguably gives notions of a religious leader such as the 
pope).  
 
The extraordinary language of the pro- and anti-war papers constructs an ideological cross-
paper polarisation, which resembles the familiar ‘us’/‘them’ scenario. In many ways, this 
cross-paper feud becomes a sort of battle within the real battle of the war in Iraq. Moreover, it 
is primarily created through lexicalisation, and indeed, as is the case with the Sun and the 
Daily Mirror, an over-lexicalisation. This is further supported in examples concerning a 
possible Labour backbench ‘rebellion’ where the anti-war camp and the pro-war camp stand 
in stale opposition. The Sun, for instance, describes the anti-war Labour MPs as both 
“mutinous” and “out of touch”, while Robert Kilroy-Silk of the Express is puzzled, “can you 
believe it? These dumbheads are prepared to abandon the man without whom they would not 
have created the modern Labour party...” (16.03.03). In comparison, the Independent reports 
of a “fresh revolt” to sign a “rebel amendment which constitutes a powerful coalition from all 
parties” (18.03.03). Here, the emphasis is on the adamant political conviction of the rebels 
rather than on the misguidance and disloyalty described by the pro-war tabloids. The 
examples again show how the different political stance over Iraq creates a discursive 
juxtaposition where there are clear differences in lexical choices.  
 
A political polarisation is also seen in the representation of the events of war in the different 
papers. The Daily Mirror emphasises the terrifying aspects of war, in what they call the 
“mother of all bombings”. For instance:  
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The world watched in horror last night as Operation Shock and Awe was unleashed on 
Baghdad. Tomahawk and air launched Cruise missiles, 2000lb bunker-buster, 
penetrator and smart bombs took out building after building along the Tigris river  
(Daily Mirror, 22.03.03). 
 
A leading article in the Mirror on the 21st of March further adds to a picture of suffering 
Iraqis, stating that, “we also feel a desperate sense of unease and helplessness at the fate 
awaiting Iraqi civilians as they lie in their homes hiding from the fearful bombardment” 
(21.03.03). Combining this with eye-witness accounts and an assessment of tactical assertions 
and military language the Daily Mirror’s emphasis, as an anti-war paper, is on the ‘terror’ of 
war and the gravity of the situation for the Iraqi people. The descriptions give negative 
associations; ‘horror’, ‘unleashed’, ‘unease’, ‘helplessness’, ‘fearful bombardment’ etc.  
 
The Sun’s emphasis is very different. For instance:  
 
From air, land and sea, British Forces tackle Saddam Hussein’s army head-on. As 
Baghdad burns after precision missile strikes, our soldiers and Marines fight a 
ferocious battle to reach the city of Basra (Sun, 21.03.03).  
 
Here, the focus is on the British army and the strategic challenges that they face. The 
emphasis is on ‘precision strikes’ rather than ‘collateral damage’ and Iraqi civilians. The Iraqi 
people are in other words solely presented through its armed forces and Saddam’s strategic 
decisions. The lexicalisation is based on a battle frame: ‘tackle’, ‘strikes’, ‘fight’, ‘ferocious’, 
etc. There is also an important distinction of ‘our’ soldiers, as opposed to ‘theirs’. Other 
stories highlight this focus, such as Saddam’s plot to “poison Iraq’s water system” (20.03.03) 
and several reports indicating that the Iraqi republican army were about to ‘give up’, both 
focusing on the negative representation of ‘their’ troops.  
 
A similar political divide is found in the broadsheet papers and their coverage of early events 
in the war. The anti-war Independent reports of “the launch of a brutal American air war” 
which “came at the end of a day of extraordinary drama” (22.03.03), while the Guardian in its 
leading article paints a sombre picture emphasising the gravity of the situation:  
 
Last night, on a spring evening in the desert, the most powerful armed nation of the 
modern world launched an immense attack of computer-guided fire and steel on the 
land of one of the great civilisations of the ancient world. The outcome of last night's 
assault is nowhere near clear yet (Guardian, 21.03.03).  
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In comparison, the Daily Telegraph, writes:  
 
Battle was joined in earnest last night, with British and American ground forces fully 
engaged for the first time. A colossal allied artillery and aerial bombardment preceded 
the final assault on a demoralised, mutinous but still numerous Iraqi army. The fall of 
Umm Qasr marked the first victory (Daily Telegraph, 21.03.03) 
 
While the Guardian (and the Independent) emphasises both the superior power of the US and 
an uncertainty of whether the initial stages of the war were successful, the Daily Telegraph 
focuses on the more strategic elements of the military operations, and on the Iraqi army being 
“demoralised” and “mutinous”. The language in the Guardian is sombre, emphasizing the 
gravity of the situation (and not knowing the outcome). In comparison, the language of the 
Telegraph is confident, emphasizing the strategic ‘positives’ of ‘us’ and the ‘negatives’ of 
‘them’.  
 
The examples show how the different papers shape their political ideologies through 
lexicalisation. The pro-war papers prefer a positive emphasis, focusing on the strategic and 
military progress of the war, while the anti-war papers have a more negative and sombre 
approach where the terrifying aspects of war are stressed.  
 
‘WMD’: Blair’s rhetorical use of the term ‘WMD’ was discussed in the previous chapter in 
relation to a security discourse (and the implicit ‘us’/‘them’ polarisation). It was suggested 
that the use of the term serves considerable ideological purposes. How then about the 
newspapers? As was mentioned in the previous chapter (section 4.3.1) the term was widely 
accepted and used in newspapers. However, more important was how the term of ‘weapons of 
mass destruction”/‘WMD’ was used. Several papers seem, like Blair, certain of the existence 
of ‘WMD’. The Times, for instance speaks of “Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction” 
(16.03.03, emphasis added), and also by using a definite article, “the weapons of mass 
destruction” (16.03.03, emphasis added). Jonathan Raban in the Guardian finds the threat 
‘remote’, but still implies the existence of ‘WMD’ by using a possessive pronoun, “his 
WMD” (22.03.03, emphasis added). Pro-war tabloid the Sun speaks of “Iraq’s doomsday 
weapons” (18.03.03), while both the Financial Times (18.03.03) and the Express (25.03.03) 
speak of “Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction”. There are some notable exceptions, 
however. The Daily Mirror on the 18th of March states that they had not seen any proof of 
Saddam Hussein’s ‘weapons of mass destruction’, while the Independent claims that the issue 
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of ‘WMD’ “always had an air of unreality” (Independent, 16.03.03). Still, the examples show 
an overriding tendency in the newspapers to confirm the allegations made by Blair and 
government that Iraq and Saddam Hussein indeed were in the possession of ‘weapons of mass 
destruction’. In both the case of Blair and the newspapers an implied existence is achieved 
through linguistic features. Although exceptions occur, the tendency supports the argument 
that the media “rather than investigate, analyze, or debate the rationale for war” instead 
offered “a dramatization of war unfolding” (Lule 2004: 187). One of the dramatisations pre-
war was certainly the debate and search for Iraqi ‘WMD’. But while the ‘threat’ aspect was 
perhaps questioned by quite a few papers, very few questioned the actual existence of the 
‘WMD’ in the first place.  
 
Considering lexicalisation three things are apparent. Firstly, the ideological bifurcation of ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ familiar with Blair is maintained in a large majority of newspapers, although the 
expression of this bifurcation varies in both frequency and persistence with regards to the 
political and socio-economic grouping of the newspaper in question. Secondly, the bifurcation 
extends to a cross-paper feud, where pro-war papers stand on one side and anti-war papers 
stand on the other. Both sides create a polarisation of the argument, and the ‘weapon of 
choice’ is a similar discursive bifurcation as seen in the more conventional us/them divide. 
Again, it is important to note the differences that occur based on the different papers and their 
readership profiles. The broadsheet papers are expectedly more subtle in their ideological 
bifurcation, while the tabloid papers are more straightforward, wilfully attempting to create 
what you may call ideological ‘one on one’s’ (e.g. Blair vs. Saddam, Short vs. Cook etc, the 
Sun vs. the Mirror). Finally, even though sometimes unintentional, specific lexical and 
grammatical choices can constitute ideologically implicit meaning as was the case with the 
use of a phrase like ‘WMD’.  
 
5.1.2 Morality discourse  
 
The two political approaches and their different lexical choices also have important cognitive 
implications. The Sun and the Daily Mirror narrate a storyline which includes a villain, a 
victim and a hero. A clear divide between villains and heroes sets up the implicit divide 
between right and wrong. This bifurcation of the debate thus becomes a cognitive narration 
‘helping’ the reader to draw the ‘right’ conclusion. In the case of the Sun this narration is 
similar to the bifurcation in Blair’s discourse; Saddam is the ‘villain’ (‘them’) and ‘our’ 
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political leaders and ‘our’ army are the heroes. Interestingly, it is also ‘we’ that are the 
potential victims (e.g. through the threat of terrorism). Despite their anti-war stance, the 
Mirror also constructs a bifurcation of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ (e.g. Saddam is still a ‘tyrant’ and a 
‘murderous dictator’). But whereas the Sun narrates ‘us’ as victims, the Mirror’s victims are 
the Iraqi people.  
 
The Guardian and the Daily Telegraph follow a similar pattern. Whereas the Guardian 
constructs a scenario where the Iraqi people are the victims, and the war consequently being 
unjustifiable, the Daily Telegraph leans toward the more traditional narration similar to the 
Sun. Indeed, the war is justified through a security discourse that paves the way for a narration 
of ‘us’ as victims. In several reports from the war this narration manifests itself in a focus on 
the strategic operations, silencing the viewpoint of the ‘ordinary Iraqi people’ emphasised by 
the anti-war papers.  
 
An ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ cognitive narration is here used to set up a moral discourse. According to 
Lakoff (1991: 4), a similar narrative construction was present back in the First Gulf War in 
1991: the ‘fairy tale’ (i.e. narrative) has “an asymmetry built into it. The hero is moral and 
courageous, while the villain is amoral and vicious…”. Initially, there is a “crime committed 
against an innocent victim. This, in turn, creates a moral imbalance, and a correction of this 
imbalance involves a battle between the hero (‘good’) and the villain (‘evil’) (Lakoff 1991: 4). 
This narrative scenario is indeed remarkably reminiscent of the Iraq discourse of Blair in its 
moral accountability (see discussion on strict father morality in Blair’s discourse, section 
4.3.2). But how does this fit with the newspaper discourse? In the example of the Daily Mail 
it seems to fit perfectly. In an article entitled “This war IS about good versus evil”, the Mail 
commentator Melanie Phillips attacks, amongst other, the church’s refusal to “differentiate 
between good and evil” and attacking ‘Western’ people who refuse to accept the existence of 
a “moral difference”. Further, Phillips argues that the west is at “war with itself”:  
 
The battle is between those that want to build a better world and destroy the promoters 
of tyranny, terrorism and mass murder, and those who wish instead to appease them – 
composed of a startling global coalition of the far Right, communists, pacifists, 
terrorists, anarchists, defeatists, anti-Semites and useful idiots. These dividing lines are 




The moral conviction is constructed within an ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ bifurcation, setting up a 
polarised argument, where you are either one of ‘us’ (i.e. the implicit notions of ‘democracy’, 
‘freedom’ etc.) or you are one of ‘them’ (i.e. ‘terrorist’, ‘pacifist’, ‘anti-Semites’, ‘useful 
idiots’ etc.). This combination of ‘us’/’them’ and a moral argument is seen elsewhere too: 
 
We go to war, not because we are an especially warlike people. We do so because our 
cause is just. We fight as we have before: because not to do so is to give victory to the 
barbarian (Mail on Sunday, 16.03.03).  
 
Mr. Blair has firmly and resolutely led us to the brink of war because he knows this is 
the only way to protect Britain, not just from Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction 
but from any other evil regime that puts us in its sighs or harbours terrorists (Express, 
19.03.03) 
 
… it is absurd that we have always regarded [the UN] as the sole arbiter of justice … 
there is surely something repellent about the idea of “cover” for our actions, as though 
we were contemplating a dodgy business deal rather then setting out to disarm and 
depose a mass murderer (Sunday Times, 16.03.03).  
 
The first two examples are more obvious, war is ‘simply’ based on the struggle against 
‘barbarian’ and ‘evil’ forces in society. It is thus a fulfilment of a self-defence scenario that is 
realised in a combination of an imminent and potentially dangerous ‘threat’ and a moral duty 
to act. These examples are grounded in the cognitive frame of a struggle between ‘good’ and 
‘evil’. The moral justification in the example of the Sunday Times is subtler. The justification 
does not lie within the good/evil frame, but in a moral accountability and duty to help the 
suffering Iraqi people.  On this basis, ‘our’ actions are accountable both with regards to a 
security discourse (to ‘disarm’) and a morality discourse (to ‘depose’). Accordingly, there is, 
then, no need for any additional justification on the basis of a UN mandate, or any “cover for 
our actions”. We are simply doing the ‘just thing’ in bringing them ‘democracy’ and 
‘freedom’. In turn, this justifies the sacrifice that war essentially entails.  
 
In contrast, an anti-war cognitive narration does not reflect this moral accountability so easily; 
the sacrifice does not necessarily justify the means. War is a terrifying aspect, and the victims 
of the war in Iraq are in the end the people of Iraq. Still, the belief in doing the ‘just thing’ is 
appealing even to the more liberal papers. This is supported by Richardson (2007) who argues 
that the moral discourse strategy appealed not only to the political right who wanted to 
remove ‘distasteful dictators’, but also to the more liberal political wing: “the propaganda … 
convinced a significant number of liberal journalists to use their columns to argue that we 
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have a civilising duty to ‘free Iraqis’ by bombing their country and killing potentially 
thousands of innocents” (Richardson 2007: 191).  
 
But if the moral justification exampled above was appealing, Tony Blair’s personal moral 
conviction was simply irresistible. Indeed, seemingly every newspaper both tabloid and 
broadsheet, opposed and supportive of the war, praised Blair for his conviction and integrity 
as Prime Minister. A look at the various leading articles from the final Sunday and weekend 
papers before the start of the war provides good examples:   
 
…even those who think that Mr. Blair is wrong are in no doubt as to his honesty, his 
decency, his sincerity and his courage (Sunday People, 16.03.03) 
 
Anybody who has seen Tony Blair in recent days will testify to the passion which 
drives him … he … knows that a real leader is required from time to time to be just 
that – a leader and not a follower. He won’t shy away from making unpopular 
decisions in what he perceives to be the national interest (Mail on Sunday, 16.03.03) 
 
Mr Blair is genuine when he insists that a peaceful settlement was pursued in good 
faith (Sunday Times, 16.03.03).  
 
In the thick of the prelude to war, one thing remains clear: Tony Blair deserves praise 
for pursuing the British national interest and for taking huge party political risks in 
doing so. It is worth noting in this context that he has received greater loyalty in that 
endeavour from Iain Duncan Smith than from many Labour politicians who owe their 
careers to him (Sunday Telegraph, 16.03.03) 
 
Mr Blair knows he is risking his premiership with the stance he is taking on Iraq ... But 
although he faces the biggest crisis of his six-year premiership, Mr Blair is sticking 
rigidly to his course (Financial Times, 15.03.08) 
 
[Blair] is risking his premiership on his vision of an international order that is just and 
legitimate, yet one which offers security against those who possess weapons of mass 
destruction and contemplate terrorism. Even his critics should acknowledge the 
remarkable leadership he is exhibiting (Observer, 16.03.03)  
 
Even the highly critical Daily Mirror praises Blair for his “attempts to get a resolution 
backing the conflict”, whilst the equally critical left-wing paper the Guardian repeats in their 
leader following Blair’s speech to the House of Commons that “[historians] will look back to 
read an impassioned and impressive speech which may give future generations some inkling 
of how, when so many of his own party opposed his policy so vehemently, Tony Blair 
nevertheless managed to retain their respect and support” (Guardian, 19.03.03). Both add to 
the overall picture of Blair as an honest and accountable leader with a firm moral belief that 
 83 
he is right. The lexicalisation consists largely of positive personal descriptions which imply a 
trustworthiness and accountability in Blair; he is praised not only for his ‘decency’, ‘courage’, 
‘sincerity’, ‘good faith’ and the ‘passion which drives him’, but by ‘risking his premiership’ 
Blair also shows ‘genuine’ and ‘remarkable leadership’, which deserves ‘praise’ and ‘respect’.  
 
Why is this so? Indeed, why is every newspaper in Britain thoroughly convinced of Blair’s 
integrity and sincerity in his beliefs, even though they in some cases were opposed to war?50  
The answer is more than likely to lie in the morality discourse and the personal conviction 
rhetoric of Blair. Clearly, it is impossible to consider the widely accepted appraisal of Blair 
without considering how the Labour PM displays himself in his own discourse. As was 
outlined in Chapter 4, Blair’s conviction is repeated in several pre-war speeches where he 
reflects on the ‘tough responsibilities of leadership’, ‘risking his premiership’, ‘a firm belief’, 
and consistently makes use of his own personal experience (using a ‘first-person narrative’, 
e.g. ‘I am…’). The bottom line in the speech in the House of Commons was simple and 
powerful: Blair was so convinced war was right that he was prepared to put his job on the 
line. This seemed, in turn to reflect favourably on Blair in the newspapers, the sentiment 
clearly being that the PM is honest and trustworthy, and, as the Guardian remarked, “even his 
critics should acknowledge the remarkable leadership he is exhibiting”.  
 
The Independent seems to be an exception, although it, too, confirms how important the issue 
of moral values had become in that last week before war. For instance, on March 16th, 4 days 
prior to the war officially started, Ted Honderich wrote:  
 
Tony Blair keeps telling us that he wouldn’t be going to war if he didn’t think it was 
moral … But the seeming needlessness and irrelevance of Mr Blair’s disclosures about 
himself are not the main point … The question is whether it is right to attack, invade 
and take Iraq (Independent on Sunday, 16.03.03).  
 
The Independent article is a criticism of the moral ‘turn’ the debate over whether or not to go 
to war in Iraq had taken in the last weeks of the war. While certainly critical, the article also 
adds to the overall assumption that the Iraq-debate took a turn from a security debate to a 
moral discourse. The turn is quite clearly quite consistent with the strategy of Blair and his 
associates. According to Kampfner (2004: 288), the failure to gain a UN resolution resulted 
                                                
50 The question arguably becomes even more significant in hindsight, considering the nature of the Hutton 
inquiry and the effect it had on Blair and the government.  
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not only in a harsh rhetoric against the countries opposes, in particular France, but also put 
Blair on “the search for a ‘moral majority’ if not a legal one”.  
 
The emphasis on Blair, the person, and his premiership is central in the attempt to create such 
a ‘moral majority’. It begs the question of whether Blair’s hints at resignation were designed 
to serve a rhetorical purpose. Certainly, the newspapers were not slow to pick up on this 
assumption. The Financial Times’ James Blitz headlined his story on Tony Blair by calling 
him “the faithful leader of a rebellious country” (15.03.03), while the leading article in the 
same paper three days later stated that “the Prime Minister's fall would be a tragedy” 
(18.03.03).  
 
Most newspapers agreed that the most significant challenge to Blair's reign as PM was the 
resignation of Commons leader Robin Cook. As the Daily Mirror remarks, “who knows 
where this ministerial rebellion will lead? Is it the end for Mr Blair?” (18.03.03). Other papers 
vehemently attacks Cook, and most significantly the Sun:  
 
Mr Cook has been storing this bile up for years. Iraq was the excuse he needed to let it 
all out ... [The Americans] will watch on TV news as Mr Cook gets a standing ovation 
from fellow MPs and wonder if - with our troops poised to attack in the desert - Britain 
has gone mad (Sun, 18.03.03)  
 
The Times, meanwhile, argue that Cook’s position on the war is contradictory, as “Mr Cook 
as foreign secretary endorsed the military campaign against Milosevic but somehow could not 
see the similarities in the Iraq conflict”. Accordingly, Blair can not “afford to alter policy to 
prevent his departure” (18.03.03). For the Sun it is personal; implying that Mr Cook is using 
Iraq as an excuse to vent his frustration against Blair, having stored “this bile up for years”. 
The Times are less direct, but still assess the situation through the personal role and political 
future of Blair; the overriding assumption being that Blair could simply not afford to listen to 
Cook.  
 
The newspaper material shows how the media help frame the debate within a moral discourse. 
The personal emphasis of Blair in his speeches, his strong conviction and integrity, becomes a 
significant part of the debate over Iraq. It is indeed striking that in the last week before the 
war the debate on Iraq is so focused on the morality aspects of the war and the role of the 
Prime Minister. Here, it is important to note the differences between the pro-war and anti-war 
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papers. While the pro-war papers, and especially the tabloid ones, are more than ready to turn 
to a morality discourse of ‘right and wrong’, ‘good vs. evil’, etc., the anti-war papers show 
fewer examples of similar attitudes. The conviction of Blair is, however, assumed by every 




The basis of Blair’s international discourse is founded in his views on globalisation as was 
shown in Chapter 4. Several examples indicate that a similar globalisation discourse exists in 
the various newspapers. For instance, the Guardian calls Blair’s vision for an international 
order “just and legitimate” (16.03.03), while the Financial Times emphasises how badly Blair 
“wanted to hold the community together” (18.03.03). Indeed the conceptualisation of an 
international community through the metaphors of NATION STATE IS A PERSON is highly 
salient. Countries are friends or enemies based on their allegiance, ‘we’ (Britain) have an 
obligation to intervene against atrocities, ‘we’ have a role as one of the leading countries of 
‘our’ community. The diplomatic efforts preceding the war give several examples: the main 
allies, Spain and the US, are the ‘friends’ of Britain, while Iraq is, of course, the enemy. 
Countries opposed to the invasion but still are political allies such as France and Germany are 
letting Britain down, putting their ‘friendship on the line’. The Sun, for instance, remark that 
the allies backing war are the “true friends” of Britain (20.03.03). Within the same 
conceptualisation Britain is also given several ‘personal’ qualities which are favourable.  
The Daily Telegraph remarks that Britain is a country “which has never shirked its obligation 
to try and preserve peace in the world and defend the interests of the West against its 
enemies” (18.03.03), while the Sunday Times defends Blair’s strategy to “keep America 
engaged in the world” through an international community model, arguing that “it would have 
been easy after September 11 for the United States to have become aggressive and 
isolationist...” (16.03.03). A central notion in the community metaphor framing is unity. A 
strong community must be ‘united’ in its policies and beliefs, and when the Daily Mirror 
remarks that “Europe is now split” this suggests a damaged community.  
 
The conceptualisation of a community is an acknowledgment of a globalisation discourse 
which extends the idea of an international community to a global arena (e.g. ‘in a new, global 
world we are affected by events that previously were too geographically remote). This allows 
for the ‘threat’ scenario of Blair to grow. As the Sun says, “the burden [Blair] carries is the 
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knowledge his critics refuse to believe –that there is a real and present danger to the national 
security of Britain” (Sun, 19.03.03). Indeed, a prerequisite for a statement similar to that of 
the Sun in this case, is an acknowledgment of the effects of a ‘new international doctrine’51.  
 
It is not only the idea of an outside ‘threat’ (making use of a conception of ‘community’ as a 
container) which gives rise to a community frame. The ‘friends and enemies’ notion of a 
community (‘neighbourhood’) is clearly present in the remarkable war of words that took 
place between Britain and France in the week before the war started. Newspapers were full of 
articles on the dispute between the nations, and especially the tabloid papers gladly attacked 
what they regarded as French hostility. The News of the World led from the front, branding 
President Chirac a “nauseating fair-weather friend”; The Express followed up calling Chirac 
the “spiteful anti-American - and anti-British – President of France”. The Sun took it one step 
further when they launched a public stunt handing out French editions of their paper in Paris. 
Reports the day after were full of characterisations of both Chirac and the French people:  
 
The Sun hit Paris yesterday to show the world our disgust at the cowardice of 
President Jacques 'The Worm' Chirac for wriggling out of his responsibilities to the 
West ... Sadly but predictably, the poor misled French people backed their spineless 
president to the hilt (The Sun, 21.03.03) 
 
The lexicalisation is vivid; with Chirac conceptualised as a ‘worm’, ‘wriggling’ his way out of 
responsibility; the ‘poor’ French people being ‘misled’ by a ‘spineless’ President. The 
underlying conceptualisation is found in an international community metaphor; France 
resembles a ‘responsible friend’ who refuses to cooperate with the rest of the community, and 
instead try to shy away from their responsibilities52.  
 
Similar reports condemning France and President Chirac continued in several papers, often 
spiralling out of control, as the suggestion that Chirac was attempting to plot a “safe haven for 
Saddam” is a good example of (23.03.03). And the attacks were by no means confined to the 
tabloids. The Daily Telegraph claims there was “nothing to admire in Chirac’s venal 
posturing”; while the Financial Times claims that some MPs had been “encouraged by 
France's obdurate stance” in making their decision to back war. Understandably, the approach 
                                                
51 This is not to imply that Blair’s vision of a new world is controversial or limited to his own ‘doctrine of 
international community’. Rather, it is a commonly held view shared by most leaders in the last decade.  
52 It is interesting to note that the rest of the ‘community’, in particular other countries that were opposed to war, 
are disregarded. What constitutes a ‘community’, in other words, is clearly subject to context and point of view.  
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to the French/British dispute was governed by the war-stance of the various papers. In 
contrast to rivals the Sun, the Daily Mirror praised the French for their persistence in wanting 
a diplomatic route:  
 
The concerted attack on France is shameful and degrading. Cabinet ministers 
yesterday toured TV and radio studios to condemn President Chirac and accuse the 
French of being responsible for war. This is hypocrisy run riot and double-think of 
scandalous proportions. You expect it from newspapers with no principles or morality, 
but we are entitled to something better from Tony Blair's government (Daily Mirror, 
17.03.03).  
 
Notably, the Daily Mirror uses the issue to make a snipe at the Sun’s coverage of the war-
diplomacy as both ‘unprincipled’ and ‘immoral’. Shared is, however, the use of the 
international community metaphor. To the Sun, French opposition is conceptualised as a 
betrayal of the ‘friendship’ between the two nations; to the Daily Mirror it is a principled 
‘friend’ with the right of opinion. Thus, the Sun focuses on the loyalty of a community, whilst 
the Mirror focuses on the democratic principles held in a ‘Western’ community model.  
 
The examples show how the community metaphor works as a readily available tool in the 
conceptualisation of international relations (e.g. diplomacy, security). This is in turn 
conceptualised through a globalisation idea where responsibilities must be shared and, as in a 
local community, loyalty is an admirable quality. At the same time, the globalisation 
framework does not reflect favourably to government policy in every instance. Consider, for 
instance, how the framework of a terrorism threat is used by the Mirror’s Brian Reade:  
 
And on that backdrop you could sketch the next piece of retaliation in what will surely 
be a downward descent. The Muslims’ revenge. As the crimson red clouds spread 
across the dark canvas, you could see the blood of future martyrs. Next time the skies 
could be on fire over London or Liverpool (Daily Mirror, 22.03.03).  
 
 
Here, the Mirror uses a legitimising argument of Blair, the threat of terrorism, as a reason 
against going to war. The ‘threat’ frame is similarly constructed in the Mirror and the Sun, 
both applying a similar view of a global international community as projected in Blair's 
discourse. But instead of embracing the idea of pre-emptive warfare, the Mirror implies that it 
is rather war in itself that increases the likelihood of Islamic terrorist attacks53. 
                                                
53 It also confirms an 'us' vs. 'them' bifurcation present in the Mirror just as much as in the pre-war discourse of 
Blair and the pro-war newspapers.  
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Ultimately, the examples show the powerful implications of the community metaphor. For 
one, the self-defence scenario, the idea of a security threat, is worthless without a community 
conception of the effects of globalisation. Similarly, the hostile reaction, the conceptions of 
French hostility and their ‘poisonous’ behaviour, is impossible to comprehend without 
applying the same metaphorical mapping. This supports the suggestion from the previous 
chapter on Blair’s discourse that the community and globalisation discourse is the background 
and basis of the consequent discourses of security and morality. Indeed the acceptance of the 
security and morality discourses is impossible without an acknowledgement of the wider 
globalisation discourse. Just as the diplomatic dispute with France and its consequent use of 
language, is impossible to comprehend without the conceptualisation of an international 




The French/British dispute mentioned above is closely connected to the feature of patriotism. 
In the Blair discourse this was argued not to be very directly expressed. Newspapers, 
however, are less subtle in the expression of patriotism, an expression that increased 
significantly in the immediate days before the war started. For instance:  
 
Our troops need our support for the difficult and dangerous task which lies ahead ... 
Make no mistake. Whatever misgivings many people in this country have about this 
war, our brave boys must not be demoralised by backbiting at home (Sunday People, 
16.03.03).  
 
As you read this, young men and women are poised to risk their lives in an alien land 
for OUR future safety. When the call comes we are sure they will acquit themselves 
with honour (News of the World, 16.03.03).  
 
The contrast between the courage of the men and women who stand ready to risk their 
lives in the Gulf and the babble of professional diplomats at the UN could not be 
sharper (Sunday Telegraph, 16.03.03).  
 
After the start of the war, patriotism prevailed. After the first British lives were lost the 
Express, under the headline “we must ensure a victory worthy of our tragic heroes”, argues: 
“we must never lose sight of the point of this war” (Express, 22.03.03), while the Sun 
launches a yellow ribbon campaign with “pride in our young men and women fighting far 
from home” (30.03.03). In reference to Blair’s address to the nation the Daily Telegraph 
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argues that “the simple, unadorned patriotism of the Prime Minister’s broadcast will have 
reassured his country, at least, that our forces are not being committed in an unworthy cause” 
(21.03.03).  
 
The papers that were opposed to war were subtle in showing signs of patriotism. Interestingly, 
the anti-war paper the Mirror seems to tread very carefully on the subject of the British troops 
in relation to their views of the war itself. Indeed, the paper found it necessary to point out 
that “the war is insane, troops our heroes” in their leader (21.03.03), and undoubtedly a fear of 
being misconceived as unpatriotic led columnist Paul Routledge to write:  
 
And now comes the big pressure here at home. Overnight, it is deemed unpatriotic - or 
worse - not to support this illegal and immoral war. Just because Tony Blair has sold 
himself into unpaid political and military slavery to President George Bush, everyone 
must shut up ... But this is not a time for faint hearts, either on the battlefields of the 
Middle East or right here where the British people must be free to make up their own 
minds (Daily Mirror, 21.03.03).  
 
If anything, Routledge’s column shows the patriotic tendencies that became more and more 
salient as the war came closer to a reality. The rise of a patriotic discourse does perhaps 
follow a predictable pattern where there is a significant boost in ‘support for the troops’ once 
the fighting actually starts. Routledge acknowledges the silencing effect this has; the Mirror 
clearly does not want to be seen as unpatriotic by its readers.  
 
The Anglo-French dispute is highly likely to be a contributing factor in the rise of patriotism 
as well. Taking the example of the Sun, it, for instance, uses the metaphor that “France has 
stuck a knife into Blair and George Bush and given it several nasty twists”, and further 
claiming that President Chirac “despises Britain” (21.03.03). This conceptualisation, that the 
French have betrayed Britain (‘stabbed them in the back’), not only creates hostility against 
the imagined ‘enemy’ but also raises national spirit and patriotic feelings. France is portrayed 
as ‘hostile’ towards Britain, acting out of ‘spite’ and ‘personal’ interest (international 
community metaphor again in play), rather than rationality.  
 
How then does the role of patriotism in the newspapers work in comparison to the discourse 
of Blair? While there are some elements of patriotism in Blair’s speeches, perhaps most 
specifically in his address to the nation before the war, it would be wrong to argue that Blair’s 
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discourse is distinctly patriotic54. Still, it is important to note the positive effect patriotism is 
likely to have provided for Blair as war was coming closer. Interestingly, the newspapers 
seem to be more concerned with patriotism, or to be more exact, a concern not to be patriotic 
enough. This is perhaps most strongly indicated in the examples from the Daily Mirror who 
were indeed very insistent on their opposition to war not being mistaken for ‘unpatriotic 
tendencies’.  
 
5.1.5 Other features  
 
This section considers two themes that were prominent in the newspaper discourse and 
potentially played an important role in shaping opinion. One of them is the notion of 
‘inevitability’. Consider, for instance, some of the comments made on the day of the so called 
‘war summit’ in the Azores:  
 
It's too late for talking: Prime Minister Tony Blair, US President George Bush and 
their ally Spanish PM Jose Maria Aznar knew the time for talking is over ... this is a 
council of war (News of the World, 16.03.03) 
 
In a build up to any conflict, a moment is reached when military imperatives start to 
dictate political actions rather than vice versa. That moment has come, as the daily 
images of troops in the gulf make powerfully clear (Sunday Telegraph, 16.03.03) 
 
Nobody wants war. As that fine warrior the Duke of Wellington observed: 'Next to a 
battle lost, the greatest misery is a battle gained'. There will be casualties on both sides 
... (Sunday Times, 16.03.03) 
 
All the examples above involve some elements of ‘inevitability’, a central notion being that 
the time for talking (i.e. that is discussion and debate) has passed. This is quite obvious in the 
examples from the News of the World and the Sunday Telegraph. Arguably, the last example 
taken from the Sunday Times is just as convincing in forming an idea of inevitability, 
considering ‘casualties’ and further consequences of going into action. The move from a 
discussion of whether or not to go to war to a discussion on how the war will be fought is an 
important semantic step, which becomes especially important when one considers the timing. 
Indeed, this was on the day Bush, Blair and the Spanish Prime Minister, Aznar, met in the 
Azores to discuss the Iraq crisis and further action within the UN, and two days before the 
                                                
54 In his address to the nation Blair for instance states that “as so often before, on the courage and determination 
of British men and women, serving our country, the fate of many nations rests” (TB-20.03.03).  
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House of Commons were to debate whether Britain should be involved in action despite the 
expected failure to gain UN support.  
 
In comparison the anti-war papers focus on the possibility of further diplomatic efforts, 
although they admit that war is highly likely. The Mirror uses their leader on the day of the 
Azores summit to argue that there is still “a chance for peace”, although they acknowledge the 
paradox of ministers “trying to soften up the public to the inevitability of war, while 
proclaiming there is still time to advert it” (16.03.03), while the Guardian insist that "UN 
unity can still be achieved" (16.03.03). A day after the Azores summit, the Independent 
argues in their leading article:  
 
For all the warmongering predictions, the emergency US-British-Spanish summit held 
in the Azores yesterday provided a necessary opportunity to cool rapidly overheating 
hearts and heads (Independent, 17.03.03).  
 
The Independent’s emphasis on the possibility of further diplomatic efforts is, however, in 
contrast to other papers, The Sunday Times writing that “the talking finally stopped yesterday” 
(emphasis added) (18.03.03), and the Daily Telegraph leader of the same day, titled “beyond 
debate”, argues that "debate ought rather to centre on the dangers and benefits of war”.  
 
Another feature present in the newspaper discourse is historical association. In particular the 
association with the Second World War is prominent. For instance:  
 
The hand of history will lie heavily on the shoulders of the leaders of Britain, America 
and Spain when they meet in the Azores today. It may not rank alongside the 
Casablanca summit of January 1943, when Franklin D Roosevelt and Winston 
Churchill met in Morocco to demand the unconditional surrender of Germany and 
Japan. But it is the pivotal moment in the Iraq crisis (Sunday Times, 16.03.03)  
 
The path to war is often strewn with fear and doubt. This was so before the second 
world war, as it is now. The solid patriotism that epitomises that war did not come 
until later. Then, like now, our country was deeply divided ... (Sunday Express, 
16.03.03).  
 
The lesson we should learn from history is that weakness in the face of a tyrant is the 
surest way not to peace, but to conflict (Sun, 19.03.03).  
 
Although the Sunday Times remarks that the Azores summit perhaps is not as prominent as 
the famous Casablanca summit of 1943, the historical association still plays an important role 
 92 
in conveying a message of the importance and responsibilities the leaders are left with. 
Moreover, the assertion of a “heavy hand of history” has important implicit notions of the 
challenges that face the ‘Western’ world in regards to Iraq. The Express example is more 
explicit, comparing the divide of opinion over Iraq with the short-term reluctance to engage in 
war with Nazi-Germany, thus placing the anti-war ‘camp’ in the same historical position as 
those who did not take the threat of the Nazis seriously enough. Another historical association 
is present with regards to Blair. For instance:  
 
With passion in his voice and fire in his belly, Tony Blair won his place in history 
alongside Churchill and Thatcher (Sun, 19.03.03) 
 
The Churchillian tone of Tony Blair’s plea to the House of Commons to support war 
against Saddam Hussein was entirely appropriate. Like his Second World War 
predecessor, the Prime Minister is standing at the threshold of an uncertain new era 
(Express, 19.03.03)  
 
Both examples make comparisons with former prominent British leaders, thus placing Blair as 
one of Britain's most important leaders in history. The Express also compares the situation of 
Blair to the challenges that faced Churchill in the Second World War, further emphasising the 
great leadership Blair is showing.  
 
As was shown in the previous chapter Blair, himself, often makes use of historical association 
in an attempt to emphasise the importance and prominence of the situation and its 
requirements. The Second World War is a good example, and it is also an often made 
association in the newspaper discourse. The association is arguably unsurprising taking into 
account the significance of the last world war in ‘Western’ history. Great leaders, ferocious 
battles, and great military achievements, were all part of the Second World War, thus making 
it especially useful for positive comparisons such as the association between Churchill and 




So far, metaphors have only been mentioned with regards to the international community 
metaphor and its important role in conceptualising a discourse of globalisation. Needless to 
say, these are far from the only metaphors that play an important part in the Iraq discourse of 
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the newspapers. Consider, for instance, the example provided in the News of the World's 
coverage of the Commons vote:  
 
In the Commons, Blair's opponents, the useless Tories, lounge in front of him. More 
deadly enemies crouch behind him on the Labour benches. And some of the PM's most 
cunning foes, members of his own Cabinet, even sit alongside him. The coming battles 
has brought these Old Labour rebels out of the woodwork, hoping that if things go 
badly wrong and lots of brave British servicemen and women come home in bodybags, 
they can at last get rid of the leader they've always hated.  
 
An overriding metaphor is the conceptualisation of POLITICS IS WAR; a political issue is a 
‘battle’ in the war. Within this conceptualisation there are ‘opponents’, ‘enemies’ and ‘foes’, 
where things can turn out to be ‘deadly’. Implicitly, an opposite group is also present, where 
‘friends’ and ‘allies’ try to prevail in the political ‘battle’ set forth55. To the ‘opposition’ the 
ambition is to ‘get rid of’ the leader, while, in this case Blair’s, ambition is the struggle to 
overcome the challenge to power. The power struggle (‘battle’) is also physically 
conceptualised through spatial metaphors that place Blair at the centre of proceedings; “the 
useless Tories lounge in front of him”, while “more deadly enemies crouch behind him”. 
Here, it is quite clearly not the “useless Tories” that are the real threat to Blair, but rather the 
“deadly enemies” that are “behind him”. This conception sparks a familiar uncertainty and 
inability to ‘see’ what is ‘behind you’, thus implying a potential ‘threat’ that is unknown, and 
perhaps more significantly, unexpected.   
 
The two metaphors illustrated here, POLITICS IS WAR and the spatial metaphors 
conceptualising political positions, are common in politics in general and are a key way of 
understanding and conceptualising the diplomatic and bargaining processes that constitute 
modern politics. The metaphor of politics as a battle or war is central to how we conceive 
conventional political decision-making and political events. Several examples from the 
newspaper material support this conception. The Financial Times, for instance, writes that the 
allies are “ready to accelerate Middle East peace effort in a last-ditch push to overcome 
entrenched opposition to its threat to attack Iraq”. Here the POLITICS IS WAR metaphor is 
conceptualised through a battlefield scene of opposition being firmly placed in their 
‘trenches’, thus, reluctant to change their opinion. The battle conception is also present in 
                                                
55 A POLITICS IS WAR metaphor is common to most areas of political debate. The issue of whether or not to 
go to war in Iraq is, however, special as it also entails the familiar lexicalization of war in addition to the 
metaphorical struggle to win the 'argument'. Thus, the notion of consequences going 'badly wrong' with 
servicemen coming home in bodybags might, indeed, work on two levels, metaphorically and realistically.  
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several papers in relation to the House of Commons vote on the war, will Blair be able to 
‘survive’ and ‘outlive’ the debate? Will he come out ‘wounded’ or even ‘dead’? Or as the Sun 
believes, is he “braced for bruising? (18.03.03). The same battle conception is present in 
relation to the Iraq war itself. The Sunday Times, for instance, writes that “a war of ‘shock and 
awe’ that turns into a bloody, protracted siege could leave [Blair] mortally wounded” 
(16.03.03). Similarly, France’s decision to block a UN resolution is “like a stake to the heart” 
although Blair and his team for weeks had “refused to let diplomacy die” (16.03.03). The 
Financial Times finds it “hard to imagine that [Blair] will come through unscathed”,  while 
the Sunday Times gives credit to the United States for not “lashing out like wounded animal at 
its enemies in periodic raid and then retreating to its own shores” (16.03.03). All these 
examples share a battlefield conception which is part of a wider POLITICS IS WAR 
conception.  
 
The metaphor of PROGRESS IS FORWARD MOVEMENT plays a similarly important role. 
Political progress and decision making is very often a conception of ‘going forward’, while 
the effects are nothing but negative in the opposite, ‘going backward’, ‘back-pedalling’, 
‘regressing’, etc. Interestingly, several of the pro-war newspapers make use of this metaphor 
in support of government policy. For instance, the Sun, turns to a similar use of metaphor as 
Blair:  
 
If we back away now, if we talk but never act, we will tell the terrorists and the 
despots that we are feeble and faltering. Future conflicts would be infinitely worse and 
more devastating in their consequences (Sun, 19.03.03).  
 
The spatial conceptualisation is clear: the only way to tackle the problem of terrorism is 
through action (progression), while to back away would make the problem worse (regression). 
As was shown in chapter 4, Blair’s discourse makes use of similar spatial metaphors to 
indicate that his policies indicate change and progress. This spatial conception seems to be a 
central feature in political discourse. The Financial Times finds Blair “sticking rigidly to his 
course”, and believe he has “been ahead of his party”; the Express believes Blair “has firmly 
and resolutely led us to the brink of war” (19.03.03) and reports of the “end of the road for 
diplomacy” (18.03.03); while the Sunday Mirror remarks that the “courageous decision would 
be to pull back now” (16.03.03). All the examples conceptualise the debate on the war as a 
journey where there is forward and backward movement. Within a war framing, this concept 
of movement arguably becomes even more significant as it also refers to battlefield 
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manoeuvres in themselves where forward movement is tantamount to progress. A forward 
movement conception of the decision-making process concerning going to war may certainly 
have important rhetorical implications. Within a journey frame turning back is more than 
often symbolic of failure. Thus, forward progress becomes positively conceptualised, while 
the ‘going backwards becomes essentially negative.   
 
Looking back at the example from the News of the World an even more controversial 
metaphor is found in the remark that the situation has brought “these Old Labour rebels out of 
the woodwork”. In real life, ‘vermin’ are usually the ones who hide in the woodwork and 
eventually might ‘crawl’ out. Thus the metaphor used here of the Old Labour rebels implicitly 
brands them as ‘vermin’ who have simply been waiting for their chance to undermine their 
leader and Prime Minister. A similar conceptualisation is found in the News of the World’s 
characteristic that the enemies “crouch behind him”. Again, the conception of ‘crouch’ is that 
of an animal trying to hide, in waiting to attack its prey. A framing of events such as this one, 
giving the ‘other’ group animal characteristics, is certainly a powerful rhetorical move. 
Suddenly, the protagonist Blair, the man at the centre of proceedings, is the man under attack, 
the victim. He is indeed trying to fight off the attacks that threaten his very existence.  
 
A metaphor discussed within the ‘us’ and ‘them’ conceptualisation in Chapter 4 was the 
juxtaposition between a Rational Actor metaphor and a WAR IS VIOLENT CRIME 
metaphor. In Blair’s discourse the implication of these metaphors were to further highlight an 
‘us’ vs. ‘them’ divide. How, then, about the newspapers? As was shown in section 5.1.1, the 
lexicalisation of war was varied both in regard to socio-economic classification and political 
view on the war. The use of a WAR IS VIOLENT CRIME can be argued to play a similar 
role. Consider, for instance, the pro-war paper the Daily Mail. The allied military operations 
are described as an “awesome firepower” striking “key targets” with “surgical” precision. The 
Iraqi army is, however, different; it is described through the alleged “parading of terrified 
American prisoners of war on Iraqi television, and by the disgusting footage of the bodies of 
other captives, at least two of whom had been shot between the eyes” (24.03.03). The 
example supports Lakoff’s (1991) suggestion that the Rational Actor metaphor is first and 
foremost conceptualised through a strictly political frame, while the WAR IS VIOLENT 
CRIME conception is understood through a moral frame. ‘We’ are, in other words, rational, 
while ‘they’ are insane.  
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The latter example has obvious semantic implications, as do the animal metaphors in the 
example from the News of the World. Other examples such as the PROGRESS IS 
FORWARD MOVEMENT metaphors and the POLITICS IS WAR metaphors are less salient, 
thus resembling the critique put forward in Chapter 2 (section 2.3.2) on the significance of 
political metaphors. For instance, do we really conceptualise the metaphor of Blair as 
potentially ‘mortally wounded’ in its original meaning, his ‘death’ as a politician? Or has the 
POLITICS IS BATTLE frame become so habitualised and subject to a wearing down of 
meaning, that the metaphorical meaning is dulled? (Chapter 2, section 2.2.3).  
 
5.2 Post-war discourse: Response to Blair's Sedgefield speech.  
 
As was argued in the previous chapter (section 4.3.4) Tony Blair’s speech in Sedgefield was 
significantly different from his speeches from before the start of the Iraq war. Things had 
changed: Iraq was in turmoil even though the Americans had declared victory as early as May 
2003, largely due to terrorism inside Iraq. Meanwhile, Britain had just witnessed a highly 
public inquiry into intelligence reports prior to the decision to participate in military 
operations in Iraq was made. Subsequently, the media, at least parts of it, had started to 
question the integrity of the PM. The Sedgefield speech was according to the Times the “most 
important since he sought the support of MPs going to war a year ago”, and evidence that Iraq 
remains the “central issue in British politics” (06.03.04).  
 
One of the most important features recognised in the Sedgefield speech (see section 4.3.4) 
was the re-emphasis on a discourse of globalisation and the continuing importance of a strong 
international community. This viewpoint also reflected the newspaper coverage. For instance:  
 
… [Blair] has sensibly chosen  … to try to set his government’s foreign policy within 
a newly defined world order … The threat of terrorism, he argued, requires the 
international community to be able to use pre-emptive force. Again, we support this 
view … his call for a new world compact based on shared international beliefs and 
interests is a vision that supporters and critics alike should support (Observer, 
07.03.04).  
 
The Observer is here fully supportive of the rationale behind Blair’s ‘doctrine of international 
community’ which was so important back in 1999, and less so in the pre-war discourse. It is 
interesting that the discourse of a ‘new world’ and the responsibilities of the international 
community were surprisingly absent from the last week of the Iraq debate but seem to 
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resurface again a year after the war started. Here, however, the notion of a ‘common identity’ 
is emphasised by the idea of a ‘new world compact’ based on ‘shared international beliefs and 
interests’. It is indeed a ‘vision’ of how the world community should function.  
 
The renewed interest in the responsibilities of the international community goes hand in hand 
with the issue of domestic security concerns, or more accurately, the ‘threat’ of terrorism. The 
best example is provided in pro-Blair paper the Sun, who under the headline “we face mortal 
danger” states that “there are madmen who would love to blow you and your family to 
pieces” (06.03.04). This is not only an acceptance of the global discourse of Blair, but also 
plays on central features in the security discourse. Interventionism and the security discourse 
seem to be the most significant point of discussion again. As the Times remarks, the central 
argument in Sedgefield was “less to do with the justification of going to war – where he put 
many of the recent controversies into their proper perspective – than in explaining the gravity 
of their general threat from terrorist groups” (06.03.04).  
 
The emphasis on the threat of terrorism and a security discourse is crucial in Blair’s speech 
for one reason: the attempt to turn the debate away from the morality discourse that was so 
important in the lead-up to the war (see chapter 4, section 4.3.4). It seems to work with the 
Observer (emphasising the broader debate of a “new world compact”), and the Sun 
(emphasising the domestic ‘threat’ of terrorism). This emphasis arguably takes the spotlight 
off one of the most important features of both Blair and the pro-war papers’ pre-war 
discourse, namely the moral justification of going to war. But why was the turn away from a 
moral discourse so important? For one, the Iraq war was not going as smoothly as had been 
hoped. The rising Iraqi insurgency meant that coalition forces were still very much in a war 
where soldiers were being lost. Thus, talk of doing ‘the right thing’, bringing ‘democracy’ and 
‘freedom’ was quite inappropriate. More significantly, Blair needed to distance himself from 
exactly the idea that Iraq was the right thing to do, an idea he had no doubt embraced before 
the war.  
 
While several papers allowed Blair a reframing of the debate, the Independent provides an 
exception, headlining their leading article on the 6th of March with “Mr Blair is wrong: the 
Iraq war was a matter of judgement and trust”:  
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The real issue, Mr Blair says is ‘not a matter of trust but of judgement’. No, Mr Blair, 
it is both. By taking this country to war without a demonstrably imminent threat, you 
betrayed the trust of millions of voters. As for your judgement, we may understand a 
little better why you acted as you did, but we beg most profoundly to differ 
(Independent, 06.03.04).  
 
Indeed, the Independent emphasises the paradoxical element of Blair’s attempt to turn the 
debate into ‘a matter of judgement not trust’. ‘Trust’ was clearly an integral part of Blair’s 
campaign to go to war in Iraq; he was a trustworthy leader and a man of strong conviction and 
strong moral values. A year later, scarred by the events surrounding the Iraq war, people were 
beginning to question this picture of Blair, which is also seen in Blair’s own emphasis on the 
war as a matter of ‘judgement’ and not ‘trust’. In this respect, the Independent’s point is one 
of few attempts to dissect what arguably is an important rhetorical move from Blair; 
attempting to remove the debate from Iraq and a moral justification (and a personal conviction 
frame) to a debate on terrorism and the threats that face Britain.  
 
The framing of the discussion on security issues is seen in several papers. The Times’ Peter 
Riddell states that, “the continuing debate about why we went to war has distracted the 
attention from these broader security dangers”, arguing that the failure to find physical 
evidence of WMD “in no way undermines the reality of the threat” (06.03.04); The Guardian, 
although they condemn the Iraq war, agrees that ‘Islamic fanatics’ constitute the “gravest of 
all threats to global security” (06.03.04); the Daily Telegraph states that “[Blair] was quite 
right to say that the philosophy of [the Westphalia treaty] – don’t mess with a country until it 
messes with you – no longer applies in the age of international terrorism” (06.03.04); while 
the Sun claims that “all the legal nit-picking by the Left totally misses the point. What 
mattered was that Saddam Hussein was an unstable lunatic intent on building a deadly arsenal 
to threaten the West” (06.03.04).  
 
The Sun’s appraisal of Blair’s discourse is the extreme example. Most other papers are less 
convinced of Blair’s justification. For instance:  
 
[A] glaring flaw in his argument was the mis-match between the threat from new 
forms of terrorism and the action taken. The question, since the summer of 2002, has 
been: why Iraq? Mr Blair came no closer to answering it… (Independent on Sunday, 
07.03.04).  
 
Much of Mr Blair’s speech was right. We are in danger from rogue states, religious 
fundamentalists and weapons of mass destruction … All the more tragic then that Mr 
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Blair is bogged down in the aftermath of the war in Iraq, a country that was certainly 
run by a monstrous dictator, but one in which there is no evidence of weapons of mass 
destruction or that it had ever been a haven for Al-Qaida… (Sunday Mirror, 07.03.04).  
 
Blair is also attacked for his association between September 11 and Iraq:  
 
Mr Blair is far too willing to use the horror of September 11 2001 as a substitute for 
argument. There simply was no connection between that attack and Iraq, though you 
may think so from Mr Blair’s words (Mail on Sunday, 07.03.04).  
 
Mr Blair draws a direct line from 11 September to Saddam Hussein which we simply 
cannot accept. All attempts by the US administration to connect the perpetrators of 
these atrocities with Iraq have come to nothing (Independent, 06.03.04).  
 
The examples shown above highlight the rise of a more prominent critical awareness with the 
newspapers. At the same time, it reaffirms the framing of the Iraq debate onto a security 
domain. In turn, this helps in taking some of the focus off Blair’s most pressing political 
challenge with regard to Iraq, his own trustworthiness. A debate on the security concerns, the 
‘new’ challenges of the ‘new world’, and the continued work to prevent ‘dangerous’ nations 
from obtaining ‘weapons of mass destruction’, allows Blair the possibility to rid himself of a 
morality discourse which he would struggle to gain support for. In other words, newspapers, 
while apparently more critical of Blair’s discourse, still seem to be governed by an agenda set 
by Blair’s discourse, although some newspapers discuss the very observation itself. The 
Independent again provides a notable exception, pointing out that “for months, the war debate 
has focused on whether Mr Blair acted dishonestly. He wants the questions raging about the 
war to relate to his judgement” (06.03.04).  
 
For Blair, the framing of the debate on to a security domain also allows him more manoeuvre 
with regards to a personal conviction rhetoric. As was argued in the previous chapter (section 
4.3.4), while Blair on the one hand distanced his own person from the proceedings within a 
morality aspect, he still makes use of a trademark personal involvement into his speeches. 
This is also reflected in the newspapers, who are clearly interested in Blair, the person. The 
Sun call the Sedgefield speech a “spirited defence”; the Guardian calls it “thoughtful” and 
“coherent”; the Daily Telegraph calls it an “eloquent case for going to war”; while  the 
Sunday Mirror argues that “Tony Blair is clearly sincere…”. Others are less convinced. Peter 
Riddell in the Times claims that “the defence is reasonable, but only to a point”, while the 
Express is more vigorous:  
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… a real arrogance seems to be emerging. Mr Blair has told us, in effect, that because 
he is Prime Minister, we must do as he says. This does not inspire confidence … 
Within two years, come the election, the people of this country will have the chance to 
reply to Mr Blair’s little homily. If he carries on like this, it might be a reply he has no 
desire at all to hear (Express, 06.03.04).  
 
The Express correspondent Robert Kilroy-Silk follows this up by asking “what is the matter 
with the Prime Minister? Why does he not trust us?” (07.03.04), referring to Blair’s refusal to 
publish the General Attorney’s controversial opinions on the legality of the war. The 
examples from the Express do not reflect well on the Prime Minister and his own personal 
conviction of going to war, bringing up the issue of ‘trust’, which Blair tries to avoid. The 
other examples show that Blair still is widely considered to be genuine in his beliefs.  
 
At the time of Sedgefield, it was not so important whether Tony Blair was right on Iraq; he 
desperately needed to be seen as trustworthy. In this respect, it was only his most vehement 
critics, such as the Express, who created the real threat to his leadership. Most other papers 
accepted a reframe of the debate onto a security domain. On the one hand, this was a positive 
refocus in relation to the debate on the issue of Iraq. On the other, it in many ways let Blair 
off the hook. In essence, the reframe to a security discourse was Blair’s chance to sound 
reasonable and trustworthy again. Indeed, in the response of the speech, the newspapers 
almost exclusively praised Blair for a reasonable and considerate argument. This reflection is 
likely to be grounded in Blair’s turn to a discourse more reminiscent of the pre-11 September 
discourse of a wider ‘international doctrine’ (as shown in Blair’s 1999 speech, Chapter 4, 
section 4.2).  
 
To sum up, the examples of the newspaper discourse show two things: One, that Blair was 
pressured by the events of an Iraqi war he was finding it harder and harder to justify. 
Consequently he had to turn the debate away from a personal conviction to a wider security 
discourse. Second, that within the security discourse Blair was again able to project himself as 
accountable and trustworthy; a process that was crucial to his reign as PM in the aftermath of 
the Hutton inquiry and the allegations of false intelligence reports.  
 
At the same time the newspapers are also more critical of Blair and the decision to go to war. 
Several papers openly criticise the Prime Minister for being dishonest and deceptive with 
 101 
regard to the war in Iraq. Thus, an assumption that the Iraq war changed the role of political 
discourse due to public and media distaste for government ‘spin’ is only partly right. The Iraq 
war may have changed how the discourse was constructed, but it did not change its important 




























Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
I have tried to show three things in the present thesis. Firstly, it was suggested that Blair’s 
discourse served an ideological purpose to justify and legitimise war in Iraq. I have proposed 
that Blair did this through the creation of both a moral and political justification. It was built 
on an idea that Britain not only needed to act, but also was right to act. The justification was 
thus partly constructed on a security discourse where it was argued that Britain needed to act 
out of self-defence in line with the wider political ideology of interventionism, and partly 
constructed on a moral duty to share responsibilities in an increasingly global world where 
engagement is crucial. In both cases, the legitimisation lies in the worldview of Blair: the 
world requires a different approach. In turn this is based on a view of a ‘new world’, or as the 
former Prime Minister stated in his address to the nation; “the threat to Britain today is not 
that of my father’s generation” (TB-20.03.03).  
 
The second claim was that the media played a crucial role in aiding Blair in achieving the 
legitimisation and justification he needed for going to war. In essence, the media played a 
mediating role between the government and the public by largely accepting the Blair 
discourse and the agenda it set. Several examples support the argument. For instance, the 
newspapers largely maintain an ‘us’ vs. ‘them bifurcation and an over-lexicalisation of ‘their’ 
properties; the threats of globalisation and a self-defence scenario of interventionism is 
largely accepted; and the ‘friends and enemies’ roadmap drawn by Blair is adopted (e.g. 
French hostility). Perhaps most importantly, however, the newspapers accept and mediate the 
personal conviction rhetoric emphasised by Blair. Thus, the focus is largely on Blair as a 
person and politician, rather than on the matter of Iraq itself.  
 
In many ways, Blair was not looking for overwhelming support for his actions, but rather 
mere acceptance. This may in turn explain why the moral framing seemed to be so successful, 
playing an important role in the rapid shift in public opinion in favour of going to war. Indeed, 
as was shown in Chapter 5, the personal conviction of Blair became a highly significant topic 
in the last week of the Iraq debate, with every newspaper, for or against war, emphasising 
their faith in the integrity and honesty of the Labour-leader. Accordingly, the emphasis of 
newspaper articles and opinion pieces related to the House of Commons debate on March the 
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18th was rather on the power struggle between Blair and his party associates, not on the actual 
debate issue.  
 
This is, however, not to say that every word, every description, or every discursive turn, that 
turns up in both the political discourse and, then, in the newspaper reports, necessarily 
suggests any link or serves any rhetorical purpose. As was also discussed in relation to the 
metaphors found in the newspaper material (section 5.1.6), the existence of a shared political 
discourse of both media and politicians/government or similar must be taken into account. It 
is important to pose the question of whether this shared discourse, of both metaphors and 
lexicalisation in general, is so conventionalised that it is in effect idiomatic. Does it then serve 
any ideological purpose?  
 
Nevertheless, Blair’s ability to set the news agenda, both through lexicalisation and discourse 
themes, is obvious.  Moreover, it is evidence that supports the hypothesis that the media 
played a crucial role in aiding Blair in a legitimisation of war. The process is by no means 
straightforward. As was briefly discussed in Chapter 3, the media is arguably as influential in 
setting political agenda as vice versa. Thus, the mediation between politicians (e.g. 
government) and media is a complex process which takes into account bilateral political and 
institutionalised pressures and discourses. But in the case of the Iraq war there is significant 
evidence which suggests that Blair and his Cabinet have, largely through language, been able 
to shape the news agenda and the framing of the Iraq debate.  
 
So what about a year after the war? What had changed? The third claim was that the events 
after the war, the controversy that surrounded the alleged ‘dodgy’ intelligence reports and 
Blair’s rapid decline in personal approval ratings, resulted in scepticism and disapproval of 
what was called ‘media-spin’. Firstly, as was shown in both the analysis of Blair’s Sedgefield 
speech and the subsequent newspaper reports, there were clear indications of a changing 
discourse. In the case of Blair this was most significantly seen in the absence, or at least 
reduction, of a moral discourse and the attempt to play down the personal conviction rhetoric. 
At the same time, several newspapers were openly critical of Blair, and what they regarded as 
a ‘deception’ of the public.  
 
Still, Blair’s reframing of the debate away from a morality discourse back to a security 
discourse and globalisation discourse seemed to strike a chord with the papers. Indeed, Blair 
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is by most papers applauded for his ability to see the wider picture and trying to frame a 
considered and thoughtful approach toward the challenges in the international ‘community’. 
As was suggested in Chapter 5, it is within this wider picture that Blair has the ability to 
regain his trustworthiness and accountability. An hypothesis claiming that the Iraq war made 
the media more sceptical and vary of what is often described as government ‘spin’ is thus 
only partly right when one considers the newspaper reports of Blair’s Sedgefield speech a 
year after war broke out. 
 
The most obvious critique of the media discourse must relate to the ease in which Blair and 
the Labour government were able to frame the news debate. In the week around the start of 
the war this was manifested in the turn away from a security discourse onto a moral discourse. 
In respect to the Sedgefield speech, it is manifested in the turn away from the moral discourse 
back onto the security discourse. These discursive turns are inextricably linked to linguistic 
features. As I have shown in the thesis, the different discourses reflect different ideological 
frames; for instance, a security discourse makes use of one set of metaphors, while a moral 
discourse makes use of a different set. Accordingly, the language of the different discourses 
shape different opinions.  
 
Looking back on the events of the Iraq war and the remarkable build-up that took place in the 
early months of 2003, it inevitability invites a sense of what was then. The political context 
that led to the war is remarkable; the post-11 September trauma, the ‘war on terrorism’, the 
threat of terrorist acts, the ‘axis of evil’, the ‘weapons of mass destruction’ all contributed to a 
world community that was shaken beyond recognition. Certainly, language became 
immensely important in the build-up to the war. The effort put into creating a discourse that 
would legitimise a decision to go to war is as remarkable as the context upon which it was 
constructed. The events of the war combined with the political fall-out of the Hutton inquiry 
did, however, leave the public feeling that they were given ‘deceiving’ information with 
regards to the Iraq war.   
 
Blair felt this distrust of government communication in his approval ratings. In fact, he had 
never been as unpopular as he was in the year after the start of the Iraq war. His resurrection 
had to be based on regaining the distrust of the people. His main tool: recreating a discourse 
that would allow him to again be seen as a leader of conviction and integrity. While the Iraq 
war may to some extent have changed media and public opinion in relation to the British 
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government, it would by no means change Blair and New Labour’s reliance on political 
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